Pigford v. Vilsack

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Writing for the Court: PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge
• Citation: Pigford v. Vilsack, 78 F.Supp.3d 247 (D. D.C. 2015)
• Decision Date: 21 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 98–1693 PLF,Civil Action No. 97–1978 PLF
• Parties: Timothy Pigford et al., Plaintiffs, v. Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant. Cecil Brewington et al., Plaintiffs, v. Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

78 F.Supp.3d 247

Timothy Pigford et al., Plaintiffs

v.Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Cecil Brewington et al., Plaintiffs

v.Tom Vilsack, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 97–1978 PLF

Civil Action No. 98–1693 PLF

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 21, 2015

Charles Jerome Ware, Charles Jerome Ware, P.A., Columbia, MD, Faya R. Toure, Selma, AL, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling LLP, David A. Branch, Law Office of David Branch, Jacob A. Stein, Stein, Mitchell & Muse, L.L.P., Richard Talbot Seymour, Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Barbara Kim Kagan, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, Joshua A. Doan, Caroline Lewis Wolverton, U.S. Department of Justice, Mona Lyons, Law Offices of Mona Lyons, Phillip L. Fraas, Washington, DC, Marcus B. Jimison, NCCU School of Law, Durham, NC, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Charles J. Ogletree Consulting, Cambridge, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Andrea Iris Newmark, Daniel Edward Bensing, Elizabeth Goitein, Herbert E. Forrest, Julie Straus, Matthew Josephson, Tamra Tyree Moore, Terry Marcus Henry, Joel L. McElvain, Michael Sitcov, Stephen McCoy Elliott, Marsha Stelson Edney, Megan Anne Crowley, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Elbert Lin, Office of the West Virginia Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on motions filed by two Track B claimants who seek vacatur of the arbitrator's dismissal of their claims. Six years ago, these claimants filed separate civil actions seeking somewhat different relief, yet in part raising the same arguments on which they now base the present motions. The Court at that time concluded that it had no authority to entertain these arguments, which were clearly foreclosed by the terms of the Consent Decree in this case. The same conclusion holds true today, and the Court therefore will deny the claimants' motions.¹

I. BACKGROUND

The two Track B claimants presently seeking relief are Lucious Abrams, Jr. and Cecil Brewington.² Both were members of the original group of plaintiffs named in the complaint in this action, in which a class of African American farmers sued the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) for discriminating against them in the provision of farming credit and benefits. In April 1999, this Court approved a Consent Decree that settled the plaintiffs' claims and created a mechanism for resolving individual claims of class members outside the traditional litigation process. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C.1999). Class members could choose between two claims procedures, known as Track A and Track B. Pigford v. Schafer, 536 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2008). Track A claims were decided by a third-party neutral known as an adjudicator, and claimants that were able to meet a minimal burden of proof were awarded $50,000 in monetary damages, debt relief, tax relief, and injunctive relief. Id. Track B imposed no cap on damages and also provided for debt relief and injunctive relief; but claimants that chose Track B were required to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence in one-day mini-trials before a third-party neutral known as an arbitrator. Id. Under the terms of the Consent Decree, all decisions of the adjudicator and the arbitrator were final and not subject to review in any judicial forum, except that the Monitor, a court-appointed third-party neutral, could, on petition for review, direct the adjudicator or the arbitrator to reexamine claims if the Monitor determined that “a clear and manifest error ha[d] occurred” that was “likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i), 12(b)(iii)).

Claimants Abrams and Brewington both elected to pursue Track B claims. On May 31, 2005, the arbitrator issued a decision dismissing Abrams' claim, concluding that, “Claimant cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence any claims of discrimination brought against Defendant.” Arbitrator's Abrams Decision at 6. Likewise, on June 6, 2005, the arbitrator dismissed Brewington's claim. Arbitrator's Brewington Decision at 6–7. Neither Abrams nor Brewington invoked his right to seek Monitor review of the denial of his claim. See Abrams Am. Mot. at 37–39; Brewington Mot. at 37–39. Accordingly, under the terms of the Consent Decree and a subsequent stipulation by the parties, the arbitrator's decisions became final 120 days following the issuance of the decision on each claim. See Consent Decree ¶ 10(i); Stipulation & Order (July 14, 2000) (setting 120–day period within which to petition for Monitor review).

