Pierson v. Ray , Nos. 79

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation87 S.Ct. 1213,386 U.S. 547
Parties. 18 L.Ed.2d 288 Robert L. PIERSON et al., Petitioners, v. J. L. RAY et al. J. L. RAY et al., Petitioners, v. Robert L. PIERSON et al
Decision Date11 April 1967
Docket NumberNos. 79,94

386 U.S. 547
87 S.Ct. 1213.
18 L.Ed.2d 288
Robert L. PIERSON et al., Petitioners,

v.

J. L. RAY et al. J. L. RAY et al., Petitioners, v. Robert L. PIERSON et al.

Nos. 79, 94.
Argued Jan. 11, 1967.
Decided April 11, 1967.

Page 548

Carl Rachlin, New York City, for Robert L. Pierson and others.

Elizabeth W. Grayson, Jackson, Miss., for J. L. Ray and others.

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of Court.

These cases present issues involving the liability of local police officers and judges under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Peti-

Page 549

tioners in No. 79 were members of a group of 15 white and Negro Episcopal clergymen who attempted to use segregated facilities at an interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961. They were arrested by respondents Ray, Griffith, and Nichols, policemen of the City of Jackson, and charged with violating § 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code, which makes guilty of a misdemeanor anyone who congregates with others in a public place under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby, and refuses to move on when ordered to do so by a police officer.2 Petitioners 3 waived a jury trial and were convicted of the offense by respondent Spencer, a municipal police justice. They were each given the maximum sentence of four months in jail and

Page 550

a fine of $200. On appeal petitioner Jones was accorded a trial de novo in the County Court, and after the city produced its evidence the court granted his motion for a directed verdict. The cases against the other petitioners were then dropped.

Having been vindicated in the County Court, petitioners brought this action for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, alleging that respondents had violated § 1983, supra, and that respondents were liable at common law for false arrest and imprisonment. A jury returned verdicts for respondents on both counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that respondent Spencer was immune from liability under both § 1983 and the common law of Mississippi for acts committed within his judicial jurisdiction. 352 F.2d 213. As to the police officers, the court noted that § 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code was held unconstitutional as applied to similar facts in Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524, 85 S.Ct. 1327, 14 L.Ed.2d 265 (1965).4 Although Thomas was decided years after the arrest involved in this trial, the court held that the policemen would be liable in a suit under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest even if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a state statute not yet held invalid. The court believed that this stern result was required by Monroe v. Pape,

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365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Under the count based on the common law of Mississippi, however, it held that the policemen would not be liable if they had probable cause to believe that the statute had been violated, because Mississippi law does not require police officers to predict at their peril which state laws are constitutional and which are not. Apparently dismissing the common-law claim, 5 the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the § 1983 claim against the police officers because defense counsel had been allowed to cross-examine the ministers on various irrelevant and prejudicial matters, particularly including an alleged convergence of their views on racial justice with those of the Communist Party. At the new trial, however, the court held that the ministers could not recover if it were proved that they went to Mississippi anticipating that they would be illegally arrested because such action would constitute consent to the arrest under the principle of volenti non fit injuria, he who consents to a wrong cannot be injured.

We granted certiorari in No. 79 to consider whether a local judge is liable for damages under § 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction and whether the ministers should be denied recovery against the police officers if they acted with the anticipation that they would be illegally arrested. We also granted the police officers' petition in No. 94 to determine if the Court of Appeals correctly held that they could not assert the defense of

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good faith and probable cause to an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional arrest.6

The evidence at the federal trial showed that petitioners and other Negro and white Episcopal clergymen undertook a 'prayer pilgrimage' in 1961 from New Orleans to Detroit. The purpose of the pilgrimage was to visit church institutions and other places in the North and South to promote racial equality and integration, and, finally, to report to a church convention in Detroit. Letters from the leader of the group to its members indicate that the clergymen intended from the beginning to go to Jackson and attempt to use segregated facilities at the bus terminal there, and that they fully expected to be arrested for doing so. The group made plans based on the assumption that they would be arrested if they attempted peacefully to exercise their right as interstate travelers to use the waiting rooms and other facilities at the bus terminal, and the letters discussed arrangements for bail and other matters relevant to arrests.

The ministers stayed one night in Jackson, and went to the bus terminal the next morning to depart for Chattanooga, Tennessee. They entered the waiting room, disobeying a sign at the entrance that announced 'White Waiting Room Only—By Order of the Police Department.' They then turned to enter the small terminal restaurant but were stopped by two Jackson police officers, respondents Griffith and Nichols, who had been awaiting their arrival and who ordered them to 'move on.' The ministers replied that they wanted to eat

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and refused to move on. Respondent Ray, then a police captain and now the deputy chief of police, arrived a few minutes later. The ministers were placed under arrest and taken to the jail.

