Pierce v. King
Decision Date | 07 March 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 5:94-CRT-523-BO.,5:94-CRT-523-BO. |
Citation | 918 F. Supp. 932 |
Parties | Ricky A. PIERCE, Plaintiff, v. Asst. Supt. KING, Sgt. Boyd, Sgt. Cheeks, Supt. Williams, Lt. Burroughs, Officer Cannie, DHO Smith, and Caseworker Jefferies, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
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Ricky A. Pierce, Maury, NC, pro se.
William Dennis Worley, N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, a state inmate serving a fourteen year sentence for armed robbery, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations while incarcerated at Tillery Correctional Center. Plaintiff has made prolific filings and motions, including numerous requests to amend the original complaint. In one such motion, plaintiff requested leave to amend the complaint in order to include an action based upon the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Although the Magistrate Judge allowed this motion within the context of a broader Memorandum and Recommendation and Order, entered February 3, 1995, this Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation but denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint on March 9, 1995. Nevertheless, plaintiff apparently filed the amended complaint, and has invoked it in seeking summary judgment. The Court must therefore address his claims under the ADA.
While confined at Tillery, plaintiff was in possession of two mattresses and two pillows. On March 22, 1994, defendant Cheek requested the return of the additional mattress, but did not confiscate the mattress upon confirming plaintiff's claim that the medical personnel had authorized his possession of the second pillow and mattress. Plaintiff filed a grievance as a result of this event.
On April 5, 1994, due to a shortage of mattresses, the bunks were inspected for double mattresses by defendant Correctional Sergeant Boyd. Boyd compiled a list of all bunks with double mattresses, which was compared to a list from the medical unit noting all inmates authorized to have two mattresses. As plaintiff's name was erroneously missing from the medical unit's list, Boyd ordered plaintiff to return one of his mattresses. Plaintiff returned the mattress, and with its return, proffered the medical slip prescribing the mattress. After confirming the additional mattress had been medically authorized — a process which took approximately ten minutes — the second mattress was returned to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an additional grievance as a result of this event.
In the late evening of April 27, 1994, plaintiff requested transportation to the emergency room after his finger began to swell. The medical staff was gone for the day, the condition was assessed as a non-emergency situation, and the request was denied. Plaintiff was given Motrin and Tylenol. The following morning, plaintiff's finger was examined and treated by a doctor, who concluded the injury was probably self-inflicted. Plaintiff failed to return for a follow up visit scheduled three days later.
On May 8, 1994, plaintiff was ordered into the day television room for a head count. Plaintiff would not respond to the order and was cited for a disciplinary infraction. Although plaintiff was found guilty at his disciplinary hearing, the violation was expunged from his record due to a technicality.
From the facts outlined above, plaintiff alleges he suffered constitutional violations arising out of medical malfeasance, reverse discrimination, harassment and retaliation for filing grievances and exercising his right of access to the courts. Plaintiff further claims that fellow inmates are granted work assignments at the Governor's Mansion, for which they earn good time credit against the length of their sentence. Plaintiff complains, however, that his disabilities prevent him from participating in this program, and that the prison has violated the ADA by refusing to make unspecified accommodations that would permit him to work at the Governor's Mansion. Plaintiff also maintains that this amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, since it results in his being deprived of good time credit on the basis of his disability.
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Summary judgment shall be granted when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). The party bearing the burden of proof on an issue at trial must "designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citation omitted). Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Whether prisoners are entitled to sue their jailers under the Americans with Disabilities Act is apparently a novel question in this jurisdiction. Although it has not squarely confronted the issue, the Fourth Circuit has recently considered the matter and expressed profound skepticism regarding this proposed radical application of federal workplace discrimination law. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 772, 133 L.Ed.2d 724 (1996); see also Haston v. Tatham, 842 F.Supp. 483, 487 (D.Utah 1994) (). At least one district court of this circuit has followed Torcasio's suggestion and summarily held that the ADA is not applicable to state prisons. Staples v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 904 F.Supp. 487 (E.D.Va.1995). Addressing many of the same issues raised by this proposal, the Fourth Circuit declined to extend application of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., to prisons. Harker v. State Use Industries, 990 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 238, 126 L.Ed.2d 192 (1993).
In Torcasio, the Fourth Circuit held that application of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., to state prisons would so impact normal federal-state relations that the acts could not be applied to state prisons absent unambiguous Congressional direction to that effect. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1346.
There can be little question that application of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would have serious implications for the management of state prisons, in matters ranging from cell construction and modification, to inmate assignment, to scheduling, to security procedures. That the acts threaten to intrude so significantly upon the management of state prisons was fully recognized by the Ninth Circuit, which observed ... that
Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1346 (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit also found that the courts have not authoritatively ruled on the question of the ADA's applicability to state prisons, and that federal regulations do not necessarily anticipate such decisions.
The Torcasio decision, however, addressed the question of the ADA's applicability to state prisons only in the context of whether state officials could claim qualified immunity from suit under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act on the grounds that they should not have expected the acts would be applied to a prisoner's request for cell accommodations. See Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1347 (). The court specifically declined to reach the question of whether state prisoners have standing under the ADA. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1343 n. 3. In the instant case, the Court must directly confront this question. Upon careful analysis and review, the Court holds that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not create a cause of action for state inmates displeased with their prison work assignments.
The federal government does not possess a general rule-making authority; it is permitted only those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution. United States v. Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1633, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). Lopez, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1626, quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const., amend. X. If a federal statute — here the ADA — is to govern the terms and conditions of labor assigned to state prisoners as an element of their confinement, it must find some authority in the Constitution whereby the states have explicitly ceded sovereignty over such affairs to the national government.
The ADA was passed pursuant to Congressional authority to regulate commerce, U.S. Const., art....
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