Pillar Title Agency v. Pei
| Decision Date | 12 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14-cv-525 |
| Parties | Pillar Title Agency, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Yezhe Pei, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on several motions. Specifically, the following motions, filed by Defendant Yezhe Pei, are before the Court for resolution: the "motion to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery requests which violate court order" (Doc. 34); the "motion to compel Blazek to serve documents to defendants pursuant to F.R.C.P. 5, for fair time to reply, and memorandum that plaintff [sic] Blazek have [sic] lied again" (Doc. 40); and the "motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery, and to sanction plaintiff Blazek for contempt of court" (Doc. 42). Also before the Court are Plaintiffs' "motion for court ordered mediation via attorney mediator" (Doc. 31) and motion to compel (Doc. 37). For the reasons set forth below, the following motions will be granted in part and denied in part: Mr. Pei's "motion to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery requests which violate court order" (Doc. 34), Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. 37), and Mr. Pei's "motion to compel Blazek to serve documents to defendants pursuant to F.R.C.P. 5, for fair time to reply, and memorandum that plaintff [sic] Blazek have [sic] lied again" (Doc. 40). Mr. Pei's "motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery, and to sanction plaintiff Blazek for contempt of court" (Doc. 42) and Plaintiffs' "motion for court ordered mediation via attorney mediator" (Doc. 31) will be denied.
Plaintiffs Pillar Title Agency and James N. Blazek filed this lawsuit on June 4, 2014 against Defendants Yezhe Pei and Yelp! Corporation alleging that Mr. Pei published false statements about them on the internet. More specifically, Plaintiff brought claims for defamation, libel, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress/intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed Yelp! Corporation from this lawsuit. Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking injunctive relief, which the Court denied.
On August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Mr. Pei and Advameg, Inc. d.b.a. City Data alleging defamation, libel, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress/intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with business relations. Plaintiffs later dismissed Advameg, Inc. d.b.a. City Data.
Thereafter, Mr. Pei filed an unopposed motion to quash a subpoena issued by Plaintiffs to his employer and for a protective order directing that information responsive to the subpoena not be provided to Plaintiffs. In the motion, Mr. Pei represented that he was not served with a copy of the subpoena issued to his employer. In an order issued on January 16, 2015, the Court accepted Mr. Pei's factual representation, quashed the subpoena, and granted the protective order. In addition, the Court advised Plaintiffs to avoid any future noncompliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4).
On February 10, 2015, Mr. Pei filed a "motion to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery requests which violate court order." (Doc. 34). In the motion, Mr. Pei seeks to quash discovery on the grounds that "this Court lacks personal jurisdiction (FRCP 12(B)(2))" over him, and the discovery requests "the same documents that have been prohibited by the Court Order (Doc. 30)." Id. at 2. Mr. Pei argues that, in seeking the discovery, Plaintiffs have violated the Court's January 16, 2015 order. Consequently, Mr. Pei "moves for sanctions ... against PlaintiffBlazek, which include the dismissal of this case and a monetary fine." Id. Plaintiffs filed a memoranda in opposition to the motion to quash and motion to compel discovery on February 18, 2015. (Doc. 37).
On March 16, 2015, Mr. Pei filed a "motion to compel Blazek to serve documents to defendants pursuant to F.R.C.P. 5, for fair time to reply, and memorandum that plaintff [sic] Blazek have [sic] lied again" (Doc. 40). In the motion, Mr. Pei contends that Plaintiffs failed to serve him with their memorandum in opposition to his motion to quash (Doc. 37) and their response to his pending motion for Rule 11 sanctions, for attorneys' fees, and for an oral hearing (Doc. 38). Mr. Pei requests that the Court compel Plaintiffs to provide him with service of these documents and grant him fourteen days from the time of service to file a response. Plaintiffs have not opposed Mr. Pei's motion.