All witnesses including the police officers agreed that the ministers entered the waiting room peacefully and engaged in no boisterous or objectionable conduct while in the 'White Only' area. There was conflicting testimony on the number of bystanders present and their behavior. Petitioners testified that there was no crowd at the station, that no one followed them into the waiting room, and that no one uttered threatening words or made threatening gestures. The police testified that some 25 to 30 persons followed the ministers into the terminal, that persons in the crowd were in a very dissatisfied and ugly mood, and that they were mumbling and making unspecified threatening gestures. The police did not describe any specific threatening incidents, and testified that they took no action against any persons in the crowd who were threatening violence because they 'had determined that the ministers was the cause of the violence if any might occur,'7 although the ministers were concededly orderly and polite and the police did not claim that it was beyond their power to control the allegedly disorderly crowd. The arrests and convictions were followed by this lawsuit.

We find no difficulty in agreeing with the Court of Appeals that Judge Spencer is immune from liability for damages for his role in these convictions. The record is barren of any proof or specific allegation that Judge Spencer played any role in these arrests and convictions other than to adjudge petitioners guilty when their cases came before his court.8 Few doctrines were more solidly

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established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it 'is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.' (Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 349, note, at 350.) It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation.

We do not believe that this settled principle of law was abolished by § 1983, which makes liable 'every person' who under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Accordingly, this Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), that the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well established, and

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we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.9

The common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim that they are entitled to one. Their claim is rather that they should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid. Under the prevailing view in this country a peace officer who arrests someone...

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4475 practice notes
  • Hunter v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, Civ. No. 96-848 (WGB).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey
    • August 27, 1996
    ...Page 1179 judges are absolutely immune from liability or damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). In order for judicial immunity to apply, the action must be a judicial act, and the judg......
  • CHIZMAR v. Bor. of TRAFFORD, No. 2:09-cv-188
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
    • March 29, 2011
    ...be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (qualified immu......
  • Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, No. 7954.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • July 31, 1972
    ...viewed in an entirely different light from suits which seek to hold such judges liable in damages for their judicial acts. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); United States v. Clark, 249 F.Supp. 720 (S.D.Ala., 1965); Rousselle v. Perez, 293 F.Supp. 298, 299 (......
  • Bliven v. Hunt, Docket No. 07-1146-cv.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 28, 2009
    ...335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). Thus, even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 562, 139......
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4486 cases
  • Hunter v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, Civ. No. 96-848 (WGB).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey
    • August 27, 1996
    ...Page 1179 judges are absolutely immune from liability or damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). In order for judicial immunity to apply, the action must be a judicial act, and the judg......
  • CHIZMAR v. Bor. of TRAFFORD, No. 2:09-cv-188
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
    • March 29, 2011
    ...be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (absolute immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (qualified immu......
  • Hodgson v. Hamilton Municipal Court, No. 7954.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • July 31, 1972
    ...viewed in an entirely different light from suits which seek to hold such judges liable in damages for their judicial acts. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); United States v. Clark, 249 F.Supp. 720 (S.D.Ala., 1965); Rousselle v. Perez, 293 F.Supp. 298, 299 (......
  • Bliven v. Hunt, Docket No. 07-1146-cv.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 28, 2009
    ...335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). Thus, even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 932 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 562, 139......
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27 books & journal articles
  • Qualified Immunity and Federalism
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal Nbr. 109-2, December 2020
    • December 1, 2020
    ...lawsuits f‌iled ten years after Monroe and nearly 35,000 such lawsuits in 2010.” (citing JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., supra note 69, at 14)). 77. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 78. Id. at 550. 79. Id. at 556–57 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)). 242 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 109:229 ......
  • PLAINLY INCOMPETENT: HOW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY BECAME AN EXCULPATORY DOCTRINE OF POLICE EXCESSIVE FORCE.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 170 Nbr. 2, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...Keller acknowledges that qualified immunity for federal [section] 1983 claims only began after the Court's decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1968), but his claim is that the immunities that existed at common law for state torts in the years leading up to the creation of [section] 19......
  • PROCEDURAL LOSSES AND THE PYRRHIC VICTORY OF ABOLISHING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 99 Nbr. 5, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...13-21-131(3) (2021). (37.) See Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778 (2021). (38.) See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (reaching this conclusion in the context of an officer acting under a statute later declared unconstitutional that he, at the tim......
  • RECALIBRATING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: HOW TANZIN V. TANVIR, TAYLOR V. RIOJAS, AND MCCOY V. ALAMU SIGNAL THE SUPREME COURT'S DISCOMFORT WITH THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 112 Nbr. 1, January 2022
    • January 1, 2022
    ...the phrase "qualified immunity" between 1967 and 1982 to refer to a defense of good faith and reasonableness. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). But, as explained later in the Article, that defense bears no resemblance to the modern doctrine of qualified immunity. (7) Harl......
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