Pigford v. Veneman
| Citation | 217 F.Supp.2d 95 |
| Decision Date | 11 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | Nos. CIV.A.97-1978(PLF), CIV.A.98-1693(PLF).,s. CIV.A.97-1978(PLF), CIV.A.98-1693(PLF). |
| Parties | Timothy PIGFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann M. VENEMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Mezines, Alexander John Pires, Jr., Conlon, Frantz, Phelan & Pires, David A. Branch, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Richard Talbot Seymour, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Washington, DC, J. L. Chestnut, Jr., Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Pettaway, Campbell & Albright, Selma, AL, John Michael Clifford, Mona Lyons, Clifford, Lyons & Garde, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Marcus B. Jimison, Stephon J. Bowens, Durham, NC, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Michael Sitcov, Terry M. Henry, Susan Hall Lennon, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Daniel Edward Bensing, U.S. Department of Justice Federal Programs Branch, Amanda Quester, Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Consumer Protection, David Monro Souders, Weiner Brodsky Sidman & Kider, PC., Elizabeth Goitein, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Wyndell Oliver Banks, Washington, DC, for Non party.
Randi Ilyse Roth, St. Paul, MN, Pro se.
John Wesley Davis, Washington, DC, James W. Myart, Jr., Law Offices of James W. Myart, Jr., & Associates, San Antonio, TX, for Claimant.
Evans M. Folins, Los Valores, CA, Pro se.
Dennis Charles Sweet, Lanston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese, Jackson, MS, Ford C. Ladd, Alexandria, VA, Gerald Robert Lear, Arlington, VA, for Movants.
Evelyn M. Coleman, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Willie S. Maymon, Rolling Fork, MS, Pro se.
Colie Dixon, Sr., Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
L D. Maymon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Lois S. Clark, Wesson, MS, Pro se.
Curtis Dixon, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Linda Catching, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Henry A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Floria A. Vaughn, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Marilynn Stewart, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Ezra McNair, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se.
Grover Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Geraldstine Miller, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Larry D. Barnes, Harrisville, MS, Pro se.
Edith Lomax-Barnes, Crystal Springs, MS, Pro se.
Daryl Brentr, Pinola, MS, Pro se.
Curtis Dixon, Jackson, MS, Pro se.
Harold B. Dixon, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
Larry Garrett, Georgetown, MS, Pro se.
Velma J. Collins, Hazlehurst, MS, Pro se.
The Court has before it two motions filed by several pro se members of the plaintiff class: a motion to vacate the Consent Decree in this case or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings pending order on said motion, and a motion to remove lead Class Counsel, both requesting an emergency hearing.1 Because the Court finds that these motions concern common issues, the Court will address both motions together.
The Court finds no grounds to grant the extraordinary relief sought by movants. To the extent that these motions are based on the recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case, see Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir.2002) movants have misread that opinion and the prior Orders of this Court cited therein.
With respect to the motion to vacate the Consent Decree, movants rely on the court of appeals' statement that the Decree is "unworkable." See Motion to Vacate Consent Decree at 2. In making that determination, however, the court of appeals necessarily was referring only to the tight deadline schedule of the Track B process—since that was the matter before it—although the judgment was influenced by the court's assessment of counsel's overall performance when faced with a workload well beyond what anyone could have imagined and counsel's failure to seek the assistance of this Court or other lawyers earlier. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 926-27. The Consent Decree therefore was described as "unworkable" only with respect to the Track B process established by the Consent Decree and the relatively few Track B cases in which crucial deadlines were missed. See id. With respect to those cases, this Court may now fashion a narrow remedy that is "suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." Id. at 927 (). As the government notes, to vacate the Consent Decree would be "`far too broad' a remedy" to address the "unforeseen obstacles" that have arisen in some Track B cases. Government Opposition to motion to vacate Consent Decree at 4 (citing Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 927). See also Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 748. Although Class Counsel have encountered many difficulties in the implementation of this enormously complex settlement agreement, those difficulties do not warrant vacating the Consent Decree.
Indeed, to vacate the Consent Decree would nullify the settlement of this case, "the grand, historical first step toward righting the wrongs visited upon thousands of African-American farmers for decades by the United States Department of Agriculture," Pigford v. Glickman, 127 F.Supp.2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.2001), and would undo the substantial progress that has been made for so many African-American farmers in the long five years since this case was filed. To vacate the Consent Decree also would require that every dollar already paid out to African-American farmers, whether in cash awards or in the form of debt relief or tax relief, be returned to the government. See id. To date, nearly $800 million of relief has gone to approximately 13,000 families of African-American farmers.2 Requiring these families to pay back the considerable sums that they received would be an extreme, unwarranted remedy that would bring great hardship to thousands of members of the class.
In urging the Court to vacate the Consent Decree, movants have made much of the court of appeals' reference to the "double betrayal" of African-American farmers; first, historically, by the Department of Agriculture and then—at least as this Court reads the opinion—by counsel in litigating the merits of certain individual claims under the Consent Decree. To the extent that some have read the "double betrayal" language more broadly, they are taking it out of context. As noted, the court of appeals' ruling pertained only to those Track B cases where crucial discovery and other deadlines have been missed, not to any events occurring before or even closely following entry of the Consent Decree. See Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d at 927. The ruling did not relate at all to the over 20,000 Track A cases that were not the subject of the court of appeals' opinion. While the court of appeals criticized Class Counsel's failings regarding Track A, the ruling itself did not turn on those errors but only on the mishandling of Track B claims. Finally, the court of appeals' "double betrayal" language could not have related to any actions that may have been taken—or not taken—by the Department of Agriculture after the settlement, because any such actions necessarily would be beyond the scope of this case and its settlement. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 92, 110-11 (D.D.C.1999), aff'd, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C.Cir.2000) ().
Similarly, the references by this Court and the court of appeals to conduct "border[ing] on malpractice," related only to counsel's failure "to meet critical consent decree deadlines," Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 27, 2001 at 5, deadlines required to be met after the Consent Decree was approved. Class Counsel ably litigated the case throughout its early stages, and they negotiated and entered into a fair settlement for the class as a whole. Indeed, this Court has noted just how remarkable Class Counsel's performance was at those early stages in vigorously litigating this case to the brink of trial and negotiating a landmark settlement with the government. See id. at 4-5 (). To the extent that the Court has been justifiably critical of Class Counsel, its concerns have related only to counsel's handling of the implementation process after entry of the Consent Decree. See id.; Pigford v. Veneman, 143 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C.2001); Pigford v. Veneman, 148 F.Supp.2d 31 (D.D.C.2001). Class Counsel's failings in handling certain matters after entry of the Consent Decree cannot provide a basis for vacating the Consent Decree.
Removal of Class Counsel at this stage would be an extreme action that should not be taken lightly. Removal of counsel would be appropriate only if the Court were to find that it was absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the adversary process, as, for example, where an attorney's conflict of interest undermines the Court's confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his or her client, or where the attorney is in a position to use privileged information concerning the other side as a result of prior representation. See Board of Education of the City of New York v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.1979); see also Koller ex rel. Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d...
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Pigford v. Veneman, CIV.A. 97-1978(PLF).
...by the Consent Decree and the relatively few Track B cases in which crucial deadlines were missed. See id. Pigford v. Veneman, 217 F.Supp.2d 95, 98 (D.D.C.2002). Today, slightly more than two years after that decision, certain individual class members once again ask the Court to modify the ......
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