Pillisz v. Smith, 4461.

• Decision Date: 07 February 1931
• Docket Number: No. 4461.,4461.
• Citation: 46 F.2d 769
• Parties: PILLISZ v. SMITH.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

46 F.2d 769 (1931)

PILLISZ v. SMITH.

No. 4461.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

February 7, 1931.

Maurice T. Weinshenk, of Chicago, Ill. (Helen B. Jerry, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellant.

George E. Q. Johnson, U. S. Atty., and Thomas Dodd Healy, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.

SPARKS, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Pillisz, an alien and subject of Hungary, was regularly admitted to the United States on July 26, 1922. On October 3, 1929, he was arrested on a warrant issued by an assistant to the Secretary of Labor charging him with having been convicted of manslaughter, a crime involving moral turpitude, prior to his entry into the United States. Pillisz was given a hearing on this charge on October 21, 1929, before the immigration inspector at Chicago, he being present and also represented by his attorney, and the charge was sustained. A warrant of deportation was thereupon issued ordering the alien deported for having been convicted of the crime of manslaughter prior to his entry into the United States, to wit, on January 23, 1919. Upon appellant's petition to the District Court, a writ of habeas corpus was issued (June 30, 1930). The issues being joined, a hearing was had and the writ was dismissed. The alien was thereupon remanded for deportation, and the appeal is from that order.

In support of the appeal appellant contends: (1) That the crime of manslaughter does not involve moral turpitude; (2) that the alien was convicted of the crime of manslaughter more than five years prior to his entry into the United States; and (3) that the alien was not accorded a fair hearing by the immigration inspector.

The alien admitted that prior to his entry into the United States he was guilty and was convicted of manslaughter; but appellant insists that manslaughter does not involve moral turpitude. The evidence shows that before his entry the alien engaged in an altercation with one Joseph Kolerits over the destruction of a fence which belonged to Kolerits; that the alien attacked Kolerits with a knife, and, as a result thereof, the said Kolerits died; that the alien was tried therefor by his own government on the charge of manslaughter, and was convicted. These facts are not denied, and are substantiated by the record of the foreign court.

We assume, therefore, that self-defense, if relied upon, availed the alien nothing; that he used more force than was reasonably necessary in the proper defense of his person; or that, whatever may have been the defense, the court of his own country found that the act had been committed under such circumstances as would not excuse him for taking the life of a human being.

We know of no greater moral law than that which discountenances the taking of human life without excuse, and one who violates it is to that extent morally depraved. We hold, therefore, that moral turpitude was involved in the crime for which the alien was convicted.

In United States ex rel. Allessio v. Day (C. C. A.) 42 F.(2d) 217, it is held that manslaughter in the first degree involves moral turpitude. It would seem from the record that in Hungary decrees in manslaughter are not recognized; but it is difficult to conceive of a greater degree of manslaughter than that for which the alien was convicted. It is true that he regarded the crime as very trivial and one for which he was not at fault, but the court of his own country did not take that view of it, and neither can we.

Appellant's second contention involves the construction of section 155, title 8, US CA, which is section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917. This section authorizes the Secretary of Labor to deport certain...