Pierson v. White Pine Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21CA3 |
| Citation | 194 N.E.3d 765 |
| Parties | Richard E. PIERSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WHITE PINE INSURANCE COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Brian T. Winchester and Chad A. Schmitt, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Hurley and Mark Brookes, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Michael R. Henry, Columbus, Ohio, for Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas Court summary judgment in favor of (1) Richard E. Pierson and Hillsboro Scrap & Metal, Inc., plaintiffs below and appellees herein,1 and (2) United Financial Casualty Company, third-party defendant below and appellee herein.
{¶2} White Pine Insurance Company, defendant below and appellant herein, assigns the following error for review:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES."
{¶3} This case arises out of a fatal March 2019 automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Pierson, while in the course and scope of employment with Hillsboro Scrap & Metal, Inc. (HSM), was driving a 1999 Freightliner semi-truck with an attached 2006 Transcraft trailer. The trailer carried a load of inoperable vehicles. Pierson's truck collided with a vehicle driven by Allen K. Ursell, along with passengers Shaun Rooker and Alesha Bennett. Sadly, the accident resulted in Ursell's death and injuries to the passengers.
{¶4} Appellant issued a commercial automobile insurance policy to HSM. After HSM notified appellant of the accident, appellant would not provide coverage for any claim that arose out of the accident, and further informed HSM that appellant "will likely not have a duty to defend or indemnify."
{¶5} Appellees, HSM and Pierson, filed a complaint and asked the trial court to declare that appellant's policy (1) provides primary liability coverage for the accident, and (2) appellant has a duty to defend and indemnify appellees for any claims arising out of the accident. The passengers, Rooker and Bennett, also filed counterclaims for negligence, negligence per se, vicarious liability, negligent hiring and supervising, and punitive damages. Ursell's estate filed counterclaims against appellees for negligence, wrongful death, vicarious liability, negligent hiring and retaining, and punitive damages.
{¶6} Appellant filed an answer, along with a combined cross-claim, a counterclaim, and a third-party complaint for declaratory judgment. Appellant alleged that UFCC issued an insurance policy to appellees that provides coverage for any loss arising out of the accident and requested the trial court to enter a declaratory judgment that (1) appellant's policy explicitly excludes coverage for any losses arising out of the subject accident, (2) appellant does not have a duty to defend or indemnify appellees, and (3) to the extent that appellant's policy provides coverage, UFCC's policy "is primary and the policies do not stack limits."
{¶7} Subsequently, appellant requested summary judgment regarding its declaratory judgment request. Appellees and UFCC also filed motions for summary judgment.
{¶8} In its summary judgment motion, appellant asked the court for judgment in its favor regarding all claims set forth in appellees’ complaint and in appellant's cross-claim, counterclaim, and third-party complaint. Appellant argued that its insurance policy explicitly excludes coverage for appellees’ claims and, to support its argument, appellant referred to the policy's exclusion for the towing and transporting of autos. That language provides that coverage is excluded for "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the use of any "auto that is not identified in ITEM SEVEN in the Auto Dealer Declarations used to move, tow, haul or carry ‘autos.’ "
Appellant asserted that the policy defines "auto" as "a land motor vehicle, ‘trailer’ or semitrailer" and that a " ‘[t]railer’ includes [a] semitrailer." Appellant claimed that, at the time of the accident, Pierson was driving a semi-truck, an "auto," and that Pierson used the semi-truck to move, tow, haul, or carry the attached trailer, also an "auto." Appellant further asserted that the trailer attached to the semi-truck was moving, towing, hauling, or carrying "autos" because the crushed pile of vehicles fell within the policy's definition of "auto," i.e., land motor vehicle.
{¶9} Appellant further argued that neither the semi-truck, nor the attached trailer, is listed in Item Seven in the Auto Dealer Declarations. Item Seven states:
Appellant points out that the schedule of covered autos "names only one vehicle," a "1999 International Rollback," and the named vehicle is not the vehicle Pierson was driving at the time of the accident.
