Pierce v. Carpentier
| Decision Date | 31 October 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 35893,35893 |
| Citation | 169 N.E.2d 747,20 Ill.2d 526 |
| Parties | Clarence A. PIERCE, Appellee, v. Charles F. CARPENTIER, Secretary of State, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William L. Guild, Atty. Gen. , for appellants.
John T. Beynon, Rockford, for appellee.
Defendants, the Secretary of State and the chief clerk in the Driver's License Division, prosecute this direct appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Winnebago County which, by indirection at least, found sections 6-204(b), 6-206(a)2 and 6-209 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law to be unconstitutional, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1959, chap. 95 1/2, pars. 6-204(b), 6-206(a)2 and 6-209,) enjoined defendants from causing the surrender of plaintiff's driver's license, or his arrest, and ordered that a notice suspending plaintiff's license be revoked, recalled and annulled. The cause was determined below on the pleadings, a factor which is determinative on this appeal.
Plaintiff, Clarence A. Pierce, filed his complaint in February, 1960, alleging that he had previously been issued a driver's license which was to expire on March 24, 1962, that he had operated a vehicle under such license in order to earn money for the support of his family, and that, on February 15, 1960, the Secretary of State had issued a notice of the suspension of such license. The notice, which was set out verbatim in the complaint, advised plaintiff his license had been suspended for a period of two months 'based upon reports of your conviction of not less than three offenses within 12 months against traffic regulations governing the movements of motor vehicles.' The notice further advised that the license would have to be surrendered immediately, that operation of a vehicle by plaintiff after the receipt of the notice was a violation of the law, that he was entitled to a hearing after his license had been suspended and a request for hearing made, and that, unless otherwise ineligible, his license would be returned at the end of the suspension period.
Continuing, the complaint alleged that the license suspension would cause plaintiff irreparable damage for which there was no adequate remedy at law, denied that plaintiff had been convicted of three traffic offenses within twelve months, and alleged the following: 'That, as a result of said suspension, the civil and/or property rights of the said plaintiff herein have been invaded under color of an unconstitutional statute, namely, Section 6- 206A2 (sic); Section 6-209; and Section 6-204-4(b) (sic) of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law.' Thereafter, the complaint prayed that defendants be enjoined from causing the surrender of plaintiff's license, that they be enjoined from following any of the surrender procedures in the sections of the Motor Vehicle Act pleaded, and that the notice of suspension received by plaintiff be revoked.
Defendants responded to the complaint by filing a 'Motion to Strike or in the Alternative to Transfer to a Proper Venue,' wherein it was alleged: (1) that subsection (e) of section 2-117 of the Motor Vehicle Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, par. 2-117(e),) provides that the action of the Secretary of State in suspending, revoking or denying any license, registration or permit is subject to judicial review, under the Administrative Review Act, either in the circuit court of Sangamon County or in the circuit or superior court of Cook County; (2) that section 2-117(a) of the act specifically provides for a hearing by the Secretary of State in the event of the vacation or suspension of an operator's license; (3) that the latter hearing is a condition precedent to a judicial review of the Secretary of State's decision; and (4) that the allegations of the complaint fail to raise a constitutional question. On the basis of these allegations it was prayed that the plaintiff's complaint be stricken or, in the alternative, that the cause be transferred to a proper venue.
The motion was denied with respect to each alternative and, when defendants elected to stand on such pleading, the chancellor ruled that the allegations of the complaint were to be taken as confessed by defendants and thereafter entered the decree from which this appeal is taken. Insofar as an express ruling upon the constitutionality of the statutory provisions is concerned, the decree did no more than to repeat the allegations of plaintiff's complaint that his civil and/or property rights had 'been invaded under color of an unconstitutional statute.'
When the alleged constitutional infirmity of a statute or ordinance is to be found in its terms, it is true, as plaintiff claims, that a prior application for the administrative relief provided for therein is not necessary as a condition precedent to judicial inquiry into the constitutional validity of such statute or ordinance. Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill.2d 493, 495, 150 N.E.2d 97. Thus, it follows that if the trial court in this instance was...
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Thorn v. Jefferson County
...are involved, facts relied upon to rebut the presumption of constitutionality must be specifically set forth. Pierce v. Carpentier, 20 Ill.2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747 (1960); Heyman v. Mahin, 49 Ill.2d 284, 275 N.E.2d 421 (1971). Illinois Pure Water Committee, Inc. v. Yoder, 6 Ill.App.3d 659, 28......
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Quake Const., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.
...but does not admit conclusions of law or conclusions of fact not supported by allegations of specific facts. (Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill.2d 526, 531, 169 N.E.2d 747.) Any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from such well-pleaded facts, however, must be taken as true for purpo......
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Loftus v. Mingo
... ... (Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill.2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747; Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 407, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976.) In ... ...
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Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan University
...such conclusions rest, are irrelevant and must be disregarded by the trial court in ruling on a motion to dismiss. (Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill.2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747; Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 407, 58 Ill.Dec. 725, 430 N.E.2d 976.) In order to survive a motion......