Pierce v. Visteon Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 1:05–cv–01325–LJM–TAB.,1:05–cv–01325–LJM–TAB.
• Citation: 843 F.Supp.2d 936,53 Employee Benefits Cas. 1306
• Parties: Darryl PIERCE and Sharon Pierce on behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. VISTEON CORPORATION and Visteon Systems, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

843 F.Supp.2d 936

53 Employee Benefits Cas. 1306

Darryl PIERCE and Sharon Pierce on behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,

v.VISTEON CORPORATION and Visteon Systems, LLC, Defendant.

No. 1:05–cv–01325–LJM–TAB.

United States District Court,

S.D. Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

Dec. 30, 2011.

Ronald E. Weldy, Weldy & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Hannesson Ignatius Murphy, Robert Anthony Prather, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LARRY J. McKINNEY, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants', Visteon Corporation and Visteon Systems, LLC (collectively, “Visteon”) motion for partial summary judgment as to the claims of certain class members in this Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1166, notice action [dkt. no. 174]. Visteon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment with regard to many of the individuals currently within the Class because those individuals were timely sent COBRA notices upon the occurrence of a COBRA qualifying event. Additionally, Visteon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on several current Class Members who were not eligible to receive COBRA notices because they did not undergo a COBRA qualifying event. Finally, Visteon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment with regard to another group of individuals currently in the Class because those individuals executed separation and/or settlement agreements by which they released and forever discharged Visteon from any and all claims arising out of their employment or separation of their employment. Having reviewed the briefing in this matter and heard oral argument, the Court concludes for the following reasons that Visteon's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Claims of Certain Class Members is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Visteon supplies automotive systems, modules, and components to global vehicle manufactures and the automotive aftermarket. Manley Decl. at ¶ 3. In January 2000, it was incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company (“Ford”). Id. at ¶ 4. On June 29, 2000, it separated from Ford. Metzigian Dep. at 13. From June 29, 2000 until May 31, 2002, Ford acted as the benefits administrator for all Visteon employees. Dalal Decl. at ¶ 3. It was responsible for performing the day-to-day administration of benefits and payroll on behalf of Visteon, including sending information to Visteon's COBRA administrator, Unicare Life and Health Insurance Company (“Unicare”). Metzigian Dep. at 19, 22. As COBRA administrator, Unicare was responsible for providing COBRA notices to qualified beneficiaries following the occurrence of a COBRA qualifying event. Id.

Plaintiffs consist of a class of former Visteon employees and/or their beneficiaries who claim that they did not receive timely notice of their rights to purchase continuing health care coverage under COBRA. In its Order certifying the class, the Court defined the class as follows:

All Qualified Beneficiaries of group medical, dental, and/or vision benefit plans administered by Visteon Corporation and/or Visteon Systems, LLC in the United States who were entitled to be provided notice of their COBRA rights due to a qualifying event to a covered employee pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1163(a)(1), (2) and (4) and who were not provided said notice in a timely fashion pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1166 and whose claims arose within the statute of limitations applicable to the state of the facility in which the Qualified Beneficiary employed by Visteon Corporation and/or Visteon Systems LLC in the United States, worked, and whose qualifying even took place on or before September 6, 2005.

Dkt. No. 116. Following Visteon's production of information that it had collected from its COBRA administrators regarding the issuance of COBRA notices to employees upon the occurrence of qualified events, Plaintiffs selected individuals for inclusion in the class (“Class Members”) and distributed class notices to Class Members. Dkt. No. 119. The Class consists of approximately 1,600 Class Members, and includes individuals who had qualifying events while Ford was the benefits administrator for Visteon's employees. Dalal Decl. at ¶ 3.

Believing that Unicare was supposed to have distributed the COBRA notices to Visteon employees who had qualifying events between June 2000 and May 31, 2002, Visteon sought discovery from Unicare regarding the COBRA notices that it issued during that time frame. Metzigian Dep. at 118–19. Unicare provided Visteon with information that Visteon subsequently produced to Plaintiffs, but Unicare never advised Visteon that it had not distributed COBRA notices during the June 2000 to May 31, 2002 time period. Id. at 122–23. In or around early October 2008, Visteon learned that Ford was the entity that issued COBRA notices to employees with qualifying events between June 2000 and May 31, 2002. Dalal Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 6.

Specifically, whenever an employee had a qualifying event, Ford mailed the employee a postcard with their final paycheck expressly advising the employee of his or her COBRA rights. Id. at ¶ 4. The postcard gave the employee the deadline to elect COBRA coverage and informed the employee about the amount of the COBRA premium and instructed the employee to contact the COBRA coordinator for more information. Id. at ex. 1–2. It also warned the employee that it was the only notice that he or she would receive. Id. At the time that Ford mailed the COBRA postcards to Visteon employees, it made a contemporaneous entry in its computer system confirming that the employee had been sent the COBRA postcard, and also recording whether the employee had been sent a postcard relating to general medical coverage, dental coverage or both, and the type of postcard that was mailed to the employee. Id. at ¶ 5.

Additionally, fifteen Class Members executed separation and/or settlement agreements with Visteon by which they expressly agreed to release various claims relating to their employment at Visteon. Manley Decl. at ¶¶ 11–12.

II. STANDARD

As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267–68 (7th Cir.1990). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides in relevant part:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials showing that a fact either is or cannot be genuinely disputed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir.1996). It is not the duty of the Court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying applicable evidence. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir.1996).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir.1996). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505;JPM, Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment, even when in dispute. See Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir.1992). If the moving party does not have the ultimate burden of proof on a claim, it is sufficient for the moving party to direct the court to the lack of evidence as to an element of that claim. See Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1994). “If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, one on which [she] would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir.1996).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Class has stipulated to summary judgment being entered as to the following individual Class Members: Wenseslao Holguin; Alberto Delfim; Stephen De La Salle; Rodrigo Guillen; Frank Amirhamzeh; James Fazio; Ahmed Omara; Anthony Verbiscus; James J. Kelly; Paul G. Stever; Radbound Vaessen; Luis Munoz; Bibiane Comte; Daniel Gizaw; William Patton; Michael Hagemann; Luiz C. Rodrigues; Paul McNeill; Andrezj Polak; Christopher Duco; Denise James; and Ross Richardson. Accordingly, as to the above listed Class Members, the Court GRANTS Visteon's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Additionally, the Court must address Visteon's ...