Pierce v. Riley

• Decision Date: 01 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 14249,3
• Citation: 51 Mich.App. 504,215 N.W.2d 759
• Parties: Don PIERCE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stanley D. RILEY et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 759

215 N.W.2d 759

51 Mich.App. 504

Don PIERCE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Stanley D. RILEY et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 14249.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

March 1, 1974.

Released for Publication March 19, 1974.

George R. Cook and Fred N. Searl, Vander Veen, Freihofer & Cook, Don V. Souter, Grand Rapids, for plaintiffs-appellants

Walter A. Urick, Hart, for defendants-appellees.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J. and McGREGOR and T. M. BURNS, JJ.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

T. M. BURNS, Judge.

This case, reported at 16 Mich.App. 419, 168 N.W.2d 309 (1969), and 35 Mich.App. 122, 192 N.W.2d 366 (1971), is before us for a third time. Inasmuch as the facts of the case were fully set forth and discussed in our prior opinions, we need only briefly restate them here.

The defendants, riparian owners on Stony Lake in Oceana County, constructed a large real estate development consisting of cottages and trailer sites on property they owned but which did not front on the lake. As part of their project defendants provided access to the lake for 90 nonriparian lots by digging a canal through one of their riparian lots situated between the lake and the nonriparian property.

The plaintiffs, other riparian owners on the lake, filed a complaint on August 26, 1966, in the Oceana County Circuit Court alleging Inter alia that defendants were planning to develop the subdivision as if the entire project had riparian rights on Stony Lake. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief consisted of five paragraphs only one of which is pertinent to this case and reads:

'5. That this Court enter a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties with respect to the matters involved in this action pursuant to GCR (1963) 521 and grant such further necessary and proper relief based thereon as may be required.'

After a hearing on the merits, the circuit court found for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. We remanded the case back to the circuit court for further consideration in light of Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967), which was decided after the circuit court's ruling. On reconsideration, the circuit court again found for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. We reversed the circuit court and held:

'It is the opinion of this court that the increased burden on the lake caused by the proposed real estate development is not a reasonable riparian use by the owners of lot No. 91. Applying the criteria in Thompson v. Enz, Supra, to determine the reasonableness of the use, we hold that an increase in the number of residences having access to the lake by 66%, when the number of residences which have frontage could never number more than about 153, is sufficiently injurious to riparian owners as to constitute an unreasonable use.

'Stony Lake is an extremely small lake. The proposed real estate development would overcrowed the lake for what appears to this court to be a commercial exploitation only. We see no reason to deprive the present riparian owners of the enjoyment of the lake when the only reason for increasing the burden on the lake is merely the commercial profit of the owner of one riparian lot. The benefit to the one riparian owner is not sufficient to justify the injury to the other riparian owners.' 35 Mich.App. 127--128, 192 N.W.2d 369.

To implement the judgment of this Court, plaintiffs requested the circuit court to order the channel filled. The circuit court did not do so, but rather enjoined the defendants from granting any of the nonriparian lot owners right-of-way easements over the riparian lot to the channel.

Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the order and appeal, arguing that as long as the channel remains open there will be a temptation to use it and that the circuit court's order can only be enforced through the constant vigilance of a sheriff's patrol or the other riparian owners. Defendants on the other hand assert that since the plaintiffs did not specifically request that the channel be filled in their prayer for relief, the courts are without power to order the channel filled.

The case at bar is equitable in nature; therefore, equitable principles will govern. A court in granting equitable relief is not bound by the prayer for relief, but may fashion such remedy as the circumstances warrant. Choals v. Plummer, 353 Mich. 64, 90 N.W.2d 851 (1958); Herpolsheimer v. A. B. Herpolsheimer Realty Co., 344 Mich. 657, 75 N.W.2d 333 (1956); Carlson v. Williams, 348 Mich. 165, 82 N.W.2d 483 (1957). We hold, therefore, that notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs did not specifically request that the channel be filled in their prayer for relief, the courts are not thereby foreclosed from granting such relief.

Having determined that the circuit court possessed authority to order the channel filled, we turn to the question of whether such relief should have been granted.

Although equity cases are reviewed on appeal De novo, great weight is given to the findings of the trial court, and the findings and decisions below will not be disturbed unless we are convinced we would have reached a different result had we been sitting as the trial court. Futernick v. Cutler, 356 Mich. 33, 95 N.W.2d 838 (1959); Stribley v. Michigan Marine, Inc., 42 Mich.App. 218, 201 N.W.2d 702 (1972).

The inherent difficulties in enforcing an injunction of the nature involved in the case at bar was amply illustrated in Opal Lake Association v. Michaywe , 47 Mich.App. 354, 209 N.W.2d 478 (1973) wherein the Opal Lake Association brought suit against Michaywe e, a real estate developer, to enjoin the development of a lake front club for the use of a potential 3800 lot owners. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court found that Michayw e's proposed use of the lake would violate the rights of other riparian owners by overburdening the use of the lake. An injunction issued which limited the use of the club to 120 individuals at any one time. The Opal Lake Association was given the...