Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop

• Decision Date: 09 December 1937
• Docket Number: 6438
• Citation: 74 P.2d 171,58 Idaho 438
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: M. A. PIERSTORFF, Respondent, v. GRAY'S AUTO SHOP, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Surety, Appellants

74 P.2d 171

58 Idaho 438

M. A. PIERSTORFF, Respondent, v. GRAY'S AUTO SHOP, Employer, and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, Surety, Appellants

No. 6438

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 9, 1937

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACTION FOR COMPENSATION-HEARING BEFORE BOARD-SCOPE-RULES OF PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE, SUFFICIENCY OF-WITNESSES-EXAMINATION-INJURED PARTY-COMPETENCY-MANNER OF INJURY-PROOF.

1. A workman's statement in report of accident, that splinter entered his eye while he was prying fender brace in place was not so inconsistent with his testimony at hearing, that he did not know whether splinter flew into his face or whether he fell against stick used in prying, as to authorize denial of compensation (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.).

2. A compensation claimant need not prove exact manner in which he was injured (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.).

3. The Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed to effect object of the law and to promote justice (I. C. A sec. 43-901 et seq.).

4. It is common knowledge that the eye is most sensitive, and that serious injury thereto causes intense pain.

5. Industrial Accident Board, in passing upon compensation claim, must decide the controversy according to preponderance of evidence and reasonable probability (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.).

6. Fragmentary and negative testimony in compensation proceeding, contradictory of claimant's testimony, held not to create substantial conflict in evidence so as to render Industrial Accident Board's finding conclusive (I C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.).

7. In compensation proceeding, testimony of employer's manager that employee whom claimant had requested to inform manager of accident told manager that claimant had injured his eye otherwise than as claimed, was hearsay and incompetent.

8. The Industrial Accident Board was not at liberty to disbelieve claimant's testimony, solely on ground that claimant was interested in result of case, where there was no substantial conflict in evidence (I. C. A., secs. 43-901 et seq., 16-201 to 16-203).

9. The statute governing competency of witnesses removes all common-law disqualifications, except those expressly retained (I. C. A., sec. 16-201 to 16-203).

10. A board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of credible witness, unless inherently improbable or rendered improbable by facts and circumstances (I. C. A., sec. 16-201 to 16-203).

11. The fact that workman was a stockholder and vice president of corporate employer would not defeat recovery of compensation (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.).

12. The Workmen's Compensation Act manifests intent to give injured workman a speedy, summary, and simple remedy for recovery of compensation, without strict rules of procedure (I. C. A., secs. 43-901 et seq., 43-1403, 43-1404).

13. Where counsel for parties in compensation proceeding overlook important and material matter, Industrial Accident Board must make full and exhaustive inquiry (I. C. A., secs. 43-901 et seq., 43-1403, 43-1404).

14. The Industrial Accident Board may examine any competent witness at conclusion of his direct and cross-examination upon all relevant matters, and may subpoena and examine other competent witnesses (I. C. A., secs. 43-901 et seq., 43-1403, 43-1404).

15. The Industrial Accident Board is an administrative and fact-finding body, exercising special judicial functions, and has duty to ascertain and produce, or cause to be produced, all available, competent, and material evidence (I. C. A., secs. 43-901 et seq., 43-1403, 43-1404).

16. An appeal from Industrial Accident Board must be prosecuted directly to the supreme court under constitutional amendment (Const., art. 5, sec. 9, as amended (see Laws 1935, p. 377); Laws 1937, chap. 175).

17. Where Industrial Accident Board failed to inquire concerning important matter neglected by both parties to compensation proceeding, and denied compensation on improper grounds, and district court reversed board's decision, and thereafter amendment was adopted requiring direct appeal from board to supreme court, supreme court would reverse both board and district court, and remand for rehearing (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.; Laws 1937, chap. 175; Const., art. 5, sec. 9, as amended (see Laws 1935, p. 377).

APPEAL from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, for Nez Perce County. Hon. Miles S. Johnson, Judge.

Appeal by Gray's Auto Shop, employer, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, surety, from a judgment of the district court reversing a decision of the Industrial Accident Board denying claimant compensation in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Reversed and remanded, with instructions to grant a rehearing.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Weldon Schimke, for Appellants.

