Pierre-Louis v. Hwa

• Decision Date: 24 August 1992
• Docket Number: PIERRE-LOUIS
• Citation: 587 N.Y.S.2d 17,182 A.D.2d 55
• Parties: Raymonde, et al., Appellants, v. Ching-Yuan HWA, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 17

587 N.Y.S.2d 17

182 A.D.2d 55

Raymonde PIERRE-LOUIS, et al., Appellants, v. Ching-Yuan HWA, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Aug. 24, 1992.

Toberoff, Tessler & Schochet, New York City (Lynn A. Crosson and Rebecca L. Weinstein, of counsel), for appellants.

Kanterman, Taub & Breitner, P.C., New York City (Regina A. Jabbour, on the brief), for respondents Ching-Yuan Hwa and David Kaplan.

Kopff, Nardelli & Dopf, New York City (Eugene A. Ward and Martin B. Adams, on the brief), for respondent Bernard M. Wechsler.

Before BRACKEN, J.P., and LAWRENCE, RITTER, and COPERTINO, JJ.

LAWRENCE, Justice.

On this appeal, we must consider the scope of the "continuous treatment" doctrine. The plaintiffs acknowledge that this action was commenced more than two and one-half years after the last examination or treatment by any of the defendant physicians. However, the plaintiffs contend that the Statute of Limitations was tolled through February 1, 1988, as a result of "continuous treatment" provided by others at the defendants' hospital.

In 1982, the plaintiff Raymonde Pierre-Louis, who had a pacemaker installed three years before, was hospitalized at Kingsbrook Hospital for premature ventricular contractions (hereinafter PVC's) and diabetes. She was prescribed procainamide, an antiarrythmic drug used to regulate heartbeats, but known to have the potential side-effect of inducing lupus erythematosus syndrome (hereinafter lupus). This medication was continued when the plaintiff was subsequently hospitalized on November 17, 1982, at the Downstate Hospital Medical Center (hereinafter Downstate) for a malfunctioning pacemaker, PVC's, diabetes, and hypertension.

In January 1983 Mrs. Pierre-Louis visited the Cardiology Clinic of Downstate, where the defendant Dr. Ching-Yuan Hwa saw her for the first time. Dr. Hwa, who was then a cardiology fellow at Downstate, continued the medication. In May 1983 Mrs. Pierre-Louis consulted Dr. Hwa at the Cardiology Clinic and complained of joint pain. Recognizing that joint pain might be a sign of lupus, Dr. Hwa ordered that her blood level be checked, but continued the medication. Mrs. Pierre-Louis saw Dr. Hwa again at the Cardiology Clinic in June and July, 1983. In July 1983 he lowered the dosage of procainamide and ordered a rheumatology consultation.

In September 1983 the defendant Dr. David Kaplan, the head of Downstate's Arthritis Clinic, admitted Mrs. Pierre-Louis to Downstate. Suspecting that her symptoms, which now included abdominal upset, indicated procainamide-induced lupus, Dr. Kaplan ordered that the medication be discontinued. She was discharged on October 8, 1983, with a diagnosis, inter alia, of "Drug Induced SLE [systemic lupus erythematosus]". Her condition was noted to be "improving" with the cessation of procainamide.

Mrs. Pierre-Louis continued visiting the Cardiology, Arthritis, and Dermatology Clinics of Downstate for treatment of the lupus until February 1, 1988. However, Dr. Hwa last saw her in April 1984 and completed his fellowship at Downstate on June 30, 1984. Dr. Kaplan last saw her on October 8, 1983, and had no involvement with her after November 1986 the last date his name appears on any clinic records. The defendant Dr. Bernard M. Wechsler, an associate professor at Downstate who claims he never treated the plaintiff but signed two of her laboratory reports in 1983 and 1984, retired from Downstate in 1984.

In February 1987 the plaintiff Raymonde Pierre-Louis brought a claim against the State of New York in the Court of Claims alleging malpractice against Downstate. That claim is not before this court. In July 1989 the plaintiffs commenced the instant action against these individual physicians. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was time-barred. We affirm.

Medical malpractice actions ordinarily must be commenced "within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of" (CPLR 214-a). However, under the "continuous treatment" doctrine, "the time in which to bring a malpractice action is stayed 'when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint' " (McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108, quoting from Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777; see also, CPLR 214-a). On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the hospital's "continuous treatment" through February 1, 1988, tolled the Statute of Limitations. This argument misapprehends the purpose and nature of the continuous treatment rule.

While the continuous treatment rule dates back to at least 1923 (see, Borgia v. City of New York, supra; Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608), its essential purpose remains the same: to "maintain the physician-patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure" (McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d at 408, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108). "The doctrine rests on the premise that it is in the patient's best interest that an ongoing course of treatment be continued, rather than interrupted by a lawsuit, because 'the doctor not only is in a position to identify and correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to do so' " (Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 78 N.Y.2d 255, 258, 573 N.Y.S.2d 434, 577 N.E.2d 1026, quoting from McDermott v. Torre, supra, 56 N.Y.2d at 408, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108; see also, Barrella v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 379, 383, 453 N.Y.S.2d 444). "It would be absurd to require a wronged patient to interrupt corrective efforts by serving a summons on the physician or hospital" (Borgia v. City of New York, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at 156, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777).

Though the policy underlying the continuous doctrine rule is clear, its application has been complicated by the fact that patients frequently receive medical care for the same condition from more than one physician or health care facility. Thus, courts have had to consider whether treatment or services rendered by one provider should be "imputed" to other previous providers. Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to impute a subsequently-treating physician's continued treatment of a patient to a physician alleged to have earlier committed malpractice who is no longer involved in the patient's care, the continuous treatment doctrine is not available unless there is evidence of "some relevant continuing relation" between the patient and the allegedly negligent doctor during the period of the subsequent treatment or "an agency or other relevant relationship" between the allegedly wrong-doing physician and...