Pierre v. Rochdale Vill. Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-6383 (MKB) (ST) |
| Parties | JOSEPH B. PIERRE, Plaintiff, v. ROCHDALE VILLAGE INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Joseph B. Pierre, proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action on November 5, 2018, against Defendant Rochdale Village Inc. pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, his former employer, discriminated against him based on his religion and national origin and retaliated against him for filing a complaint against a supervisor who made disparaging remarks to Plaintiff based on his national origin. (Id. at 5.) Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint or stay the action and compel arbitration pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ("FAA"), and Plaintiff opposes the motion.1
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion and stays the action. The Court denies Defendant's request for attorneys' fees and costs associated with its motion.
The Court assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the Complaint for the purposes of this Memorandum and Order. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court also considers and assumes the truth of the factual allegations in Plaintiff's opposition. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) ().2
i. Plaintiff's employment and termination
Defendant manages Rochdale Village, a 120-acre housing cooperative in Jamaica, Queens. (Decl. of Jay Williams in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. ("Williams Decl.") ¶¶ 4-5, Docket Entry No. 37.) On November 21, 2011, Defendant hired Plaintiff to serve as a public safety officer at Rochdale Village. (Id. ¶ 13.) Beginning "around 2016," Plaintiff was told to salute his superior officer, Chief Pearson, but refused to do because of his religion (Voodoo). (Compl. 4-5, 14.) Pearson forced Plaintiff to write and submit a report about why he could not salute her. (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff requested a copy of the report but was refused one. (Id.)
Sometime later, another of Plaintiff's supervisors allegedly fabricated a report against Plaintiff and threatened him, stating "you be careful." (Id.) In addition, someone poured an offensive-smelling liquid in Plaintiff's work locker, ruining his uniform and other belongings. (Id.)
In May of 2018, another of Plaintiff's supervisors, Sergeant Ernest Gaither, told Plaintiff, "I fired [seventy-five] people already, you Haitians think you are sharp, I am sharper." (Id. at 5, 14.) Plaintiff filed a petition to demote or terminate Sergeant Gaither due to his behavior. (Id. at 5, 14.)
On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff was terminated for allegedly violating a lunch policy.3 (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that his termination was in retaliation because he "stood for [him]self" by refusing to salute Chief Pearson and writing a petition against Sergeant Gaither. (Id. at 14.)
ii. Arbitration agreement
During the relevant time period, Plaintiff was a union employee represented by the Special and Superior Officers Benevolent Association (the "Union") and covered by a series of collective bargaining agreements (collectively, the "CBA") between the Union and Defendant. (Williams Decl. ¶ 9.) Articles 16 and 17 of the CBA describe the grievance and arbitration procedures for represented employees. (See CBA 26-28, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2.) Article 16 defines a grievance as "any dispute arising during the term of [the CBA] between an employee or [the Union] and [Defendant]" and lays out a three-step internal dispute resolution process. (Id. at 26-27.) Article 17 provides that the Union may appeal to arbitrationany grievances not resolved during the three-step process and that such disputes "shall be referred . . . by the Union in accordance with the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association ["AAA"] then prevailing in the City of New York." (Id. at 28.) Employment discrimination claims, "including claims made pursuant to Title VII," are "subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations." (Id. at 27.)
iii. Plaintiff's grievance and administrative filings
Prior to commencing this action, Plaintiff submitted a grievance to the Union on June 12, 2018, alleging wrongful termination based on the events described above. (Grievance 4, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2; Pl.'s Opp'n 4.) In addition, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on July 3, 2018. (Compl. 12.) On July 27, 2018, Plaintiff, the Union, and Defendant participated in a Step 3 Grievance Hearing pursuant to the CBA's mandatory grievance procedures, after which Defendant issued a decision sustaining Plaintiff's termination. (
On August 16, 2018, Plaintiff emailed Defendant's Assistant General Manager Jay Williams regarding his recent termination and the Union's failure to take action and requested a meeting to discuss his termination. (Rochdale Emails 11, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2.) Williams replied that he was out of the country but copied Defendant's Human Resources Director Dolores Benner on the email "to help expedite the review of [Plaintiff's] termination." (Id.) On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff and the Union's president, Ronald Fedrizzi, attended a second hearing with Defendant. (Pl.'s Opp'n 4.) Plaintiff maintains that, prior to the hearing, he communicated to Fedrizzi a desire to arbitrate his claims, to which Fedrizziresponded, "[w]e cannot win arbitration," and that after the hearing, Fedrizzi told Plaintiff he would get his job back. (Id.)
Several weeks later, on September 14, 2018, Plaintiff emailed Fedrizzi informing him that he was dissatisfied with Fedrizzi's representation at the grievance hearings. (Union Emails 9, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2; Pl.'s Opp'n 5.) Fedrizzi responded, "[w]hen we left the meeting you were positive on how you were represented and now because you filed an EEOC claim and they don't want to bring you back you are claiming that my representation of your [sic] was somehow flawed or lack[ing]." (Union Emails 8; Pl.'s Opp'n 5.) Plaintiff responded, in pertinent part, (Union Emails 8.)
On October 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") alleging that the Union had "failed and refused" to process his grievance. (Charge Against Labor Organization 1, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2.) The NLRB investigated the charge and dismissed it on January 17, 2019. (Letter from NLRB dated Jan. 17, 2019, at 2, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2.) Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and NLRB denied his appeal on February 25, 2019. (Letter from NLRB dated Feb. 25, 2019, at 13, annexed to Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket Entry No. 46-2.) The appeal denial letter states that the Union "thoroughly considered the evidence presented by [Defendant] and made a good faith determination it would not succeed at arbitration," and that the Union "communicated to [Plaintiff] the reasons that it would not pursue [his] grievance to arbitration." (Id.) Both the Union and Defendant received copies of the dismissal and the appeal denial. (Pl.'s Opp'n 5.) Defendant maintains it is "unaware of any [Union] demand to submit [Plaintiff's] grievances . . . to binding arbitration." (Williams Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13; Williams Reply Decl. ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000 for psychological suffering and compensation for the years he would have worked for Defendant but for his termination on June 4, 2018. (Compl. 6.)
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on November 5, 2018. (Compl.) Defendant filed its answer to the Complaint on February 15, 2019. (Answer, Docket Entry No. 10.) Plaintiff then requested that the case be designated for the Court-Annexed Mediation Advocacy Program. (Letter dated Mar. 6, 2019, Docket Entry No. 14.) Pursuant to Plaintiff's request, Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione referred the case for mediation. (Order dated Mar. 20, 2019.) On June 25, 2019, the parties jointly requested and received extensions of time to complete mediation and paper discovery for the mediation so that they could focus on settling. (Letter Mot. for Extension, Docket Entry No. 19; Order dated June 25, 2019.) On August 14, 2019, the parties reported at a status conference that mediation had been unsuccessful. (Minute Entry dated Aug. 15, 2019, Docket Entry No. 22.)
By letter dated October 28, 2019, Defendant moved for a pre-motion conference regarding its anticipated motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, for the first time raising the issue of arbitration. (Letter Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conference, Docket Entry No. 23.) The Court granted Defendant leave to file its motion.4 (Minute Entry dated Nov. 19, 2019.) Defendant filed its motion on January 10, 2020, (Def.'s Mot.), at which time discovery had been limited to preparing for mediation and the settlement conference.
The FAA requires courts to compel arbitration of claims that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as reflecting "'a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,' and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on 'the same footing as other...
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