Pierce v. Blalack, 06-17-00013-CV

• Decision Date: 29 September 2017
• Docket Number: No. 06-17-00013-CV,06-17-00013-CV
• Citation: 535 S.W.3d 35
• Parties: Felicia PIERCE, Appellant v. Debbie BLALACK, et al., Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

535 S.W.3d 35

Felicia PIERCE, Appellant

v.Debbie BLALACK, et al., Appellees

No. 06-17-00013-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: September 14, 2017

Date Decided: September 29, 2017

Felicia Pierce, Pro Se, 9764 Water Tree Dr., McKinney, TX 75070, for Appellant.

G. Edward Fowler, Jr., Lead Counsel, James H. Cheatham IV, Law, Snakard & Gambill, 4055 International Plaza, Ste. 650, Fort Worth, TX 76109, Jonathan J. Cunningham, Lead Counsel, Jude Barreneche, Fidelity National Law Group, 5151 Belt Line Rd., Ste. 410, Dallas, TX 75254, Gregory T. Brewer, Fidelity National Title Group, 5151 Belt Line Rd., Ste. 410, Dallas, TX 75254, J. Don Westbrook, Coghlan Crowson, LLP P.O. Box 2665, Longview, TX 75606, Charles W. Gameros, Jr., Hoge & Gameros, LLP, 6116 N. Central Expressway, Ste. 1400, Dallas, TX 75206, Arthur F. Selander, Rachel L. Hytken, Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, PC, 2001 Bryan St., Ste. 1800, Dallas, TX 75201–3070, Julie Wright, Steven M. Mason, Flowers Davis, PLLC, 1021 Ese 323 Loop, Ste. 200, Tyler, TX 75701, John T. Richer, Lead Counsel, Tami Hines, Hall, Estill, et al., 100 N. Broadway Ave., Ste. 2900, Oklahoma City, OK, 73102, M. Keith Dollahite, M.Keith Dollahite, PC, 5457 Donnybrook Ave., Tyler, TX 75703, Andrea L. Fair, Ward, Smith & Hill, PLLC, P.O. Box 1231, Longview, TX 75606, Bobby Lamb, Gillam & Smith, LLP, 303 S. Washington Ave., Marshall, TX 75670, Christopher Hogan, Reynolds Frizzell LLP, 1100 Louisiana St., Ste. 3500, Houston, TX 77002–5212, Chris B. Dove, Jonathan Pelayo, Locke Lord, LLP, 2800 JP Morgan Chase Tower, 600 Travis St., Houston, TX 77002, for Appellees

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Moseley

Felicia Pierce's trespass to try title suit against Debbie Blalack, et al.,¹ was dismissed with prejudice for her failure to comply with court orders requiring her to amend her pleadings to join necessary parties. On appeal from this dismissal, Pierce argues (1) that the trial court² erred in concluding that parties who were not joined were necessary parties under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a), (2) that a trespass to try title suit is not subject to a dismissal under Rule 39, (3) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to sever her claims against the unserved parties (an action which she maintains would have allowed her to proceed against the parties already joined in the lawsuit), and (4) that dismissal with prejudice was not warranted.³

We conclude that Rule 39 applies to the claims raised by Pierce. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) in determining that Pierce had failed to join necessary parties under Rule 39(a), (2) in dismissing the case with prejudice under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or (3) in denying Pierce's motion for severance. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

This dispute involves a 366.7-acre piece of property located in the P.W. Warraner Survey in Gregg County, Texas,⁴ that in 1870, had belonged to James R. Oliver, who bequeathed it to his wife, Lettuce Beall Oliver, and daughter, Emily Oliver. Following Lettuce's death, in 1917, Annie Hart, who represented herself to be the sole surviving heir of Lettuce and Emily, purported to convey fee simple title to the property to A.A. King. In 1921, a judgment was entered in favor of King, which granted him possession to the land against Annie Hart. In 1931, King further filed an affidavit wherein he claimed himself to have been in adverse possession of the property from 1918 to the date of the affidavit. Documents to which Pierce made reference in her petition indicated that King severed the mineral estate from the surface estate and executed various deeds and leases to several oil and gas companies.