On October 14, 2008, Abrams and Brewington filed substantially identical complaints in this Court in which they sought to renew their claims of discrimination against USDA by bringing new civil actions. See Abrams v. Vilsack, 655 F.Supp.2d 48, 52 (D.D.C.2009) ; Brewington v. Vilsack, Civil Action No. 08–1762(PLF), 2009 WL 2617910, at *1 & n. 2 (D.D.C.2009) (noting identity of the two cases, and incorporating analysis and conclusion contained in Court's Memorandum Opinion relating to Abrams' complaint). Mr. Abrams and Mr. Brewington each invoked recently passed legislation that afforded certain defined Pigford claimants who had not timely submitted claims the right to file new lawsuits by tolling the statute of limitations and providing a cause of action for such claims. SeeAbrams v. Vilsack, 655 F.Supp.2d at 51–52. The Court dismissed both Abrams' and Brewington's complaints for failure to state a claim, as neither claimant fell within the class of Pigford claimants for whom Congress had provided relief. See Abrams v. Vilsack, 655 F.Supp.2d at 53 ; Brewington v. Vilsack, 2009 WL 2617910, at *1.

The Court also noted that the claimants, in their complaints, had asserted that the arbitrator's decisions on their Track B claims were invalid, on the ground that the arbitrator had dismissed the claims prior to holding a hearing on either claim. See Abrams v. Vilsack, 655 F.Supp.2d at 52 & n. 4. Abrams and Brewington argued that the arbitrator's dismissals thus violated both the Consent Decree and their constitutional right to due process. See id. But the Court stated that it lacked authority to entertain any such claim, as the Consent Decree unequivocally provided that decisions of the arbitrator were final and not subject to judicial review. Id. at 52 & n. 5.

In late 2014, Mr. Abrams and Mr. Brewington filed the motions presently before the Court. Both claimants are represented by the same counsel, and their motions are virtually identical.³ Abrams and Brewington complain that the arbitrator refused to extend filing deadlines to allow them to supplement the evidentiary records supporting their claims, and that the arbitrator then dismissed their claims prior to holding any hearing on them, on the ground that the existing records failed to show prima facie cases of discrimination. See Abrams' Am. Mot. at 8–10 & nn.15–16; Brewington Mot. at 8–10 & nn.15–16. Invoking Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Federal Arbitration Act, they contend that this Court should vacate the arbitrator's decisions on the basis of these purported violations of the Consent Decree and of due process. Each maintains that he should be given a hearing before the arbitrator on his claim. Abrams' Am. Mot. at 40; Brewington Mot. at 40. The defendant, USDA, has filed memoranda in opposition to the claimants' motions, and neither Mr. Abrams nor Mr. Brewington has filed any reply.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court will deny Mr. Abrams' and Mr. Brewington's motions for the same reason that was set forth more than five years ago, when the Court previously addressed their contention that the arbitrator's dismissal of their Track B claims without a hearing denied them due process of law and violated their rights under the Consent Decree. Now, as then, “[t]he Court has no authority to address such claims,” as “[n]othing in the Consent Decree authorizes the Court to grant [vacatur of the arbitrator's decisions and resurrection of the claimants' Track B claims].” Abrams v. Vilsack, 655 F.Supp.2d at 52 & nn. 4–5. As the Court then explained, “[t]he Consent Decree provides that decisions of the arbitrator are final (except that the parties may petition the [M]onitor for review), and that those who seek relief under Track B ‘forever waive their right to seek review in any court or before any tribunal of the decision of the arbitrator with respect to any claim that is, or could have been decided, by the arbitrator.’ ” Id. at 52 n. 5 (quoting Consent Decree ¶ 10(i)). This provision regarding the finality of the arbitrator's decisions, set forth in Paragraph 10(i) of the Consent Decree, mirrors virtually identical provisions establishing the finality of the adjudicator's decisions on claimants' Track A claims.See Consent Decree ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v) (concerning assertion of only non-credit claims under a USDA benefit program). Thus, with respect to decisions of the adjudicator on Track A claims and decisions of the arbitrator on Track B claims, the parties, in negotiating the terms of the Consent Decree, agreed that these decisions would be final and not subject to judicial review “in any court or before any tribunal.” Id. ¶¶ 9(a)(v), 9(b)(v), 10(i).

Following a day-long fairness hearing at which all interested persons were heard and their views carefully considered, the Court found that the terms of the Consent Decree, including its finality provisions, were fair, adequate, and reasonable under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. at 107–08, 112–13. With respect to the finality provisions of the Consent Decree specifically, the Court stated:

[T]he decisions of the adjudicators on Track A claims and the decisions of the

...