Pilot v. Kollar-Kotelly, Case No. 17-cv-01337 (CRC)
| Decision Date | 18 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-cv-01337 (CRC) |
| Parties | MICHAEL CHARLES PILOT, Petitioner, v. COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, Personally and Individually; JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Officially; CHANNING D. PHILLIPS, Officially, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Pro Se Plaintiff Michael Pilot has an unfortunate history of personally suing District Court Judges whose rulings he dislikes. See, e.g., Pilot v. Goldsmith, 17-cv-09929, (CKK) (). Earlier this year, Judge Kollar-Kotelly of this Court denied Pilot's habeas petition because none of the respondents named in that case had custody over Pilot, and a proper habeas petition must be directed at "the person with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court[,]" Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242) (internal quotation marks omitted). See May 23, 2017 Memorandum Opinion and Transfer Order, 17-cv-09929, ECF No. 4. Judge Kollar-Kotelly then transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where Pilot's original habeas petition was still pending. Id. Judge Kollar-Kotelly subsequently denied Pilot's motion for leave to file a motion requesting reversal of the transfer order. Id., ECF Nos. 6-7.
Less than two months later, Pilot filed the present action in this Court against Judge Kollar-Kotelly, in her personal and individual capacity; United States Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, in his official capacity; and the Acting United States Attorney Channing D. Phillips, in his official capacity. See July 6, 2017 Compl., 17-cv-01337, ECF No. 1. Pilot's 94-page complaint raises a series of largely incomprehensible claims, but it appears at bottom to seek a declaratory judgment vacating the transfer order and money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 85-86. Pilot has since moved to convene a three-judge panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 to review the transfer order. See Pl.'s Mot. Convene Three-Judge Court, ECF No. 3.
The Court has the authority to dismiss a case "at any time" if it determines that the complaint is (1) frivolous, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). All three grounds apply here and lead the Court to deny Pilot's motion, dismiss the case in its entirety, and quash the summons that have been issued to be served upon the defendants. First, the case is frivolous. When a judge issues an order against him, Pilot's proven pattern is to file a complaint with a new judge naming the prior judge as a defendant. Not only are these suits a backdoor attempt to relitigate his already decided claims, they are also a complete waste of judicial resources.
Second, "[a]s a general principle, it is well settled that transfer orders are not appealable final orders." Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. F.T.C., 981 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). While Pilot has not styled his complaint as an appeal from the transfer order, what he seeks is essentially that—a three-judge panel to review and reverse the order. Furthermore, Pilot has failed to specify any statute authorizing a three-judge court to be convened for this purpose. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (). Pilot likewise fails to state claims onwhich relief may be granted under § 1983. He asserts, for example, that Judge Kollar-Kotelly acted in gross negligence by "[c]ontinuing to engage in improper abusive tactics as to the Removal of action" and "[i]gnoring common sense and federal common law[,]" Compl. 49-50; defamed him by publishing the transfer order, see id. at 54; and conspired with Judge Goldsmith to violate state and federal law, see id. Nowhere does Pilot offer facts to support these accusations or evidence that Judge Kollar-Kotelly at any time acted outside of her official duties as a judge. Because "[Pilot's] Complaint relies substantially, if not entirely, on naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement," Ilaw v. Dep't of Justice, 148 F. Supp. 3d 24, 37 (D.D.C. 2015) (CKK), he has failed to state a claim.
Finally, the case must be dismissed on immunity grounds. As to the claims against Judge Kollar-Kotelly, "[j]udges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in [their] judicial capacity, unless [the] actions are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). Such "immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Pilot named Judge Kollar-Kotelly as a respondent and attached her transfer order to his complaint. "Absolute immunity applies here because Judge [Kollar-Kotelly] was acting in her judicial capacity when she made the decisions challenged by [Pilot]." Ilaw, 148 F. Supp. 3d at 34...
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