Pierog v. H. F. Karl Contractors, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 62832,62832
• Citation: 351 N.E.2d 249,39 Ill.App.3d 1057
• Parties: Agnes M. PIEROG and Marian P. Pierog, Plaintiffs, v. H. F. KARL CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Defendants. H. F. KARL CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Counter-Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE et al., Counter-Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 249

351 N.E.2d 249

39 Ill.App.3d 1057

Agnes M. PIEROG and Marian P. Pierog, Plaintiffs, v. H. F. KARL CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Defendants.

H. F. KARL CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., Counter-Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF RIVERSIDE et al., Counter-Defendants, Appellees.

No. 62832.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

June 14, 1976.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1976.

Ancel, Glink, Diamond & Murphy, P.C., Chicago (Robert E. Grundin, P.C., Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Pedersen & Houpt, Chicago (David C. Newman, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

BURKE, Justice.

Counter-plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their counterclaim which sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Village of Riverside. Counter-plaintiffs alleged in their counterclaim that a provision of the Village's zoning ordinance requiring 2200 square feet of lot area per living unit is unconstitutional as applied to an apartment building located at 89 Lincoln Avenue, Riverside, Illinois. The trial court ruled that the counterclaim was barred by a prior judgment of 'guilty' entered against the counter-plaintiffs in a quasi-criminal action brought by the Village for violating the zoning ordinance in question. Counter-plaintiffs contend on appeal that their counterclaim should not be barred by the prior judgment in the quasi-criminal action.

On March 27, 1972, Carl Veltmann and Elizabeth Veltmann, the officers and principal shareholders of H. F. Karl Contractors, Inc., submitted an application to the Village of Riverside for permission to erect a 5-unit apartment building. Application was granted, and in the fall of 1972, the Veltmanns completed construction of a building containing six rather than five apartments. The Veltmanns maintained and leased the structure as a 6-unit apartment building until it was sold on July 22, 1973.

On August 27, 1973, the Village of Riverside brought a quasi-criminal action in the 4th Municipal District of the circuit court of Cook County against Carl Veltmann. The Village alleged that the maintenance of a 6-unit apartment building at 89 Lincoln Avenue violated the minimum lot area requirements for each household unit as prescribed by the Village's zoning ordinance. The complaint alleged that the violation continuously occurred between June 26, 1973, and July 31, 1973, despite due notice by the Village to cease utilization of the sixth apartment as a household unit. Following a 'technical plea' of 'not guilty,' Veltmann was found 'guilty' on January 4, 1974, and fined $200 plus costs. The trial court's half-sheet contains the record of the proceeding.

On January 29, 1974, Veltmann filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the minimum lot area requirements of the Village's zoning ordinance were constitutionally invalid in their application to the premises located at 89 Lincoln Avenue. Veltmann argued in his post-trial motion that the court erred in sustaining the presumptive validity of the zoning requirements in question. The motion outlines several arguments in support of Veltmann's contention that the Village's minimum lot area requirements, as applied, are unconstitutional. The trial court's halfsheet reflects that on September 20, 1974, Veltmann's post-trial motion was heard and denied. Veltmann did not appeal the finding and judgment in the quasi-criminal action.

On May 25, 1973, H. F. Karl Contractors, Inc., by the Veltmanns, entered into a real estate contract to sell the building as a 6-apartment structure to Agnes Pierog and Marian Pierog. The transaction was completed on July 22, 1973, when the Pierogs tendered the purchase price and took possession of the building. The Village notified the Pierogs on September 5, 1973, that their recently purchased building could not be maintained as a 6-unit structure under applicable minimum lot area zoning requirements. The Pierogs complied with the zoning requirements and presently maintain the building as a 5-apartment structure.

On August 5, 1974, the Pierogs brought an action against the Veltmanns and H. F. Karl Contractors, Inc. demanding rescission of the real estate contract on the ground that the building was fraudulently represented as being constructed in compliance with all applicable zoning ordinances. The Pierogs prayed for return of the purchase price as well as compensatory and exemplary damages. The Veltmanns responded on September 13, 1974, with a motion requesting that the Village of Riverside be joined as a party defendant; that the quasi-criminal action pending on a motion for a new trial in the 4th Municipal District of the circuit court of Cook County be consolidated with the action brought by the Pierogs; and that time to answer or further plead be extended. On September 27, 1974, the trial court denied the Veltmanns' motion to consolidate the actions but allowed the Village of Riverside to be joined as a counter-defendant. The ruling on the Veltmanns' motion in the Pierog action was made one week after Carl Veltmann's motion for a new trial in the quasi-criminal action was denied.

On October 21, 1974, the Veltmanns filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the Pierogs' complaint. A counterclaim was also brought by the Veltmanns against the Village of Riverside as counter-defendant. The Veltmanns requested declaratory and injunctive relief alleging in their counterclaim that the minimum lot area requirements of the Village's zoning ordinance were constitutionally invalid as applied to the building located at 89 Lincoln Avenue. Eight paragraphs contained in the counterclaim are identical in language to eight paragraphs contained in the Veltmanns' motion for a new trial against the Village in the quasi-criminal action. Identical arguments asserting identical facts about the neighborhood in which the building is located are pleaded in the counterclaim as well as in the motion for a new trial in the quasi-criminal action. The Village responded with a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that it should be barred by the prior judgment entered against Carl Veltmann in the quasicriminal action brought by the Village. The trial court granted the Village's motion to dismiss the counterclaim, and this appeal followed.

Illinois courts have long recognized the distinction between the doctrines of estoppel by judgment (generally termed Res judicata) and estoppel by verdict (generally termed collateral estoppel). Under the doctrine of estoppel by judgment, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in a cause of action between two parties operates to estop the same parties or their privies from relitigating matters found to be part of the Same cause of action before the same or a different tribunal. The judgment in the first action is conclusive as to all questions actually decided and to all questions which might have been...