Pierce v. Dow
Decision Date | 13 November 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-3965 (FSH) |
Parties | MAURICE PIERCE, Petitioner, v. PAULA DOW, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OPINIONAPPEARANCES:
MAURICE PIERCE, Petitioner pro se
SARA BETH LIEBMAN, ESQ.
UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
Counsel for Respondents
Petitioner Maurice Pierce ("Petitioner"), a convicted state prisoner presently confined at the Northern State Prison in Trenton, New Jersey, has submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his New Jersey state court judgment of conviction entered on or about April 14, 2003. For the reasons stated herein, the Petition will be denied for lack of substantive merit.
On February 16, 2001, a Union County grand jury indicted Petitioner on the following counts: (Count One) first degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; (Count Two) third degree unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b; and (Count Three) second degree possession of a weapon, a firearm, for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. (Ra23,1 Union County Indictment No. 01-02-00198-I at Da1-Da2.) Petitioner also was charged under a separate indictment on February 16, 2001, with second degree possession of a firearm by a previously convicted person, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7. (Id., Union County Indictment No. 01-02-00199-I at Da3.)
A trial was held on the first indictment before a jury and the Honorable James C. Heimlich, J.S.C., in late October 2002. On October 30, 2002, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts under Indictment No. 01-02-00198-I. Following the jury verdict, a separate trial was commenced on October 30, 2002, before the same jury, on the second indictment, IndictmentNo. 01-02-00199-I. The jury also found Petitioner guilty on the second indictment. (Ra23 at 1.)
On April 4, 2003, Judge Heimlich conducted a sentencing hearing, granting the State's motion to sentence petitioner to a discretionary extended term sentence as a persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3a. The court sentenced Petitioner to an extended term of 40 years in prison with 16 years parole ineligibility on Count One (armed robbery) to run concurrently with a sentence Petitioner then was serving. On Count Two (unlawful possession of a firearm), Petitioner was sentenced to a four-year prison term to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Count One. On Count Three (possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose), the court imposed an eight-year prison term with a parole ineligibility term of three year to run concurrently with the sentences imposed on Counts One and Two. Finally, on the separate Indictment No. 01-02-00199-I, the court imposed a term of eight years in prison to run concurrently with the sentences imposed on the first indictment, Indictment No. 01-02-00198-I. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner thereafter filed a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence before the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division. On May 11, 2005, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. (Ra3.) Petitioner fileda petition for certification, which the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted on September 12, 2005, on the sole issue of the extended term sentence. (Ra5.) On August 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded Petitioner's extended term for resentencing. State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155 (2006).
Petitioner was resentenced on September 22, 2006, and the original terms were re-imposed. (Ra22.)
On October 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") in state court. While that state PCR petition was pending, on February 6, 2008, the Appellate Division conducted a hearing on the re-sentence and affirmed the trial court's resentence, except remanding for entry of an amended sentence merging Petitioner's conviction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose into his conviction for armed robbery and vacating the sentence on the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose conviction. (Ra6.) The Appellate Division thereafter issued an opinion affirming the resentence on February 11, 2008. (Ra7.) On April 8, 2008, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification. (Ra10.)
On August 20, 2008, Petitioner filed an amended PCR petition. After conducting a hearing on November 20, 2008, Judge Heimlich denied the petition. (Ra23 at 3.)
Petitioner then filed an appeal from denial of his PCR petition. On December 1, 2010, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. (Ra12; State v. Pierce, 2011 WL 13840 (N.J. Super. A.D. Dec. 1, 2010.) The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied certification on April 14, 2011. (Ra15.)
On June 30, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, before this Court. The State filed an answer, together with the relevant state court record, on August 8, 2012 and August 17, 2012. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) Petitioner filed his traverse or reply on September 17, 2012. (ECF No. 19.)
The facts of this case were recounted below and this Court, affording the state court's factual determinations the appropriate deference, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), will simply reproduce the recitation as set forth in the published opinion of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, decided on May 11, 2005, with respect to Petitioner's direct appeal:
Vaz gave a full description of the man to police and described the gun. Several days after the robbery, Vaz picked defendant out of a photo lineup and identified him as the man who robbed him. The weapon described by Vaz was found with defendant when he was arrested.
At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense with his sister, Phyllis Pierce, testifying that defendant was with her and their sister Shirley in Atlantic City at the time of the robbery.
Petitioner asserts the following claims in his petition for habeas relief:
Ground One: The discretionary extended term sentence violated Petitioner's constitutional right to a trial by jury.
Ground Two: Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to request a Wade2 hearing.
Ground Three: Petitioner's statement was not voluntary or knowing, and should have been suppressed, because Petitioner was under the influence of marijuana and alcohol and had physical injuries at the time of his interrogation.
Ground Four: Trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the handgun to go into the jury room without first examining it.(ECF No. 1, Petition at ¶ 12.)
The State essentially contends that the petition is without merit, or fails to raise a claim of federal constitutional dimension that would entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. The State also asserts that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies regarding Ground Four, but despite this failure to exhaust, the claim is subject to dismissal on the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 now provides, in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Parker v. Matthews, --- U.S. ----, ----, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151, 183 L.Ed.2d 32 (2012).
"Clearly established Federal law" should be determined as of the date of the relevant state court decision and is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Greene v. Fisher, ---U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 38, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). A state-court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court (1) contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or (2) confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); Jamison v. Klem, 544 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2008). The state court judgment must contradict clearly established decisions of the Supreme Court, not merely law articulated by any federal court, Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, although district and appellate federal court decisions evaluating Supreme Court precedent may amplify such precedent, Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 256 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d877, 890 (3d...
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