Believing (1) that Hart was not the sole heir of Lettuce and Emily, (2) that she owned the property in fee simple as an heir of Lettuce and Emily, and (3) that King had improperly acquired the property through adverse possession, Pierce, proceeding pro se, filed suit on September 10, 2015, against a sole defendant, Lottie Guttry, King's alleged heir. Among other things, Pierce's trespass to try title suit sought (a) to quiet title in her name, (b) to set aside and declare conveyances to and by King void, and (c) an injunction preventing unnamed persons and entities from receiving oil and gas royalties. The petition attached deeds, leases,⁵ and other documentation as exhibits in an effort to demonstrate that many other unnamed persons and entities had an interest in both the mineral and surface estate.

On October 15, 2015, Guttry filed a plea in abatement and argued that Pierce had to serve other parties who might have an interest in the property because she sought a declaration that she was its sole owner. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that Guttry⁶ had no interest in the property and instructed Pierce to amend her petition to include all necessary persons and entities who would be adversely affected by a determination of title. Pierce's second amended petition, however, did not accomplish this task.

On November 12, 2015, the trial court abated the case again, giving Pierce ninety days to join additional parties to the lawsuit. The trial court specifically found that all persons currently claiming an interest under the various conveyances attached to Pierce's petition would be adversely affected by a judgment in Pierce's favor and, thus, were necessary parties under Rule 39(a). The trial court further explained that Lettuce and Emily had heirs other than Pierce, that a judgment in Pierce's favor would result in her being entitled to only a then-unspecified fractional undivided interest in the lands and that the other heirs of Lettuce and Emily were required to be joined as plaintiffs.

Pierce's third through eighth amended petitions failed to name all parties that would have an interest under the various conveyances attached to her original petition, and the petitions contained only the following named defendants: Debbie Blalack, Andrew Riley, East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., Bruce A. Boyles, Sr., James C. Pee, Ricky Davis, Citi Financial, and Breitburn Operating, LP. Several of these defendants also filed motions to dismiss the case under Rule 39 or, alternatively, motions to abate the case so that additional parties could be named. As a result of these motions, on March 4, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the status of the parties. During that hearing, it was established that Pierce had only added seven defendants, all of whom were surface owners of parts of the estate, but she had not yet added any owners of the mineral estate as parties. At that hearing, Pierce asked the trial court to sever the case against the surface owners from her claims against the mineral owners. Although the trial court denied her request for a severance, it gave Pierce an additional ninety days to add necessary parties.

When Pierce filed her tenth amended petition, on May 3, 2016, she included 117 parties as defendants and moved to serve them by publication, without first stating that she had attempted to serve them by any means. Her twelfth amended petition listed a total of 172 defendants. It also listed 22 other heirs as "involuntary plaintiffs" and alleged that each of those she named in that capacity held a 4.35 percent interest in the property.⁷ These heirs were neither sued nor served and did not otherwise appear.

Ultimately, a September 2, 2016, hearing revealed that Pierce had only served 55 defendants.⁸ During that hearing, it was also established that, on January 6, 2016, Pierce was provided with a schedule of documents concerning title to the property to aid her in identifying parties that should have been added as defendants. That schedule of documents revealed that there were many unnamed easement holders which had not been named as parties. The trial court found that Pierce never argued that the necessary persons could not be made parties to the case. Instead, it concluded that Pierce had named some of the necessary parties but had simply failed to serve them. By letter ruling, on September 15, 2016, the trial court indicated that it intended to grant the motions to dismiss filed by several of the defendants. The letter stated, in part, that

during the hearing held on September 2, 2016, it was established that Plaintiff had been provided with the identity of entities holding approximately 104 pipeline easements on the 366.7 acres in question that would be necessary parties, and Plaintiff declined to make any effort to add any of said entities as a party to this Cause.

Pierce then filed a thirteenth (and last) amended petition, which (a) included only the 55 defendants she had served, (b) dropped the other defendants and the other 22 heirs as parties, (c) alleged three trillion dollars in damages, and, among other things, (d) prayed that title be "restored to its rightful owners, the heirs of Lettuce Beall Oliver, (Plaintiff), in fee simple," and that the named defendants be ordered to cease drilling efforts on the property.

On October 13, 2016, the trial court entered final judgment dismissing Pierce's claims with prejudice to refiling those claims. Pierce appeals.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Determining It Was Necessary for Pierce to Join Absent Parties

Rule 39(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of

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