Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State

• Decision Date: 06 February 1969
• Citation: 70 Cal.2d 282,74 Cal.Rptr. 521,449 P.2d 737
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 449 P.2d 737 PIERPONT INN, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of California Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 29583.

Page 521

74 Cal.Rptr. 521

70 Cal.2d 282, 449 P.2d 737

PIERPONT INN, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of California Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 29583.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 6, 1969.

Harry S. Fenton, Sacramento, R. B. Pegram, Joseph A. Montoya, Richard L. Franck, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., George W. Miley and Elbert E. Hensley, Jr., Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Gustafson & Cohen and Roy A. Gustafson, Oxnard, for plaintiff and respondent.

BURKE, Justice.

In this inverse condemnation action defendant State of California appeals from the judgment entered in favor of plaintiff. A hearing was granted by this court, after decision by the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, for the purpose of giving further study to the problems presented. After such study we have concluded that the opinion of the Court of Appeal, prepared by Justice Herndon, correctly treats and disposes of the issues involved, and it is therefore, with certain minor deletions and additions, adopted as and for the opinion of this court. Such opinion (with deletions and additions as indicated) is as follows: ¹

( ) Appellant's primary contention is that respondent's claim was not filed within the time allowed by section 644 of the Government Code with the result that respondent's action is barred. Additional assignments of error relate to the factual determinations made by the trial court and the standards adopted for ascertaining respondent's damages and the dates from which interest thereon should be computed. We have concluded that none of these contentions is meritorious.

Respondent is the owner of the Pierpont Inn, a hotel in Ventura, California, consisting of a main building and guest cottages situated on a somewhat elevated parcel of land overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Respondent's property is a parcel of 7.37 acres divided by San Jon Road which runs northsouth over the property (near its westerly boundary), to the public beach lying below (and adjacent to) its southerly boundary.

In 1951, respondent's predecessor in title had donated to the state the portion of the property lying west of San Jon Road by deed containing a condition subsequent that the land should 'be forever used for the development and maintenance of a State park under the jurisdiction of the State Park Commission.' No park was ever developed thereon and on August 18, 1959, appellant's Director of Natural Resources executed a deed granting an easement to its Department of Public Works and authorizing the construction of the freeway over a portion thereof. Grading and other preparatory work on the freeway began early in 1960, and on July 24, 1961, respondent declared a forfeiture for breach of the condition upon which the property had been granted to the state.

In a previous action brought upon the state's failure to reconvey, respondent sued the state to establish its title and to compel a reconveyance. Judgment in this former action was entered on November 30, 1962, in respondent's favor and declared that respondent 'is now, and has been since July 24, 1961, vested with title' to the property; that the state 'has no right, title or interest therein except the right to (remain in) possession of the portion' thereof devoted to public use as a freeway. No appeal was taken from this judgment. It became final and established respondent's ownership of the portion of the property involved therein.

In addition to the portion of respondent's property west of San Jon Road used for freeway purposes, respondent's complaint alleged that (a northerly strip of) the freeway is also located upon a southerly strip of its property lying to the east of San Jon Road. It was appellant's theory that this strip was not a part of respondent's property or, alternatively, that it had been subjected to a dedicated but unused road easement since 1909, and therefore its occupancy for freeway purposes did not constitute a taking of respondent's property for which compensation need be paid, either for the property itself or by way of severance damages.

On August 13, 1962, respondent filed its claim for damages with the State Board of Control. It was rejected on November 15, 1962. The freeway itself was opened for traffic in October 1962, and was formally accepted by the state on November 20, 1962. Respondent filed the instant action on February 13, 1963. The judgment herein was entered on January 5, 1966, and awarded respondent damages which included the following elements:

(1) $31,308 for the part taken east of San Jon Road plus interest from February 1, 1960. (2) $4,318 for the part taken west of San Jon Road plus interest from July 24, 1961. (3) $35,000 for the diminution of the fair rental value of the remaining property from August 13, 1960, to the completion of construction on November 20, 1962, plus interest from November 20, 1962. (4) $155,000 for the permanent diminution of the fair market value of the remaining property plus interest from November 20, 1962, the date of completion of the freeway. (5) $188.85 for costs.

