Pierson v. The Kingman Milling Company

• Decision Date: 07 March 1914
• Docket Number: 18,668
• Citation: 91 Kan. 775,139 P. 394
• Parties: FRANK PIERSON, Appellant, v. THE KINGMAN MILLING COMPANY, Appellee
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

139 P. 394

91 Kan. 775

FRANK PIERSON, Appellant, v. THE KINGMAN MILLING COMPANY, Appellee

No. 18,668

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 7, 1914

Decided January, 1914.

Appeal from Kingman district court; PRESTON B. GILLETT, judge.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. ORAL CONTRACT -- Employment During Life -- Statute of Frauds. An agreement to provide a person with employment during his life is not required by the statute of frauds to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, since its performance will not necessarily extend over a year.

2. INJURED EMPLOYEE--Contract for Settlement Misread--Important Omissions--Employee Not Chargeable with Notice of Omissions. If an injured employee, who is too weak to read, is induced to sign a contract releasing his employer from liability, by the false representation that it provides for his future employment, the contract being read aloud as though it contained such provision, constructive notice of its real contents is not imparted to him by the fact that his wife, being present as his agent, to aid him in the matter, omitted to read it.

3. SAME--Receipt--Not Signed by Employer--Contents Misrepresented by Employer--May be Reformed. A writing acknowledging the receipt of money by an injured employee, and in consideration thereof releasing the employer from liability, although signed only by the employee, is contractual in its nature, and upon sufficient proof may be reformed on his application by inserting a provision for his future employment.

4. CONTRACT--Employment for Life--Enforceable. A contract by which an employer agrees to furnish an injured employee employment for life is not too indefinite for enforcement, although it makes no provision for the kind of work to be done or the amount of compensation.

5. SAME--Employment During Life--Executed by Secretary -- Subsequent Ratification by Corporation. Evidence to the following effect is sufficient to take to the jury the question whether a corporation was bound by a contract to give life employment to an injured employee: The contract was entered into on behalf of the company by the secretary, who acted as foreman, employing men, making agreements as to their wages, and discharging them. The five directors of the corporation owned all the stock. They were the president (the secretary's father) and his wife, the secretary (who was also treasurer) and his wife, and the vice president. The vice president told the employee before he resumed work that the contract required the company to look after him. When the employee reported after his injury he told the president he was ready to go back to work according to the contract. He was given employment, which continued for four years.

John H. Connaughton, and Charles C. Calkin, both of Kingman, for the appellant.

George L. Hay, L. F. Walter, both of Kingman, and T. A. Noftzger, of Wichita, for the appellee.

Mason J. Burch, J. dissenting. Porter, J., Smith, J. concur.

OPINION

MASON, J.

On September 27, 1906, Frank Pierson was injured while in the employ of The Kingman Milling Company, a corporation, his left leg being broken and his right so injured that it was amputated. The next day he signed and delivered to the company a writing reading as follows:

"For a valuable consideration, the same being the payment of money, physicians' charges, medicine bills and other expenses received to my full satisfaction of the Kingman Milling company, I hereby release, acquit and discharge the said company from all claims and demands which I have or may be entitled to have against it either in my own name or in the name of any one else, and especially from all liability to me from loss or damage which has resulted or may result to me from injuries received and suffered by me by reason of being hurt and injured by the machinery of said company at or in its mill and elevator in the City of Kingman, County of Kingman and State of Kansas, on the 27th day of September, 1906, while in the performance of duty no matter whether said injury was caused by the act, carelessness or negligence of either said company or myself."

In the following May Pierson resumed work for the company, and continued in its employ (possibly with some interruption) until May 27, 1911, when he was discharged. In the meantime his wages, which were originally $ 1.75 a day, were several times increased, the final amount being $ 2.50 a day. On June 13, 1911, he brought an action against the company, his petition containing in substance these allegations, among others: The writing referred to was made in pursuance of an agreement between Pierson and the company, which acted through its secretary and treasurer, Jay Holdridge. One of the provisions of the agreement was that the company was to give Pierson continuous employment during his life at labor that would not be injurious to his health or person. Pierson was unable to read the writing because of his weak condition, resulting from his injuries, an operation, and an anaesthetic. Holdridge told him that the provision regarding life employment was included in the writing, and in reliance upon this assurance he signed it. Pierson worked for the company under this understanding of the contract until discharged in May, 1911. The prayer of the petition was that the writing should be reformed by the insertion of the promise of permanent employment, and that the plaintiff should have judgment for damages on account of the company's refusal to perform it. The company, among other defenses, interposed a general denial. Upon trial a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was sustained, and he appeals.

The evidence tended in a general way to sustain the allegations of the petition. If the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case it was because of some of the matters hereinafter discussed.

The writing was not signed by the milling company. The statute of frauds does not prevent its enforcement on that account. When it was executed it was possible the contract might be fully performed within a year, since Pierson might have died within that time. (20 Cyc. 202; Note, 35 L. R. A. 514.)

The three-year statute of limitations is invoked on the theory that the action is on an oral agreement. Plaintiff, however, seeks first to reform, and then to enforce, a contract in writing. It is also argued that the action is one for relief on the ground of fraud, the limitation being two years, running from the discovery of the fraud; and that the fraud must be deemed to have been discovered at the time of the signing of the paper, for the reason that the plaintiff's wife, who he testified was acting as his agent, had an opportunity to read the writing and failed to do so. She testified that it was read to her and as read purported to contain the provision relating to permanent employment. There are cases holding that, even between the original parties, one who signs a written contract omits reading it at his peril, if he is able to do so. (Note, 37 L. R. A. 598.) But there are also many decisions to the effect that if one of the parties assumes to read the contract to the other, and purposely misreads it, he can not take advantage of the other's want of care in relying upon his reading of it. (Note, 37 L. R. A. 598.) Whatever may be the general rule on the subject, it can not be said in this case as a matter of law that the wife's opportunity to read the writing imported constructive notice of its contents to her husband.

The defendant maintains that the writing is a receipt, not contractual in its nature, and not open to reformation by the addition of a promise on the part of the milling company. The instrument, however, is not a mere receipt. It is clearly contractual in virtue of Pierson's agreement to release the company from any claim on his part growing out of his injury. (Thompson v. Williams, 30 Kan. 114, 1 P. 47; K. C. & O. Rld. Co. v Hicks, 30 Kan. 288, 1 P. 396; Brooks v. Hall, 36 Kan. 697, 699, 14 P. 236.) But it is said that the writing is unilateral in that it contains no agreements on the part of the milling company. Upon the face of the contract it appears that the sole consideration for the release of Pierson's claim was the payment of...