Pilgrim Real Estate v. Superintendent of Police of Boston

• Decision Date: 28 May 1953
• Citation: Pilgrim Real Estate v. Superintendent of Police of Boston, 112 N.E.2d 796, 330 Mass. 250 (Mass. 1953)
• Parties: PILGRIM REAL ESTATE, Inc. v. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OF BOSTON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 796

112 N.E.2d 796

330 Mass. 250

PILGRIM REAL ESTATE, Inc. v.SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OF BOSTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 5, 1953.

Decided May 28, 1953.

Richard A. Kaye, Boston, for petitioner.

John V. Bonner, Boston, for respondents.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus by a domestic corporation owning residential real estate located upon a street opposite a public park, owned by the city and maintained under the supervision and control of the board of park commissioners, brought against the respondents, the super-intendent of police of Boston and the commissioner of police respectively, seeking the revocation of an order given to the members of the police department 'not to institute any criminal proceedings against motorists who park their vehicles in the park, the general intent of such order or orders being not to enforce rule No. 11[of the board of park commissioners] in so far as it applies to the park,' and to require them to enforce the rule.¹The petitioner appealed from a judgment dismissing the petition after the sustaining of the respondents' demurrer.

This petition is not brought to protect any proprietary interest in property of the petitioner, nor to enforce any special or peculiar interest different in kind and nature from that possessed by citizens in common who reside in the general vicinity or who have occasion to travel along the highways in its neighborhood.The apparent object of the petition is to secure on the part of the respondents the performance of a public duty which, if it exists, was owed by them to all the citizens.In such a proceeding, the petitioner is a nominal party, for the real party in interest is all the people.The enforcement of this rule of the park commissioners, if we assume, without deciding, that it prohibits the parking of automobiles--which is the only matter complained of--is a matter of public interest.The only petitioner is a corporation and the question arises whether it alone ² has a standing to maintain the petition.It has been frequently decided that where the object of a petition is to procure the enforcement of the law, a petitioner'without special interest in the subject matter independent of the rights of the public, has a standing by reason of his citizenship to maintain a petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce a public duty of interest to citizens generally.'Police Commissioner of City of Boston v. City of Boston, 279 Mass. 577, 585, 181 N.E. 790, 793;Kelley v. Board of Health of Peabody, 248 Mass. 165, 169, 143 N.E. 39;Sears v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 327 Mass. 310, 314-315, 98 N.E.2d 621.

A corporation, unlike a natural person, owes its existence to the sovereign, having such powers as have been expressly conferred upon it together with such powers as may be implied, or are incidental or auxiliary to the powers expressly granted, or are reasonably necessary in order to enable it to carry out the object for which it was organized.The scope of its powers and the extent of its liability are limited by the act creating it.Teele v. Rockport Granite Co., 224 Mass. 20, 24-25, 112 N.E. 497;Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel Russell Boiler Works, Inc., 258 Mass. 453, 455, 155 N.E. 422;American Surety Co. v. 14 Canal Street, Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 125, 176 N.E. 785;Limerick Mills v. Royal Textile Co., 288 Mass. 479, 193 N.E. 9.A corporation, in the absence of a statute or some restrictions in its charter, may maintain all such actions as may be necessary to protect its rights and to secure compensation for damage to its property, and is liable for injuries caused to another, all upon similar grounds as natural persons and to the same extent.But the present proceeding does not involve rights of this character.

The rights now attempted to be asserted are those which arise out of citizenship.It is true, apart from any statute showing an intent to include a corporation as a citizen, that corporations are considered as citizens for some purposes, principally for the purpose of determining jurisdiction of the Federal courts, Swiss National Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42, 46, 45 S.Ct. 213, 69 L.Ed. 504;People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 479-480, 53 S.Ct. 447, 77 L.Ed. 903; but it is settled that a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, art. 4, § 2, which provides that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Mass. 239, 74 N.E. 467;Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236 Mass. 185, 128 N.E. 4;Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 45, 20 S.Ct. 518, 44 L.Ed. 657;Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 48 S.Ct. 577, 72 L.Ed. 978, nor within § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits a State from enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United...