{¶10} Thus, appellant claimed that the towing and transporting of autos exclusion precludes coverage for the accident and, consequently, it has no duty to defend or indemnify appellees for losses arising out of the accident. Appellant further argued that its policy contains a blanket exclusion for punitive damages. Thus, appellant requested summary judgment regarding all claims and a declaration that it has no duty to provide coverage for the accident or to defend and indemnify appellees.
{¶11} Appellees filed a combined summary judgment motion in opposition to appellant's motion and argued that the exclusion for the towing and transportation of autos "is irrelevant and inapplicable" because Pierson did not haul "autos" at the time of the accident. Instead, appellees claimed that Pierson carried "scrap metal and crushed vehicles." Appellees also contended that (1) appellant incorrectly interpreted the towing exclusion because appellant's interpretation would render coverage illusory, and (2) the policy is internally inconsistent and this inconsistency creates "some ambiguity."
{¶12} Appellees also disputed appellant's argument that the trailer attached to the semi-truck establishes that the semi-truck was moving, towing, or hauling an "auto." Appellees contended that a semi-truck with an attached trailer constitutes a single unit and, hence, a single "auto." Appellees claimed that because courts have uniformly held that a tractor-trailer combination is viewed as one vehicle for insurance purposes, they disagreed with appellant's interpretation of the towing exclusion to mean that the semi-truck, an "auto," was towing the 2006 trailer, also an "auto." Appellees further argued:
[I]t is common sense that a semi-tractor does not move, haul, tow or carry anything (i.e. cargo), unless it has an attached trailer. Rather, the combination tractor/trailer is what does the moving, hauling, towing. * * * * Simply put, what is being moved, towed, hauled and/or carried is the load, goods, or cargo that is on or in the trailer attached to the semi.
Appellees also noted that, because the towing and transporting of autos exclusion uses the plural word "autos," the use of the plural word shows appellant's intent to exclude coverage for vehicles used to tow more than one "auto." Appellees thus alleged that the towing exclusion should not preclude coverage when one "auto," such as a semi-truck, is used to tow a single "auto," such as a trailer. Appellees further opined that appellant's interpretation of the towing and transporting of autos exclusion would render coverage under the policy illusory. If the trailer "constitutes an ‘auto’ being moved, towed, hauled or carried, then, appellee reasons, there would never be any coverage whenever any semi-truck (other than the 1999 International Rollback semi) owned by Hillsboro * * *is used with an attached trailer to haul any kind of cargo." Appellees thus claimed that "[appellant's] interpretation would eliminate all commercial auto liability coverage except when the 1999 International Rollback semi-truck is used."
{¶13} Consequently, appellees requested the trial court determine that appellant is obligated to defend and indemnify appellees for any claims, and to declare that "[appellant's] policy provides primary liability coverage in the amount of one million dollars for the subject accident."
{¶14} In its summary judgment motion, UFCC also asserted that appellant's policy provides coverage to appellees for the accident and disputed appellant's argument that the towing and transporting of autos exclusion precludes coverage. UFCC claimed the 2006 trailer does not constitute an "auto" because courts across the country have indicated "that a truck-tractor and a trailer become one vehicle when they are connected."
{¶15} UFCC further contended that appellant's interpretation of the towing exclusion contradicted the owned autos coverage for symbol 22 autos. Symbol 22 covers owned autos, as well as "any ‘trailers’ you don't own while attached to power units you own.’ " UFCC thus asserted that the symbol 22 definition treats an owned semi-truck with a non-owned trailer attached to it as a combined unit for covered auto purposes. UFCC alleged that to read the towing exclusion to mean that coverage is excluded when an owned auto, such as a semi-trailer, is used to tow another owned auto, such as a trailer, would contradict the symbol 22 definition and renders the policy ambiguous.
{¶16} UFCC also argued that the 2006 Transcraft trailer was not hauling "autos," or that the objects the semi-truck-trailer combination carried are not "autos." UFCC maintained that those objects are not "land motor vehicles" because they are no longer capable of operation on land as motor vehicles.
{¶17} After consideration, the trial court granted appellant summary judgment regarding the punitive damages claims, but denied appellant's request for summary judgment regarding its duty to defend and indemnify appellees for all other claims and...
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