On March 27, 2014, Mr. Pei filed a "motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery, and to sanction plaintiff Blazek for contempt of court." (Doc. 42). Mr. Pei contends that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) and (f), a party may not seek discovery prior to the parties conferring. Mr. Pei states, "Plaintiff Blazek did not contact Defendant Pei in any means to discuss discoveries [sic], nor did he attempted [sic] to do so before he sent out his discovery in January 2015." (Doc. 42). On this basis, Mr. Pei seeks to quash Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Mr. Pei also states that it is "reasonable to levy a fine on Plaintiff Blazek for his waste of court resources and contempt of court." Id. at 3. Plaintiffs filed a memoranda in opposition to the motion on April 8, 2015. (Doc. 43).
Plaintiffs filed a "motion for court ordered mediation via attorney mediator." (Doc. 31). Although Mr. Pei did not file a memoranda in opposition, he addresses Plaintiffs' motion in his "motion to dismiss the case and to sanction pliantiff [sic]Blazek for his contempt of court and persuant [sic] to F.R.C.P. 11." (Doc. 35). Mr. Pei states that, "[i]n short, because of Plaintiff Blazek's dishonesty, mediation via attorney may be another waste of litigation resource [sic]." Id. at 35. Thus, Mr. Pei does not wish to mediate the matter at this time.
This Court first examines Mr. Pei's "motion to quash plaintiff Blazek's discovery requests which violate court order." (Doc. 34). As an initial matter, and contrary to Mr. Pei's argument, the Court will not quash Plaintiffs' discovery requests on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. That issue is before the District Judge and need not be resolved in order to address the discovery dispute raised in Mr. Pei's motion. Turning to the substance of the motion, Mr. Pei does not set forth or attach the disputed discovery requests. He does, however, specifically object to Plaintiffs' request for "all paystubs from the employer Oppenheimer Company or Oppenheimer Brokerage," on the grounds that this request was "denied in the Court Order" issued on January 16, 2015. Id. at 3. Although not entirely clear, Mr. Pei seems to suggest that Plaintiffs again issued a subpoena from his employer to obtain the requested information.
In their memoranda in opposition, Plaintiffs attach the requests that are purportedly at issue, which are directed to Mr. Pei, and not to his employer. The requests ask Mr. Pei to:
(Doc. 37, Ex. 1 at 2). In addition to opposing Mr. Pei's motion, Plaintiffs move the Court to compel the requested discovery. Although the motion to compel appears to be directed to Mr. Pei, who is the recipient of the attached discovery requests, Plaintiffs ask the Court to "compel Microsoft to produce the documents requested...." Id. at 3. They also move "to compel Defendant to mediate," which is the subject of a separate motion. Id.
Information subject to disclosure during discovery need not relate directly to the merits of the claims or defenses of the parties. Rather, it may also relate to any of the myriad of fact-oriented issues that arise in connection with the litigation. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978). On the other hand, the Court has the duty to deny discovery directed to matters not legitimately within the scope of Rule 26, and to use its broad discretionary power to protect a party or person from harassment or oppression that may result even from a facially appropriate discovery request. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Additionally, the Court has discretion to limit or even preclude discovery which meets the general standard of relevance found in Rule 26(b)(1) if the discovery is unreasonably duplicative, or the burden of providing discovery outweighs the benefits, taking into account factors such as the importance of the requested discovery to the central issues in the case, the amount in controversy, and the parties' resources. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Finally, the Court notes that the scope of permissible discovery which can be conducted without leave of court has been narrowed somewhat by the December 1, 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules. Rule 26(b) now permits discovery to be had without leave of court if that discovery "isrelevant to the claim or defense of any party ...." Upon a showing of good cause, however, the Court may permit broader discovery of matters "relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." Id.
There is no question that "'[t]he proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant.'" Guinn v. Mount Carmel Health Systems, 2010 WL 2927254, *5 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2010) quoting Clumm v. Manes, Case No. 2:08-cv-567 (S.D.Ohio May 27, 2010) ...
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