Pierson v. State
| Decision Date | 27 January 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 22362.,22362. |
| Citation | 168 S.W.2d 256 |
| Parties | PIERSON v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Grover Adams, Judge.
Robert M. Pierson was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Baskett & Parks, of Dallas, for appellant.
Dean Gauldin, Cr. Dist. Atty., and Chas. A. Pippen and Jimmie Martin, Asst. Dist. Attys., all of Dallas, and Spurgeon E. Bell, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
For the murder of Thomas Joseph Vittrup, the appellant has been found guilty and his punishment assessed at death.
The deceased was employed as "special officer" (sometimes referred to as "a bouncer") at a beer tavern situated near the city of Dallas. Appellant's wife was a waitress at the tavern.
According to the State's testimony, appellant, on the afternoon of February 12, 1942, went to the tavern, and, without justification or excuse, killed the deceased by shooting him in the back with a pistol.
The defensive theory, shown chiefly by the testimony of the appellant, was that, for some time prior to the killing, deceased had been keeping company with the appellant's wife; that, a short time prior to the killing, the wife admitted to him that she and deceased had been guilty of immoral relations. Appellant said that, as a result of this information, on the occasion of the killing, he went to the tavern for the purpose and with the intention of talking with deceased relative to such conduct, with a view of having deceased to cease such conduct and relationship; that, as he entered the tavern and spoke, the deceased made a demonstration as if to draw a pistol, whereupon he (appellant) shot, fearing his life was in danger, and that he did so in self-defense.
Appellant was positive in his testimony that, at the time he went to the tavern, he had no intention of killing the deceased, and that the demonstration by deceased as if to draw a pistol was made with the left hand.
The foregoing is deemed a sufficient statement of the facts for a discussion of the questions presented for review.
Appellant's chief contention arises out of a confession or statement he made to the grand jury. As to this, it appears that appellant was arrested shortly after the killing, and that, from that time, he was continuously confined in jail, charged with this offense; that, while so confined, he was carried before the grand jury, while that body was engaged in investigating his case; that he was duly warned, by the grand jury, that he was not required to make a statement, and that, if he did so, any statement he might make could be used in evidence against him.
The record reflects that, with such warning, the appellant then, in answer to questions propounded by the grand jury, or under its direction, testified at length and detailed many facts relative to the killing. The statement so made was oral and was not reduced to writing and signed by the appellant.
For the purpose of laying a predicate for the introduction of a part of such statement, State's counsel, upon cross-examination, asked appellant if he did not testify, before the grand jury, that he went to the tavern for the purpose and with the intention of killing the deceased. To the asking of such question the appellant registered the general objection to proof of any statement he made before the grand jury. The objection being overruled, the appellant denied having so testified before the grand jury.
The State, upon rebuttal, and in line with the predicate so laid, proved that the appellant did so testify before the grand jury that, on the occasion of the killing, he went to the tavern for the purpose of killing the deceased; to the introduction of which appellant again registered a general objection to proof of any statement he made before the grand jury, which objection was overruled.
The State was further permitted to prove, over appellant's said general objection, that, when the appellant was before the grand jury, he testified, with reference to the demonstration that the deceased was alleged to have made as if to draw a pistol, that the demonstration was made by deceased with the right hand, which testimony was directly contradictory of that given by appellant upon the trial of the case on that point.
The question thus presented for our determination is whether the statement appellant was alleged to have made before the grand jury was admissible.
If we correctly comprehend the State's position, it is that the testimony was admissible because: (a) The warning was sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute to authorize introduction thereof as a confession by appellant; (b) the statements so proven were authorized for impeachment of the appellant; and (c) the objection urged against the admission was insufficient to meet the requirements of the law or to point out to the trial court wherein the testimony was inadmissible.
It is appellant's contention that, the statements having been made while under arrest, and same not being reduced to writing and signed by appellant, same were not admissible for any purpose against him, and that a general objection to the introduction thereof was all that was required in order to preserve the question for review.
In the light of these contentions, it is deemed pertinent to review the legislative as well as judicial history of this state relative to the admission in evidence of a confession of one accused of crime.
The admission in evidence of a confession of one accused of crime has always been controlled by statute in this state.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1857, known as the "Old Code", Article 661 thereof reads as follows: "The confession of a defendant may be used in evidence against him if it appear that the same was freely made without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed." Said Article has remained unchanged throughout the years and appears as Art. 726 of our present Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 662 of the Old Code read as follows: "The confession shall not be used, if, at the time it was made, the defendant was in jail or other place of confinement, nor while he is in custody of an officer, unless such confession be made in a voluntary statement of the accused, taken before an examining court in accordance with law, or be made voluntarily after having been first cautioned that it may be used against him."
Under this Article, oral confessions made in accordance with the provisions thereof were admissible in evidence. However, as to such confessions, the court stressed that great caution should be exercised because such were "so liable to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated, and so hard to be contradicted". Gay v. State, 2 Tex.App. 127; Riley v. State, 4 Tex.App. 538; Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387.
Said Art. 662 of the Old Code was later amended by adding thereto the following language: "or unless in connection with such confession he make statement of facts or of circumstances that are found to be true which conduce to establish his guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or instrument with which he states the offense was committed."
Said Art. 662 of the Old Code as thus amended appeared as Art. 750, C.C.P. of 1879, and remained unchanged until amended, by Chapter 118, Acts of the Regular Session of the 30th Legislature, in 1907, to read as follows: ...
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Sanchez v. State
..."To understand the nature of the question presented, the history of our confession statutes become important. "In Pierson v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 388, 168 S.W.2d 256 (1943), part of that history is set forth, as " 'The admission in evidence of a confession of one accused of crime has always......
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Zimmerman v. State
...admission in evidence of a "confession" of one accused of a crime has always been controlled by statute in this state. Pierson v. State, 168 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.Cr.App.1943). In Pierson, quoted in Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190, 191-92 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the history of our statutes was set The......
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Briddle v. State
...McGilvery v. State, 533 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Smith v. State, 514 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Pierson v. State, 168 S.W.2d 256, 258-259 (Tex.Cr.App.1943). On this the State and appellant both agree. The above quoted statute provided an exception to the general rule. As to the ......
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Butler v. State, 44220
...so. To understand the nature of the question presented, the history of our confession statutes become important. In Pierson v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 388, 168 S.W.2d 256 (1943), part of that history is set forth, as 'The admission in evidence of a confession of one accused of crime has always......