Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club Inc.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-1943-DLF-ZMF |
| Parties | JAMES E. PIETRANGELO II, Plaintiff, v. REFRESH CLUB, INC. (DBA THE WING) et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Now before the Court is Plaintiff James E. Pietrangelo II's second motion to compel answers to interrogatories. Upon consideration of the motion, the responsive briefing, and the entire record herein, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff's motion for the reasons set forth below.
This case arises from Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Refresh Club, Inc. and The Wing DC, LLC (collectively, “Defendants” or “The Wing”) for sex-discrimination and/or gender identity-discrimination in violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1977 (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq. See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1.
Defendants operated a network of co-working and community spaces committed to the advancement of women in society.[1] See id. ¶ 6. On June 4, 2018, Plaintiff applied for membership at Defendant's Washington, D.C. location. See id. ¶¶ 18-19. Defendants' standard application requested the applicant's basic personal details, how the applicant supported women, and what the applicant saw as the biggest challenge facing women at that time. See id. ¶ 11(ll). Plaintiff responded, “I have always supported and advocated for equality for all people” and, “The same challenges facing men,” respectively. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A. The day after submitting his application, Plaintiff called The Wing to review his application status. See Compl. ¶ 21. Two Wing employees explained that The Wing had permanently deferred Plaintiff's application because Plaintiff was a man. See id. Plaintiff's central claim is that, as a “place of public accommodation” under the DCHRA, The Wing cannot restrict membership on the basis of sex or gender identity, or on one's commitment to a particular philosophy that promotes discrimination on those prohibited bases. See id. ¶¶ 10-13.
On January 14, 2020, Judge Friedrich referred all discovery matters in this case to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 72.2. See Min. Order (Jan. 14, 2020). On March 31, 2021, the undersigned ruled on Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions to compel discovery. See Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club, Inc. (Pietrangelo I), No. 18-cv-1943, 2021 WL 1209300, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2021), aff'd, 2021 WL 2156504 . Plaintiff served Defendants with a second set of interrogatories (Interrogs. 7-14) on July 7, 2021; a third set (Interrogs. 15-18) on July 25, 2021; and a fourth set (Interrogs. 19-25) on August 2, 2021. See Pl.'s 2d Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 86, at 2. Defendants served their responses on August 6, August 25, and September 3, 2021, respectively. See id. The parties twice conferred to resolve outstanding discovery disputes. See Pl.'s Mot. at 1-2. On December 20, 2021, Defendants served supplemental responses to Plaintiff's second and fourth set of interrogatories. See id., Exs. 2, 4.
On December 24, 2021, Plaintiff moved to compel answers to his second and fourth sets of interrogatories. See id., Exs. 1-2. On January 21, 2022, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. See Defs.' Opp., ECF No. 91. On January 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed his Reply. See Pl.'s Reply, ECF No. 92.
All discovery must be “relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information “need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. Relevance “encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any party's claim or defense.” United States ex. rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The requested discovery material must have “some probable effect on the organization and presentation of the moving party's case.” Jewish War Veterans of the U.S., Inc. v. Gates, 506 F.Supp.2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). When in doubt, “‘relevance' for discovery purposes is broadly construed.” Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “This broad interpretation of relevance advances Rule 26's liberal and expansive purpose of permitting the parties to develop the facts, theories, and defenses of the case.” Ted Cruz for Senate v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 451 F.Supp.3d 92, 98 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up).
A party seeking discovery may move for an order to compel if: (i) “a deponent fails to answer a question,” (ii) “a party fails to answer an interrogatory, or (iii) “a party fails to produce documents.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B). As a threshold matter, the movant “bears the initial burden of explaining how the requested information is relevant.” Gates, 506 F.Supp.2d at 42. When the “opposing party has answered the movant's requests, the movant has the burden of showing that the opposing party's responses are incomplete.” Porter v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-1546, 2014 WL 12768504, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2014). “When the opposing party refuses to respond to a discovery request, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the movant's request is burdensome, overly broad, vague or outside the scope of discovery.” United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 284 F.R.D. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'lBank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 59-60 (D.D.C. 1984)).
[T]he court must restrict the extent of discovery otherwise allowed if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “[T]he proper scope of discovery in any case is a function of the nature of that case.” Waters v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 216 F.R.D. 153, 159 (D.D.C. 2003). Judges “have considerable discretion” over discovery matters, which “is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.” Shamesh, 314 F.R.D. at 9 (quoting Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 1012).
“The elements of Plaintiff's cause of action guide the discovery analysis.” Pietrangelo I, 2021 WL 1209300, at *3. As relevant to Plaintiff's claims, the DCHRA makes it unlawful to “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based on the actual or perceived . . . sex . . . gender identity or expression . . . of any individual: to deny, directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodations.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a)(1).
I. Discrimination
Whether a defendant acted “wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason” is determined by a Title VII analysis:
[T]he plaintiff must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination, which ‘raises a presumption that the defendant's action, if otherwise unexplained, was more likely than not based on a consideration of impermissible factors.' The burden then shifts to the defendant to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether he discriminated against plaintiff, by showing a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for his actions. Finally, plaintiff must show that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext ‘either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant or indirectly by showing that the defendant's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'
See Sumes v. Andres, 938 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1996) (quoting RAP, Inc. v. D.C. Comm ni on Human Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 176 (D.C. 1984)) (internal citations omitted).
The Effects Clause of the DCHRA adds that “[a]ny practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unlawful discriminatory practice.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.68. Thus, “despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, practices are unlawful if they bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason.” Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987). A plaintiff can proffer evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent to satisfy the burden of proof. See id.; see also Mitchell v. DCX, Inc., 274 F.Supp.2d 33, 49 (D.D.C. 2003) ().
P. Place of public accommodation
On December 3, 2021, Defendants stipulated to the finding that The Wing met each element of a place of public accommodation pursuant to D.C. Code § 2-1401.02(24) at the time of the alleged discrimination. See Defs.' Opp., Ex. A.
An interrogatory may relate to any material discoverable under Rule 26(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(2). A party to whom an interrogatory is propounded “must provide true, explicit, responsive, complete, and candid answers.” Equal Rights Center v. Post Properties, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants objected to and refused to...
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