Pigg v. Howard, Case No. 11-CV-796-GKF-FHM
| Decision Date | 20 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-CV-796-GKF-FHM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
| Parties | STEVEN RAY PIGG, Petitioner, v. BRUCE HOWARD, Warden, Respondent. |
Before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. # 1) filed by Petitioner, a state inmate appearing pro se. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. # 6) and provided the state court records (Dkt. ## 6, 7) necessary for adjudication of Petitioner's claims. Petitioner did not file a reply to Respondent's response. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be denied.
BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2008, in Locust Grove, Oklahoma, Officer Tim Cooper (Cooper) stopped a vehicle because it had a broken windshield and its driver's side mirror was missing. Petitioner Steven Pigg (Petitioner) was driving the vehicle and Robert Justice (Justice) was the front seat passenger. Cooper observed that Justice smelled of marijuana and appeared to be under the influence of marijuana. After obtaining Petitioner's consent to search the vehicle, Cooper ran his drug dog around the vehicle. The dog did a "head throw" beside the trunk and alerted beside thepassenger door. Both Petitioner and Justice were placed under arrest at the scene. Deputy Davis arrived as backup and assisted Cooper with searching the vehicle. They found marijuana "shake" on the floorboard and a small baggie containing a white powder in a brown paper sack just behind the middle console. The white powder field tested positive for methamphetamine. Petitioner told Cooper he did not know anything about the methamphetamine found in his car.
Based on those events, Petitioner was charged, by Information filed in Mayes County District Court, Case No. CF-2008-258, with Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine), After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (Count I); Driving With License Suspended (Count II); and Defective Vehicle (Count III). After his request for a continuance was denied, Petitioner waived a jury trial and proceeded with a non-jury trial, held on April 29, 2010. The trial judge accepted Petitioner's pleas of guilty to Counts II and III and found Petitioner guilty of Count I. On July 26, 2010, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to twenty (20) years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 on Count I, and fines of $100 and $10 on Counts II and III, respectively. Petitioner was represented during trial by attorney Brant Shallenburger.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). Represented by attorney S. Gail Gunning, Petitioner raised the following proposition of error:
Proposition 1: The evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charge against Appellant in Count I - Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine).
(Dkt. # 6-1). In addition, Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief raising an additional proposition of error, as follows:
Appellant was denied the right to jury trial in violation of Amendments VI and XIV of the United States Constitution and Article II Sections 19 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Id. at 17. On October 24, 2011, in Case No. F-2010-724, the OCCA entered its unpublished summary opinion, rejecting both propositions of error and affirming the Judgment and Sentence of the district court. (Dkt. # 6-3). Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari at the United States Supreme Court nor did he file an application for post-conviction relief in the state district court.
Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. # 1) on December 22, 2011. As his petition, Petitioner simply attaches the two briefs filed on direct appeal and requests reversal of the Judgment and Sentence or favorable modification of the sentence on Count I based on the two claims raised in the briefs. Id. In response to the petition, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Dkt. # 6).
ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether Petitioner meets the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). Petitioner fairly presented his habeas grounds to the OCCA on direct appeal. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner satisfied the exhaustion requirement before filing his habeas petition.
The Court further finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted as Petitioner has not met his burden of proving entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1998).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides the standard to be applied by federal courts reviewing constitutional claims brought by prisoners challenging stateconvictions. Under the AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated a claim, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas relief only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386 (2000); Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (10th Cir. 2001). "Clearly established Federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (citations omitted).
When a state court applies the correct federal law to deny relief, a federal habeas court may consider only whether the state court applied the federal law in an objectively reasonable manner. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002); Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2002). An unreasonable application by the state courts is "not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)). The petitioner "'must show that the state court's ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011)); see also Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013).
"When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. Section 2254(d) bars relitigation of claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts and federal courts review these claims under the deferential standard of § 2254(d). Id. at 784; Schriro v.Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Further, the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Here, Petitioner presented grounds 1 and 2 to the OCCA on direct appeal. Because the OCCA addressed Petitioner's claims on the merits, the Court will review these claims under the standards of § 2254(d).
As his first ground of error, Petitioner claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine). (Dkt. # 1 at 9). In support of this claim, Petitioner argues that the trial testimony of defense witness Regina Ball (Ball) "should be given significant weight." Id. at 15. Petitioner also asserts that his conviction on Count I was based on "no more than suspicion": suspicion resulting from his prior drug-related convictions, suspicion resulting from the drug dog's alert to the passenger side door of the vehicle, and suspicion attributable to Petitioner's proximity to the methamphetamine found in the car. (Id. at 13-15). Petitioner concludes that "[t]he totality of the evidence presented in Mr. Pigg's trial falls short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine found in the back seat of the car he was driving." (Id. at 16). In adjudicating this claim on direct appeal, the OCCA cited Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), and ruled as follows:
We find that a reasonable trier of fact could have found Appellant guilty of the crime of Possession of CDS beyond a reasonable doubt. Where actual possession is absent, constructive possession can be inferred through "additional factors" including other incriminating evidence. Johnson v. State, 1988 OK CR 246, ¶ 6, 764 P.2d 530, 532. Additional factors were present here. Ms. Ball's testimony creates only a conflict of evidence to be decided by the trier of facts. Dolph v. State, 1974OK CR 46, ¶ 10, 520 P.2d 378, 381. The trial court, within its discretion, decided the credibility of all evidence presented and found Appellant guilty. Proposition one is denied.
In a habeas proceeding, the Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prosecution" and asks whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The same test applies to both jury and bench trials. United States v. Mayberry, 913 F.2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1990). "This standard of review respects the [fact finder's] responsibility to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony presented at trial." Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Jack...
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