Pike v. Dickson

• Decision Date: 22 November 1963
• Docket Number: No. 18470.,18470.
• Parties: Charley Luther PIKE, Appellant, v. Fred R. DICKSON, Warden, California State Prison, San Quentin, California, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

323 F.2d 856 (1963)

Charley Luther PIKE, Appellant, v. Fred R. DICKSON, Warden, California State Prison, San Quentin, California, Appellee.

No. 18470.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

October 18, 1963.

Rehearing Denied November 22, 1963.

Henry A. Dietz, Saratoga, Cal., for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., of California; Albert W. Harris, Jr., Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Before POPE, HAMLEY and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.

POPE, Circuit Judge.

The appellant Charley Luther Pike, convicted of first degree murder in a California Superior Court and sentenced to death, filed in the court below his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his sentence of death was the result of proceedings in the State court which had denied him due process of law. No question is raised as to the appellant having exhausted his State remedies in the light of the decision in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837.

The petitioner filed his petition in the court below in propria persona and he was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The petition, although couched in good English, is an inexpertly drawn legal document. Petitioner stated that he was not versed in the law and that his education did not go beyond the seventh grade.

In view of these circumstances it is appropriate that the petition be read in the manner suggested by Chief Judge Sobeloff in United States v. Glass, 4 Cir., 317 F.2d 200, 202, as follows: "Where the layman's papers clearly show what he is driving at, it is usually in the interest of justice and may in the long run save time to temper the reading of the papers with a measure of tolerance." This court has applied the same rule of construction of a layman's pleadings in Thomas v. Teets, 9 Cir., 205 F.2d 236, 238.¹

Pike's petition complains of the conduct of the prosecuting attorney at his trial in two respects. The first complaint has to do with the prosecuting attorney's mode of questioning prospective jurors on their voir dire examination with respect to their willingness to join the other jurors in bringing in a verdict of death. He then alleges that what he asserts to have been an unfair method of questioning jurors was followed in the final argument of the prosecutor by an improper emphasis upon the answers given on voir dire. The petition's allegations in this respect are set forth in the margin.²

The second respect in which petitioner attempts to allege a denial of fair trial relates to a part of what is asserted to have been a portion of the closing argument of the prosecutor to the jury. The allegation is that the remarks of the prosecutor to the jury operated to deprive petitioner of the right to effective aid of counsel and to deny him a fair trial. This portion of the petition is set forth in the margin.³

What the petitioner was attempting to claim was that the way the prosecutor interrogated the jurors as to their attitudes toward the imposition of the death penalty, and the prosecutor's closing remarks to the jury were so extremely prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner that they operated to deny him a fair trial and to deprive him of due process of law. It is noted also that the petitioner challenges as incorrect or inaccurate the California Supreme Court's account of what transpired at the trial.

When this petition, which prayed for an order to show cause why the petition should not be granted, was presented to the trial judge, the judge made an order simply reciting that he had carefully examined and considered the petition and found it without merit. The court then added "It is to be noted that the matters urged upon this court have been fully considered by the Supreme Court of the State of California in People v. Pike, 58 A.C. 69, * * * which Court reached the same conclusion. It is to be noted that certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States." See People v. Pike, 58 Cal.2d 70, 22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656. Accordingly the petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied and dismissed.

At the outset it is to be noted that the procedure adopted by the trial court was inadequate. Assuming, as we do, that the petition failed completely or adequately to set forth a claim, yet it is entirely clear that the petition was susceptible to amendment. The settled rule with respect to a pleading which is inexpertly drawn and fails to set forth facts in a proper manner was stated authoritatively in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80; as follows: "In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. * * * The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."⁴

Far from affording any opportunity for an amendment of the petition, the court proceeded to pass upon its merits upon the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court of California rendered upon Pike's mandatory appeal. It is plain that petitioner had the right to challenge the State Supreme Court's version of the facts about the mode of his trial.

With all of its ineptitude the petition was plainly aimed at making two points: the first, a question of fact, was its assertion that what happened at petitioner's trial was not as recited in the opinion of the California Supreme Court but rather as set forth in the petition; the second, was that the misconduct of the prosecutor alleged in the petition was so egregious as to deny the petitioner a fair trial, which is another way of saying that he was deprived of due process of law.

The clear impropriety of relying upon a State Supreme Court's decision as a conclusive determination of questions of this kind is too well settled to require argument. United States ex rel. Jennings v. Ragen, 358 U.S. 276, 79 S.Ct. 321, 3 L.Ed.2d 296, is a case almost precisely in point. There petitioner claimed denial of constitutional rights through the interjection in the evidence of a confession which he alleged was coerced through physical mistreatment. The district court dismissed the application without a hearing. The Supreme Court noted that the district court in dismissing the application "simply relied on the facts and conclusions stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois." This was held to be error and that dismissal by the district court should not have taken place without that court "first satisfying itself, by an appropriate examination of the State court record, that this was a proper case for the dismissal of petitioner's application without a hearing, in accordance with the principles set forth in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-465, 506."

The reason why a State court's adjudication of the facts relating to a claim of denial of constitutional right cannot be final or binding upon a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding was noted in Brown v. Allen, supra, 344 U.S. at p. 500, 73 S.Ct. at 443, 97 L.Ed. 469, as follows: "But the prior State determination of a claim under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose consideration here of such a claim, else the State court would have the final say which the Congress, by the Act of 1867, provided it should not have. * * *"

This court had occasion to discuss that proposition in Cranor v. Gonzales, 9 Cir., 226 F.2d 83, 93.

Another question, one of law, is whether the actual conduct of the prosecutor at petitioner's trial was sufficiently prejudicial so as to prevent a fair trial.

Here again the federal court is not bound by the State court's conclusion that the conduct was not prejudicial. In Chavez v. Dickson, 9 cir., 280 F.2d 727, 737, this court had occasion to say upon this point: "A question of law is presented as to whether the trial court error was so prejudicial as to deprive Bates of due process of law. As to this the federal district court was not bound by the state court conclusion that the error was not prejudicial."

The contention of the appellee Warden here is that the asserted misconduct on the part of the district attorney would amount to no more than recital of mere errors of law in a state criminal trial. It is said that this does not raise a federal question and hence there would be no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, citing Buchalter v. People of State of New York, 319 U.S. 427, 431, 63 S.Ct. 1129, 87 L.Ed. 1492, and Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 226 to 229, 62 S.Ct. 280, 285 to 286, 86 L.Ed. 166. This, we think, overlooks the strong current of present judicial authority respecting the sort of errors which are so serious as to amount to a denial of a fair trial and of due process of law.

It may be conceded that a mere error committed in the course of a trial would not, under ordinary circumstances, be deemed so fundamental as to measure up to a deprivation of due process; but, as always, circumstances alter cases, and the presently recognized rule appears to be that errors which operate to affect the fairness of a jury's consideration of a case may be so egregious as to amount to a denial of a fair trial. The test to be applied in determining whether errors are so egregious was stated by us in Chavez v. Dickson, supra, as follows: "It is only where criminal trials in state courts are conducted in such a manner as amounts to a disregard of that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice that due process is offended and that federal court interference is warranted," 280 F.2d at 735, citing Lisenba v. California, supra. And see cases cited in our footnote to that statement.

Illustrating the application of such...