The Industrial Accident Board is the trier of the facts. A finding of fact of the Industrial Accident Board is conclusive and is binding upon the appellate court if there is any substantial evidence to support it, and has the force and effect of a verdict of the jury, and in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact by the commission the appellate court will look only to the evidence which is most favorable, adding thereto all reasonable inferences of fact to be drawn therefrom to support such finding of fact by the commission and will disregard all opposing evidence. (Estes v. General Chemical Clay Co., (Mo. App.) 93 S.W.2d 295; Industrial Com. v. Barton, 98 Colo. 51, 52 P.2d 670; Smeltzer v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Ind.App. 239, 198 N.E. 797; Hale v. State Highway Com., 262 Ky. 753, 91 S.W.2d 23; Vaughn v. Robertson & Thomas, 54 Idaho 138, 29 P.2d 756; Strouse v. Hercules Min. Co., 51 Idaho 7, 1 P.2d 203; Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Woodward, 53 Ga.App. 778, 187 S.E. 142.)

Durham & Hyatt, for Respondent.

Where one is an employee of a corporation and performs labor as a workman and receives an injury while performing such labor, he is entitled to the benefit of the Workmen's Compensation Law, regardless of the fact that he may also be a stockholder, officer and director of such corporation. (71 C. J. 507; Southern Surety Co. v. B. T. Childers, 87 Okla. 261, 209 P. 927, 25 A. L. R. 373; note, 25 A. L. R. 376; Skouitchi v. Chic Cloak & Suit Co. et al., 230 N.Y. 296, 130 N.E. 299, 15 A. L. R. 1285; note, 15 A. L. R. 1288; Stevens v. Industrial Com., 346 Ill. 495, 179 N.E. 102, 81 A. L. R. 638; Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co., 210 Mich. 370, 178 N.W. 36; Hunter v. Hunter Auto Co., 204 N.C. 723, 169 S.E. 648.)

Injuries sustained by an employee upon premises owned or controlled by the employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. (Burchett v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 48 Idaho 524, 283 P. 515; 71 C. J. 696.)

The uncontradicted testimony of an unimpeached and credible witness, though a party, cannot be disregarded by the Industrial Accident Board. (Manley v. Harvey Lumber Co., 175 Minn. 489, 221 N.W. 913; Arundel v. Turk, 16 Cal.App.2d 293, 60 P.2d 486; Baggett v. Pace, 51 Idaho 694, 10 P.2d 301; Jeffrey v. Trouse, 100 Mont. 538, 50 P.2d 872.)

HOLDEN, J. Morgan, C. J., and Ailshie, Budge and Givens, JJ., concur.

OPINION

HOLDEN, J.

This is an appeal by Gray's Auto Shop, employer, an Idaho corporation, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, surety of such employer, from a judgment of the district court reversing a decision of the Industrial Accident Board denying respondent compensation for an injury claimed to have been sustained by an accident on the evening of October 22, 1935, while claimant was working on a fender of an automobile in the shop of his employer.

Following the accident and on October 28, 1935, respondent filed with the Industrial Accident Board a report of the accident and a claim for compensation in which he stated that he was "Prying fender brace in place to hook last fender bolt in--Fender stick made of oak hard wood cracked and splinter from stick about size of darning needle penetrated (left) eye ball."

The testimony given by respondent at the hearing before the Industrial Accident Board concerning the accident is substantially as follows: That on the evening of October 22 1935, he and his wife started to drive in the family automobile from their residence down to the fire station in Lewiston to have some life insurance papers witnessed; that as they passed the shop they saw a light and stopped and that respondent went in where he found V. A. Westfall, another stockholder and employee of Gray's Auto Shop; that Westfall witnessed an insurance paper; that shortly afterwards Westfall left the shop and respondent, being then alone, went to the back end of the shop to get a drink; that in going to the back end of the shop to get drink he noticed a Chevrolet car and stopped to put a bolt in the fender brace of the car; that "Well, we have a fender stick, a notched stick that you pull up under the end of the fender to hold it in place, and I took one of these sticks. I had a light burning, and I put a block of wood on the tire and used this stick as a brace. I used one as a brace under the end of the fender and the other under the car, and I pried on this iron to get the holes to line up between the fender and the fender brace. I thought the stick broke and I fell against it. I don't know just what did happen, but it gave way some place and I fell forward and I got a stick in my eye. I don't know just what did happen. I don't know if I fell against the stick or whether the stick flew up"; that he put his hand to his eye and felt the splinter and reached up with his right hand and pulled it out; that he then went up into the office of the shop and picked up the phone and called his wife...