Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18-cv-1943-DLF-ZMF |
| Parties | JAMES E. PIETRANGELO II, Plaintiff, v. REFRESH CLUB, INC. (DBA THE WING) et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff James E. Pietrangelo, II filed this complaint against Defendants Refresh Club, Inc. and The Wing DC, LLC under the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977 ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 et seq. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.). District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich referred the case's discovery matters to a magistrate judge on January 14, 2020 under Local Rule 72.2. See Minute Order, Jan. 14, 2020. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have filed Motions to Compel Discovery. See ECF No. 44 (Renewing Pl.'s Mot. to Compel at ECF No. 28) [hereinafter Pl.'s Mot.]; ECF No. 45 (Defs.' Mot. to Compel) [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.].
Considering both motions and the responsive briefing to each, the undersigned hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Compel.
The Wing is a network of co-working and community spaces committed to the advancement of women in society. See ECF No. 11 (Defs.' MTD) at 1. As such, its facilities are geared towards women members. See id. at 1-3. After launching three locations in New York City, the Wing opened in D.C. in April 2018. See id. at 3.
On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff, a man, submitted an online application for a membership to use The Wing's facilities. See Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 28. The application asked for basic personal details, how the applicant has supported women, and what the applicant sees as the biggest challenge facing women today. See id. ¶ 11(1)(ll).1 Plaintiff responded, "I have always supported and advocated for equality for all people" and "The same challenges facing men," respectively. Defs.' MTD, Exh. A. On the following day, Plaintiff called to inquire about the status of his application and two Wing employees informed him that it would be permanently deferred because membership was only available to "self-identifying women, and individuals who don't identify on the gender binary, so non-binary individuals." See ECF No. 47 (Pl.'s Opp.) at 19.
Defendants admit, "Prior to the recent adoption of a formal, written membership policy, The Wing's practice was to admit as members only women and nonbinary individuals." Defs.' MTD at 5. Yet, Defendants also answer that Plaintiff's application was not accepted because he failed to demonstrate commitment to The Wing's mission. See Defs.' Mot. at 3. Defendants' mission is the "professional, civil, social, and economic advancement of women through community." Defs.' MTD at 1. Plaintiff alleges that as a "place of public accommodation" under the DCHRA, Defendants cannot confine membership on the basis of sex or gender identity, or on preferences like commitment to a particular philosophy that intend discrimination on that prohibited basis. See Pl.'s Opp. at 6-7.
Early on, Plaintiff sought a corporate deposition of The Wing under Rule 30(b)(6). See Pl.'s Mot. at 6-7. After Defendants objected to Plaintiff's first Notice of Deposition including thirty-one topics, see Pl.'s Mot., Exhs. 10, 14, Plaintiff submitted an Amended Notice of Deposition reduced by only a single topic and arguably adding some specificity but no reduction in scope to the others, see Pl.'s Mot., Exh. 19. Defendants attempted to work through this impasse, continuing to object to the scope. See Defs.' Mot. at 7. On September 11, 2019, Plaintiff deposed The Wing CFO Deidra Nelson as a corporate representative. See Pl.'s Mot. at 11-12. Deeming that deposition inadequate, Plaintiff here seeks to compel a second 30(b)(6) deposition. See id. at 1-2.
Additionally, Plaintiff seeks a plethora of information about The Wing as a business through interrogatories and requests for production, to prove that it is a place of public accommodation and had discriminatory policies. See Pl.'s Mot. at 47. Defendants seek detailed personal history of Plaintiff to test Plaintiff's good faith in bringing suit and the genuineness of his application. See Defs.' Mot. at 4-6.
Both parties' requests have some legitimacy but go too far.
All discovery must be "relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information "need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable." Id. Relevance "encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any party's claim or defense." United States ex. rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The requested discovery material must have "some probable effect on the organization and presentation of themoving party's case." Jewish War Veterans of the U.S., Inc. v. Gates, 506 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1975). When in doubt, "'relevance' for discovery purposes is broadly construed." Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "This broad interpretation of relevance advances Rule 26's liberal and expansive purpose of permitting the parties to develop the facts, theories, and defenses of the case." Ted Cruz for Senate v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 451 F. Supp. 3d 92, 98 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up).
"A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection [when] a deponent fails to answer a question . . . a party fails to answer an interrogatory . . . [or] fails to produce documents . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). The party moving to compel "bears the initial burden of explaining how the requested information is relevant." Jewish War Veterans, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 42. The non-moving party then takes on the burden to "explain why discovery should not be permitted." Id. at 42. Judges "have considerable discretion" over discovery matters, which "is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion." Shamesh, 314 F.R.D. at 9 (quoting Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1012). "[T]he proper scope of discovery in any case is a function of the nature of that case." Waters v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 216 F.R.D. 153, 159 (D.D.C. 2003).
A Rule 30(b)(6) deposition "allows a party to depose a corporation through representatives designated by the corporation; the designee's testimony is then generally admissible as a statement of the corporation." Banks v. Off. of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, 241 F.R.D. 370, 372 (D.D.C. 2007). The party noticing a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition "must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). "[T]he Rule obligates a corporate party toprepare its designee to be able to give binding answers on its behalf," Rainey v. Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 1998), that are complete and knowledgeable, Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp., 181 F. 3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 1999). The deponent or deponents must have knowledge of information not just within their personal knowledge but reasonably within the corporation's knowledge. See Banks, 241 F.R.D. at 373.
A Rule 30(b)(6) deponent should "not be subjected to a 'memory contest.'" Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 137, 143 (D.D.C. 1998). The duty of the corporation requires a "good faith effort" at preparing the witness for all noticed topics. See Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 530 (D. Md. 2005); see also Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. s.p.a. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 36 (D. Mass. 2001). But for a Rule 30(b)(6) witness to be found inadequate, her lack of knowledge must be "significant, conscious, and material" to a party's discovery. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 168, 173 (D.D.C. 2003).
The elements of Plaintiff's cause of action guide the discovery analysis. The relevant provision makes it unlawful to "wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the actual or perceived . . . sex . . . gender identity or expression . . . of any individual: to deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations." D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a)(1).
"'Place of public accommodation' means all places included in the meaning of such terms as . . . restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; . . . any store, park or enclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold; . . . all stores where . . . beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the premises; wholesale and retailstores, and establishments dealing with goods or services of any kind." § 2-1401.02(24). Yet this does not include "any institution, club, or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private." Id. "A place of accommodation, institution, or club shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if the place of accommodation, institution, or club: (A) Has 350 or more members; (B) Serves meals on a regular basis; and (C) Regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals, or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business." Id.
Finally, businesses can avoid lawsuits such as this one by receiving approval from the city for an "affirmative action plan" to prioritize service to historically marginalized groups, like women and non-binary people. Id. § 2-1402.53. The Wing has not represented that such a plan exists, and Plaintiff alleges that it does not. See Compl. ¶ 14(d).
Plaintiff asserts that the previous 30(b)(6) deposition was insufficient because Ms. Nelson was unable to...
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