Pietrycka v. Simolan

• Decision Date: 01 March 1923
• Citation: 120 A. 310,98 Conn. 490
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: PIETRYCKA v. SIMOLAN.

120 A. 310

98 Conn. 490

PIETRYCKA v. SIMOLAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1923

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; L. P. Waldo Marvin Judge.

Action by Walter Pietrycka against Stanislaw Simolan to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence. Verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appeals. Error, and new trial ordered.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant's automobile by his invitation, that the defendant was operating the automobile, which was overturned because of the negligence, incompetence, and inexperience of the defendant, and thereby the plaintiff, who was at all times exercising due care, was injured. An amendment set out:

" Said negligence of the defendant consisted in operating said automobile so controlled by him recklessly and at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper having regard to the use, width, and traffic of said highway at said time and place and in such a manner as to endanger the life and limb of the plaintiff herein."

The answer was a general denial.

Cornelius J. Danaher, of Meriden, for appellant.

A Storrs Campbell, of Hartford, for appellee.

BURPEE, J.

The defendant claimed to have proved that with his permission the plaintiff was riding from New Haven to Southington in an automobile operated and controlled solely by the defendant that late at night, when there was little traffic on the streets, the defendant was driving toward the intersection of Main and Bristol streets in Southington, at a speed of 25 miles an hour; that as he approached the junction of these streets, another automobile ran out of Bristol street into Main street very rapidly and directly toward the defendant's car; that to avoid a collision he turned to the left very sharply, and thereupon his car skidded about 50 feet on the street railway tracks, then overturned, pinned the plaintiff under it, and thus caused his injuries; and that the plaintiff did not at any time exercise any control over the automobile, nor give any warning of danger. No claim was made that the plaintiff by his conduct contributed essentially to his resulting injuries.

The plaintiff claimed to have proved that the portion of the town of Southington around the junction of Main and Bristol streets is thickly settled, where the buildings average for the distance of a quarter of a mile less than 100 feet apart; that the rate of speed of the defendant's automobile exceeded 20 miles an hour for more than a quarter of a mile while it was operated through this part of the town; and that the defendant did not reduce this speed nor make any signal as he approached the intersection of these streets, although signboards were erected and legible for a distance of more than 100 feet. It does not appear that any conflicting evidence concerning these matters was offered.

Calling the attention of the trial court to the complaint, and asserting that it alleged in effect that the defendant drove his automobile so recklessly and negligently as to overturn it and thus injure him, the plaintiff requested the court to charge the jury in the language of section 25, chapter 400, of the Public Acts of 1921, as follows:

" Reckless Driving. No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions, or so as to endanger the property or life or limb of any person. * * *"

And he asked the court further to direct their attention to section 26 of the same act, which declares what is prima facie evidence of reckless driving in these terms:

" If the rate of speed of a motor vehicle operated on any public highway exceeds thirty miles an hour for a distance of one quarter of a mile, or if such rate of speed exceeds twenty miles an hour for a quarter of a mile through the thickly settled portion of any town, city or borough where the buildings average for such distance less than one hundred feet apart, such rate of speed shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person operating such motor vehicle is operating the same in violation of the provisions of section 25 of this act. * * *"

Then the plaintiff asked the court to instruct the jury that, if they found that the defendant operated his automobile recklessly in this respect, then there was a violation of these statutes, and if they further found that the accident took place as a result of such recklessness, and was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, it was their duty to render a verdict for the plaintiff. In response to these requests the trial court charged the jury as follows:

" Now, similarly, with reference to the rate of speed. Reference has been made here to the statutes of the State of Connecticut. I think they have been read to you. It is unquestionably the proper function of the legislature to say that a certain rate of speed in a thickly populated community is prima facie evidence of negligence, and that another rate of speed under other conditions is prima facie negligence; and that is what the Legislature has said. The Legislature has not said or forbidden a motor vehicle to proceed at a higher rate of speed, and this provision, as I understand it, is prima facie evidence which should be considered, but can be overcome by proof of conditions existing which make the rate of speed at the time a reasonable one. I have told you before in other cases that a rate of speed is naturally a varying thing. What is a reasonable rate of speed varies with the circumstances and surroundings, whether the person is in a thickly populated community, or otherwise, or approaching an intersecting highway or in the open country. * * * And then, as to the rate of speed, as to the reckless driving: You will have to be satisfied by fair preponderance of the evidence that there was an excessive rate of speed, and you will have to be satisfied that that excessive rate of speed contributed or brought about this accident in order to find for the plaintiff."

We do not think that these instructions were adapted to the issues raised and the apparently undisputed facts of this case. The court stated certain general principles of law, but gave the jury no safe guidance to a correct result. It was the duty of the court to direct the jury how to apply the particular law applicable to the facts of this case. Morris v Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Sisson v. Stonington, 73 Conn. 348, 353, 47 A. 662. It should have informed them distinctly what their conclusion should be if they found that the prima facie evidence had not been overcome, and that the defendant was driving recklessly within the definition prescribed by the statute, or had violated the statute by the manner in which he operated his motor vehicle. Considering the allegations of the complaint and the evidence, together with the plaintiff's requests, the court was called on to go beyond a mere statement of the common-law principles which fix the measure of duty which one person owes to another respecting his person or property, and the violation of which is negligence. The Legislature, with unquestionable authority, has established an arbitrary standard for the test of conduct in operating motor vehicles in the highways of this state. It has prescribed that certain acts, plainly stated or specifically defined, shall not be done. A violation of the statute is a violation of the duty which one person owes to another in respect to person or property, and therefore is negligence of itself, and when it is the proximate cause of injury it is actionable neghgence. Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 508, 77...