Pierson v. N.Y., S. & W. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 November 1912
• Citation: 83 N.J.L. 661,85 A. 233
• Parties: PIERSON v. NEW YORK, S. & W. R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

85 A. 233

83 N.J.L. 661

PIERSON

v. NEW YORK, S. & W. R. CO.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 21, 1912.

Error to Supreme Court

Action by James I. Pierson against the New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Coult & Dolan, of Newton, for plaintiff in error.

George S. Hobart, of Jersey City, for defendant in error.

GUMMERE, C. J. This action was brought to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff while engaged in the service of the defendant company. The latter's liability is rested entirely upon the federal Employer's Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322]).

The material facts in the case (and they are undisputed) are as follows: The defendant corporation is the owner and operator: of a railroad that, to some extent, is used in interstate commerce, and a portion of which is located in Sussex county, in this state. At the time of the happening of the accident to the plaintiff, the company was engaged in removing old rails from its track, and replacing them with new ones, at a point between Beaver Lake and Ogdensburg, both of which places are located in that county. These new rails had been purchased by the defendant from the Buffalo Steel Company of Buffalo, N. Y., and were shipped from the latter place to Beaver Lake, part of the distance over the line of the Erie Railroad Company, and the rest of the way over that of the defendant. They remained at Beaver Lake some three or four days after their arrival there, and upon the cars on which they had been carried from Buffalo. At the expiration of that time these cars were attached to an engine and hauled down to the place where the new rails were to be put in. Upon reaching that place the rails were unloaded from the cars and laid on the track edge by a gang of men, 14 in number, of which the plaintiff was a member. While one of the rails was being lifted out of the car by these 14 men, and while it was being held in the hands of all of them, the end of it furthest from where the plaintiff was standing was dropped. His hold upon the other end was thereby broken, and the rail fell upon his foot, crushing it so badly that it became necessary to amputate one of his toes.

Upon the case thus made the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant was asked upon two grounds: First, because there was no proof of the circumstances under which the men having hold of the end of the rail furthest from the plaintiff dropped it, and, consequently, nothing upon which an inference of negligence on their part could be predicated; and, second, because, even if the dropping of the rail raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the plaintiff's fellow employes, the facts did not bring the case within the purview of the federal Employer's Liability Act, which imposes liability, under the conditions therein specified, upon a master for injuries received by a servant through the carelessness of a fellow servant. The motion was granted; the ruling being put upon the ground that no negligence on the part of the plaintiff's fellow servants was shown. On this ruling the plaintiff now assigns error.

The question to be determined is whether the motion to direct a verdict for the defendant was properly allowed upon either of the grounds advanced in support of it; for, if it was, the fact that one of the grounds was untenable, and that this ground was the one upon which the ruling was rested, is immaterial. It is the judicial action, and not the soundness of the reason which prompted it, that is under review.

Without determining whether the facts recited made the question of the negligence of plaintiff's fellow servants one for the jury, in case it became material—a matter upon which the members of the court are not agreed—we take up the consideration of the applicability of the federal statute to these facts.

On June 11, 1900, Congress passed "An act relating to liability of common carriers in the District of Columbia and territories, and common carriers engaged in commerce between the states, and between the states and foreign nations, to their employes." Act Juno 11, 1906. c. 3073, 34 Stat 232 (U....