Pifer v. Single Source Transportation

• Decision Date: 07 March 2002
• Docket Number: 01-807
• Citation: 69 S.W.3d 1
• Parties: HENRY PIFER, APPELLANT, VS. SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE,SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS Opinion Delivered 0
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

HENRY PIFER, APPELLANT VS SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE

No. 01-807

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

Opinion Delivered 03/07/02

APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, CLAIM NO. E909634,

REVERSED AND REMANDED. ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Associate Justice

Appellant, Henry A. Pifer, was injured at work while returning to his truck from the restroom. The employer, Single Source Transportation, contested his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Pifer sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. In construing Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2001), the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission reversed the ALJ's award and dismissed Mr. Pifer's claim. The Commission found that Mr. Pifer was not performing employment services at the time of the accidental injury. The Arkansas Court of Appeals, in a 4-2 unpublished opinion, reversed the Commission's decision and remanded for further consideration consistent with Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001). See Pifer v. Single Source Transportation, CA01-86, slip op. (Ark. App. July 5, 2001). This court accepted Single Source's petition for review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(e) (2001). On appeal, Mr. Pifer contends that the Commission erred in its interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). We agree, and reverse the Commission's decision.

Standard of Review

Upon a petition for review, we consider a case as though it had been originally filed in this court. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission's decision, and we uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Id.

Facts

Henry A. Pifer worked as a truck driver for First Source Transportation during a seven-year period prior to the accident. On June 7, 1999, Mr. Pifer returned to his employer's terminal after delivering a load around 11:15 a.m. At that point, according to Mr. Pifer's testimony, he was in need of a restroom break: "I had to go to the bathroom very bad and when I pulled around, I just locked the truck down when I say locked down, I mean the brakes, and I run in to use the bathroom." The truck was left running. After using the restroom upstairs in the office, he spoke briefly with two co-workers and started to return to the truck to do his paperwork, complete his log book, secure the truck, and do a safety check. While returning to his truck, Mr. Pifer was hit on the left side of his back by a co-worker's pickup, knocking him five to six feet. Had he not been injured, Mr. Pifer testified that he would have done his paperwork, secured the truck, done a post check on the truck, turned in his paper work, and gone home after checking to see it there was another load for him that day.

Employment Services.

The pivotal issue presented by this case is whether, pursuant to Act 796 of 1993, codified at Ark. Code. Ann. §§ 11-9-101, et seq. (Repl. 1996, Supp. 2001), Mr. Pifer was performing employment services when he sustained an injury while on a restroom break at an employer-provided restroom located on the employer's premises.¹ To evaluate Mr. Pifer's claim and the full Commission's decision, we are called upon to interpret the phrase "in the course of employment" and the term "employment services" as used in Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) and 9-11-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2001). When interpreting a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001); Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

Act 796 of 1993 made significant changes in the workers' compensation statutes and in the way workers' compensation claims are to be resolved. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra. Claims arising from injuries occurring before the effective date of Act 796 (July 1, 1993) were evaluated under a liberal approach. Eddington v. City Electric Co., 237 Ark. 804, 376 S.W.2d 550 (1964); Ark. Stat. Ann., § 81-1325(b)(4) (Supp.1979). However, Act 796 requires us to strictly construe the workers' compensation statutes. Ark. Code. Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3); White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra. The doctrine of strict construction directs us to use the plain meaning of the statutory language. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, supra, and Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, supra.

Act 796 defines a compensable injury as "[a]n accidental injury . . . arising out of and in the course of employment . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). A compensable injury does not include an "[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). However, Act 796 does not define the phrase "in the course of employment" or the term "employment services," Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). It, therefore, falls to this court to define these terms in a manner that neither broadens nor narrows the scope Act 796 of 1993. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). When the meaning of a statutory term is ambiguous, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Stephens v. Arkansas Sch. for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939, 20 S.W.3d 397 (2000).

Since 1993, we have twice been called upon to construe the statutory language found in sections 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) and 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). See White v. Geogia-Pacific Corp., supra, and Olsten Kimberly Quality Care, supra. We have held that an employee is performing "employment services" when he or she "is doing something that is generally required by his or her employer . . . ." White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100. We use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing "employment services" as we do when determining whether an employee was acting within "the course of employment." White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra; Olsten Kimberley, supra. The test is whether the injury occurred "within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee [was] carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interest directly or indirectly." White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100 and Olsten Kimberly, supra.

It is well-settled that any interpretation of a statute by this court subsequently becomes a part of the statute itself. Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Comm'n, 336 Ark. 130, 984 S.W.2d 418 (1999); Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993). The General Assembly is presumed to be familiar with this court's interpretations of its statutes, and if it disagrees with those interperetations, it can amend the statutes. Without such amendments, however, our interpretations of the statutes remain the law. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, supra.; Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997). Although aware of our interpretation of the term "employment services" in White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Olsten Kimberley, the General Assembly has not changed section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) or section 11-9-102(4)(b)(iii), other than to renumber those sections. See 2001 Ark. Acts 1757 and 1999 Ark. Acts 20. Accordingly, this court's interpretation of the pertinent statutory language remains the law.

Mr. Pifer would have this court either reaffirm the personal-comfort doctrine² or hold that a restroom break is a necessary function and directly or indirectly advances the interests of the employer. Conversely, Single Source contends that an employee is not performing employment services during a restroom break, or any personal break, because the personal-comfort doctrine is not consistent with a strict construction of Act 796. Since the enactment of Act 796, we have not directly addressed the personal-comfort doctrine.³ To automatically accept a personal-comfort activity as providing employment services would impermissibly broaden the requirements of Act 796. On the other hand, to automatically reject a personal-comfort activity as not providing employment services would impermissibly narrow the requirements of Act 796. Instead of following either extreme position, the critical issue is whether the employer's interests are being advanced either directly or indirectly by the claimant at the time of the injury. In addressing this issue, we decline to adopt the factors identified by the court of appeals in Matlock v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra.

We note that the activity of seeking toilet facilities, although personal in nature, has been generally recognized as a necessity such that accidents occurring while an employee is on the way to or from toilet facilities, or while he or she is engaged in relieving himself or herself, arise within the course of employment.⁴ As the court of appeals...