Pierce v. Mo-Kan Sheet Metal Workers Welfare Fund
Decision Date | 10 November 2020 |
Docket Number | WD 83234,C/w WD 83259 |
Parties | Mary PIERCE, Respondent-Appellant, v. MO-KAN SHEET METAL WORKERS WELFARE FUND, Appellant-Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel O. Herrington, Garrett W. Hunkins, Marsha R. Woodward and Brian H. Dunn, KCMO for Appellant-Respondent.
Stephen G. Sanders, KCMO for respondent-appellant.
Before Division Two: Lisa White Hardwick, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton and Karen King Mitchell, Judges
Mo-Kan, an ERISA benefit plan administrator, appeals from the circuit court's judgment declaring that Mo-Kan has no right to reimbursement from the civil judgment of a beneficiary, Mary Pierce. Mo-Kan contends that the court erroneously applied the law by declaring that Mo-Kan's Summary Plan Description was not an enforceable Plan Document and that Missouri law applied over federal law. Pierce cross-appeals, contending that the court abused its discretion in declining to impose civil penalties and attorney's fees against Mo-Kan under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) and (g)(1), and 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1. For reasons explained herein, we reverse and remand, in part, and affirm, in part.
Pierce was involved in an automobile accident on March 13, 2016. A passenger in the other vehicle died as a result of the accident. On September 13, 2017, the parents of the deceased initiated a wrongful death suit against Pierce and the Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission ("MHTC"). Pierce filed a crossclaim against the MHTC for personal injuries sustained in the accident.
Pierce is a beneficiary of Mo-Kan's ERISA benefit plan. Since the automobile accident, Mo-Kan has paid approximately $105,000 in medical benefits on Pierce's behalf. On March 19, 2018, Pierce sent a letter to Mo-Kan requesting various plan administration documents. She asked again on November 29, 2018. The parties corresponded, but Mo-Kan declined to produce any documents.
On January 23, 2019, Pierce filed a motion for an order to show cause with the circuit court. In her motion, she sought an order declaring that Mo-Kan would have no right to reimbursement from any judgment in Pierce's favor on her crossclaim against the MHTC. Pierce also sought an order for Mo-Kan to produce the documents requested and to impose civil penalties and attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), § 1132(g)(1), and 29 C.F.R. § 2575.502c-1. The court granted the show cause order and set the case for hearing.
The court heard arguments on April 23, June 3, and September 16, 2019. On November 12, 2019, the court issued an order declaring that Mo-Kan had no subrogation claim. It further ordered Mo-Kan to produce some, but not all, of the documents requested. The court did not require Mo-Kan to pay penalties or attorney's fees. Mo-Kan filed this appeal, and Pierce subsequently cross-appealed.
"The judgment of the trial court in a court-tried civil case will be sustained ‘unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Swallow Tail, LLC v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation , 522 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Mo. App. 2017) (quoting Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) ). "A claim that the judgment erroneously declares or applies the law ... involves review of the propriety of the trial court's construction and application of the law." Pearson v. Koster , 367 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Mo. banc 2012). "This Court applies de novo review to questions of law decided in court-tried cases." Id.
In its sole point, Mo-Kan contends that the court erred in finding that it had no subrogation claim. The court based its decision on two grounds: (1) the subrogation provision in the Summary Plan Description was not an enforceable term in a Plan Document, and (2) Missouri law applied to bar any subrogation claim. In addition to the two grounds upon which the court's decision was based, Pierce argues that the Summary Plan Description does not meet the statutory requirements for a Plan Document under 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b). Pierce also contends that subrogation would violate the plan's anti-inurement provision and would breach Mo-Kan's fiduciary duty to her.
Typically, an ERISA benefit plan consists of both a Plan Document, which contains the enforceable terms of the plan, and a Summary Plan Description, which explains the plan's terms. See Cigna Corp. v. Amara , 563 U.S. 421, 438, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Terms in a Summary Plan Description, but not a Plan Document, are normally unenforceable. Id. The dispute before us arises from language contained in a document labeled as the Summary Plan Description. This language allows Mo-Kan to seek reimbursement, by way of subrogating to the rights of a judgment holder, for prior medical expenses paid:
(Emphasis added). The parties agree that Mo-Kan's plan does not include a formal Plan Document that exists separate from the Summary Plan Description. Rather, the Summary Plan Description purports to also function as the Plan Document:
This booklet provides a general description, written in non-technical language, of the import provisions of this Plan as expressed in the insurance contracts and administrative rules and regulation of this Plan. However, this is not just a summary of the Plan, but the actual Plan document written so that it can be used by Participants and the Trustees in administering the Plan. All provisions for any insured benefits are subject to the terms and conditions of the group of policies issued by the Company.
(Emphasis added.)
Nevertheless, the circuit court relied on Amara to find that Mo-Kan's Summary Plan Description was not a Plan Document. The United States Supreme Court held in Amara that terms located in a Summary Plan Description, but not in the separate Plan Document, were not enforceable. Id. In doing so, the Court emphasized that a Summary Plan Description is not a Plan Document. Id. Finding that Amara applied to the Summary Plan Description, the court in this case determined that Mo-Kan may not enforce the subrogation provisions therein.
Mo-Kan contends that Amara is distinguishable from the case before us, and, therefore, does not apply. We agree. Amara involved two separate documents—a Summary Plan Description and a Plan Document. It follows that if a Plan Document exists separate from the Summary Plan Description, then the Summary Plan Description cannot physically be the Plan Document. Here, however, we have a single, joint document to consider.
The Eighth Circuit has recently affirmed these all-in-one Plan Documents notwithstanding Amara . See MBI Energy Servs. v. Hoch , 929 F.3d 506, 510-11 (8th Cir. 2019). The court in Hoch held that a reimbursement provision in a similar all-in-one document was an enforceable term of the Plan Document itself. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit...
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