At the time construction of the freeway began, and at the time respondent filed its claim with the state and commenced the instant action, section 644 of the Government Code required that a claim be presented to the State Board of Control 'within two years after the claim first arose or accrued.' Appellant contends that this statutory period began to run when it entered upon respondent's land in February of 1960, or at the latest, when it began preliminary work in March of 1960. ² Therefore, although respondent's claim was filed in August 1962, prior to the completion of the project, appellant contends that it was untimely with the result that respondent is whooly barred from recovery. Neither reason nor precedent supports this contention.

There is a paucity of authority dealing with the problem of determining the exact date upon which a claim or cause of action for inverse condemnation arises. Prior to the age of the freeway, most inadvertent or intentional trespasses by authorities with the power of condemnation were of such a nature that there was only a relatively brief interval of time between the first invasion upon the land and the completion of the project itself. Such authority as does exist, however, supports the holding of the trial court herein.

In the early cases of Williams v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 150 Cal. 624, 89 P. 599, and Robinson v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 129 Cal. 8, 61 P. 947, it was held that the actions for damages were barred, it appearing that they had been commenced after the expiration of the statutory period running from the time the roads were built and placed in operation. In Robinson, the complaint was not filed until 1899. It was alleged that in May 1887, the defendant therein 'entered upon the above-described lands of plaintiff and seized and took possession of a strip of said land one hundred feet in width, * * * that defendant '* * * constructed a steam railroad upon and over said strip of land, and completed the same on or about June, 1888; and that since November 7, 1889, the defendant has operated the said railroad.'"" (p. 9, 61 P. p. 947.) The court stated at page 11, 61 P. at page 948:

'It seems to us that the complaint shows a trespass by defendant in 1889 for which plaintiff had his appropriate remedy. The complaint alleges an unlawful taking of possession in May, 1887; the damages alleged accrued at least as soon as the road was Built and operated, which was in 1889.' (Italics added.)

Similarly, in Williams, plaintiff's complaint alleged 'that on January 1, 1900, * * * the defendant, * * * had entered upon the part of said land within Laurel Avenue, and laid a railroad track thereon; That ever since said last-named date the defendant Had operated its railroad over said track, * * *' (Italics added.) Since the action in Williams had not been filed within three years after January 1, 1900, the court relied upon its earlier decision in Robinson, stating at page 627, 89 P. at page 600 that it had been held therein 'that an action to recover damages for a wrongful entry by a railroad company upon the land of plaintiff, and the construction of its railroad thereupon, without proceedings for condemnation, and without plaintiff's consent, is barred if not commenced within three years after the road Was built and operated.' (Italics added.)

While their language and their reasoning tends to support the trial court's determination that respondent's claim was not untimely, the Robinson and Williams decisions are not conclusive since, as we have indicated, the court was not required in those cases to decide whether or not the statutory periods there in question might have begun to run at some date earlier than the date of completion of the projects.

In Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 750--751, 218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833, in distinguishing between cases involving permanent trespasses and 'constantly increasing' nuisances, the court referred to these cases as standing for the rule that 'the statute of limitations runs from the time of the original entry.' However, in the context there employed it is clear the court had reference to the date when the trespassing encroachment first became permanent rather than when a trespass was first committed for purposes of construction.

Similar language was used in the same fashion in Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. City of Santa Cruz, 198 Cal.App.2d 267, 271, 17 Cal.Rptr. 892. That is to say, the court in no way was required to hold, nor did it hold, that the statutory period begins to run prior to the completion of the project in issue. Although the court used the expression 'wrongful entry' in discussing the Robinson decision, supra, it stated that 'The action was filed Ten years after the wrongful entry.' Under the facts in Robinson, this statement necessarily refers to the date when the railroad was completed and placed in...