Pierre v. N.J. Treasury Dep't

• Decision Date: 14 May 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 18-3443 (JLL)
• Parties: DUQUENE PIERRE, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, TREASURY DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

DUQUENE PIERRE, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, TREASURY DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 18-3443 (JLL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

May 14, 2019

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

LINARES, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of the Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants John Luby, City of Elizabeth ("Elizabeth"), Elizabeth Police Department ("Elizabeth PD"), Thomas Koczur, and County of Union ("Union"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Duquene Pierre's Complaint filed by Defendants John Furda and Ann Rubin, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (collectively, "Defendants' Motions"). (ECF Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91). Plaintiff opposed Defendants' Motions, and Defendants replied thereto. (ECF Nos. 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103). The Court decides this matter without oral argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motions in part, but denies the part of Defendants' Motions seeking to dismiss certain claims against Defendant Koczur.

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I. BACKGROUND¹

The Court shall only reiterate the facts to the extent necessary to determine Defendants' Motions, as the Court has already discussed the surrounding circumstances and procedural history in detail, (see ECF No. 66 at 2-6), and writes for the parties who are familiar with the background of this case. To summarize, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested in March 1994 and convicted in 1996 after a jury trial in state court for a murder in New Jersey that he allegedly did not commit. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 127). Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that there was exculpatory evidence that was overlooked by the police and prosecutors, including a South Carolina traffic ticket, a Georgia motel receipt, and several phone calls from Florida that indicated that Plaintiff was not in New Jersey at the time of the homicide. (See Compl. ¶¶ 34-37). As a result of the murder conviction, Plaintiff spent over twenty-two years in prison, until the New Jersey Supreme Court granted him a retrial on December 17, 2015 and, on July 8, 2016, the second trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for a judgment of acquittal based on a lack of evidence. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-45, 51, 70-71).

Plaintiff alleges the following allegations in relation to each of the individual Defendants presently moving before the Court:

• Defendant Koczur - An officer for Defendant Elizabeth PD who investigated the abovementioned homicide and allegedly first suspected Plaintiff because of his Haitian ethnicity and the fact that he drove a similar model car as one observed at the shooting. (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 40). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Koczur intentionally and knowingly coerced a suspect, Lamar McCall, to make false statements implicating

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Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 37). Later on, during Plaintiff's first murder trial, Defendant Koczur allegedly coerced Allison Johnson, a confidential informant who was not present at the time of the homicide, to provide false testimony to the Court that she saw Plaintiff at the scene of the homicide. (Compl. ¶¶ 38-39). Defendant Koczur allegedly did not disclose that Johnson was a confidential informant, and Plaintiff was therefore unaware of said fact until in or around June 2016, when Plaintiff's attorney for the second murder trial made an inquiry to an assistant prosecutor and the assistant prosecutor discovered that Johnson was in fact a confidential informant. (Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41, 72).

• Defendant Luby - An officer for Defendant Elizabeth PD who, along with Defendant Furda, allegedly took statements from McCall "which they knew or should have known were false and damaging to the Plaintiff's alibi." (Compl. ¶ 43). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Luby conducted an interview with two witnesses simultaneously, which Plaintiff claims was improper. (Compl. ¶ 43). Plaintiff further states that said interview was relied upon in Plaintiff's allegedly unlawful arrest and prosecution. (Compl. ¶ 43).

• Defendant Furda - A Union County Prosecutor's Office investigator who, along with Defendant Luby, allegedly took statements from McCall "which they knew or should have known were false and damaging to the Plaintiff's alibi." (Compl. ¶ 43). Defendant Furda also allegedly presented false or misleading statements to the Grand Jury to make it appear that Plaintiff was not traveling outside of New Jersey at the time of the homicide. (Compl. ¶ 42). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Furda discredited Plaintiff's alibi by misrepresenting the height of the South Carolina State

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Trooper who pulled Plaintiff over and the statements of the Georgia motel's employee. (Compl. ¶ 42).

• Defendant Rubin - The assistant prosecutor with the Union County Prosecutor's Office who represented the state in Plaintiff's first murder trial and allegedly "pursued alternate theories and motives surrounding the murder, which were mutually exclusive." (Compl. ¶ 44). Defendant Rubin also presented Johnson as a witness, who testified that she saw Plaintiff in Elizabeth, New Jersey a few hours after the homicide. (Compl. ¶¶ 38-39). Plaintiff claims that it would have been evident to a seasoned prosecutor such as Defendant Rubin that Johnson was a confidential informant, because Johnson's criminal record reflected that she had been arrested numerous times but was never convicted. (Compl. ¶ 39).

Plaintiff also broadly alleges that all of the Defendants listed above "knew or should have known" that Johnson was a confidential informant and did not disclose same in violation of the constitutional principles established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). (Compl. ¶ 41). Plaintiff further states that the actions of the abovementioned Defendants "represent a conspiracy to deny and violate the civil rights of Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 145). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants engaged in a custom or practice of permitting and facilitating unlawful arrest and prosecutions "in this instance, and in other instances," and that the failure of, among others, the institutional Defendants currently moving before this Court—i.e., Defendants Elizabeth, Elizabeth PD, and Union—to train, supervise, and discipline their subordinates resulted in a pattern or practice of condoning this allegedly improper conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 148-52).

Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a notice of claim on October 3, 2016, and filed suit on January 22, 2018 in New Jersey Superior Court, Union County, which was subsequently removed to this

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Court. (ECF No. 1; see also ECF No. 89-3 at 14 (stating the uncontested date of Plaintiff's notice of claim filing)). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim against the New Jersey Treasury Department pursuant to the Mistaken Imprisonment Act, N.J.S.A. 52:4C-1 et seq. (which is listed as Count I), and a claim against the attorneys who represented him during his initial trial for Professional Negligence/Breach of Responsibility (which is listed as Count II). (Compl. ¶¶ 49-132). Plaintiff then asserts the following causes of action against all remaining defendants including but not limited to the abovementioned Defendants: (1) Violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("the NJCRA") and New Jersey Constitution ("Count III"); (2) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Count IV"); (3) Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 ("Count V"); (4) Unlawful Policy, Practice, or Supervision under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ("Count VI"); (5) Common Law Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED") ("Count VII"); (6) Common Law Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress ("NIED") ("Count VIII"); (7) Common Law Malicious Prosecution ("Count IX"); and (8) Common Law Abuse of Process ("Count X"). (Compl. ¶¶ 133-75)

On November 5, 2018, this Court issued an Opinion and Order granting in part the motions to dismiss filed by several defendants ("the Court's prior Opinion"). (ECF Nos. 66, 67). Defendant Union was one of the defendants who originally moved for dismissal, and the Court specifically found that all of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed against it with the exception of Count VIII, because Plaintiff had sufficiently established a prima facie claim for NIED against Defendant Union. (ECF No. 66 at 10-14). As for the police and prosecutor defendants who previously moved for dismissal, the Court found that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim against them and that they were also entitled to various forms of immunity. (Id. at 14-22). Now,

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Defendants move for dismissal arguing in part that the logic from the Court's prior Opinion applies to them as well.

II. LEGAL STADARD

A. Failure to State a Claim

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal in the Third Circuit, the Court must take three steps: (1) "it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim"; (2) "it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their...