Pimental v. River Junction Estates, LLC

• Decision Date: 14 September 2021
• Docket Number: AC 42644
• Citation: 263 A.3d 847,207 Conn.App. 361
• Parties: Donald PIMENTAL et al. v. RIVER JUNCTION ESTATES, LLC, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

207 Conn.App. 361

263 A.3d 847

Donald PIMENTAL et al.

v.RIVER JUNCTION ESTATES, LLC, et al.

AC 42644

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 3, 2020

Officially released September 14, 2021

Stephen T. Penny, Manchester, for the appellant (named defendant).

Kenneth R. Slater, Jr., Hartford, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Mark R. Brouillard, Putnam, for the appellees (defendant town of Thompson et al.).

Prescott, Moll and Harper, Js.

MOLL, J.

In Connecticut, one method of establishing a public highway is through the common-law theory of dedication and acceptance. See Montanaro v. Aspetuck Land Trust, Inc. , 137 Conn. App. 1, 10, 48 A.3d 107, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 932, 56 A.3d 715 (2012). This appeal concerns the trial court's determination that the defendant River Junction Estates, LLC (River Junction), failed to prove, pursuant to such theory, that a portion of Starr Road in the town of Thompson (town), i.e., from approximately 0.15 miles beyond Starr Road's intersection with New Road to the Rhode Island state border (disputed portion), is a public highway. River Junction appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a trial to the court—in favor of the plaintiffs, Donald Pimental, Melissa Pimental, Jayson Livingstone, and Gail Livingstone,¹ as well as the defendant town—on the plaintiffs’ claim to quiet title to the disputed portion of the road. River Junction's primary claim on appeal is that the court erred in failing to find a manifested intent by the owner of the fee to dedicate the disputed portion of Starr Road to public use. Because we disagree with River Junction's primary claim, which is dispositive of this appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.²

The following facts, as found by the trial court or as are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties agree that Starr Road, from its intersection with New Road and travelling thereon for approximately 0.15 miles to the northeast corner of a cul-de-sac, is a public highway. Beyond the cul-de-sac, the road extends to the Rhode Island state border; it is this portion of Starr Road beyond the cul-de-sac that is in dispute.

The Pimentals are the fee simple owners of approximately 7.49 acres of real property located at 40 Starr Road (Pimental property), and the Livingstones own in fee simple approximately ten acres of real property located at 55 Starr Road (Livingstone property). As is relevant to this appeal, River Junction owns in fee simple approximately 15.70 acres of real property (River Junction property) between the Pimental property and the Buck Hill Management Area, the latter of which is owned and managed by the state of Rhode Island. The River Junction property was part of a 112 acre site acquired by River Junction in May, 2004. The Pimental, Livingstone, and River Junction properties are located beyond the cul-de-sac, accessible only by way of the disputed portion of Starr Road, with the River Junction property and the Livingstone property across from one another, separated by the disputed portion. Both the Livingstone property and the River Junction property share their easterly borders with the state of Rhode Island. The Pimental property is located on the northerly side of Starr Road, west of the River Junction property.

The defendant Inland Wetlands Commission of the Town of Thompson (commission) is the duly authorized municipal agency empowered to regulate wetlands and watercourses and to enforce the inland wetlands regulations of the town pursuant to the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act, set forth in General Statutes § 22a-36 et seq. On September 4, 2015, River Junction submitted a permit application to the commission to conduct a regulated activity by constructing a bridge across a watercourse and wetlands for a driveway to access the River Junction property (wetlands permit application). The drawings associated with the wetlands permit application included permission to divert water from a regulated intermittent watercourse. The commission held three public hearings on the wetlands permit application in January and February, 2016, and thereafter denied that application.

Meanwhile, River Junction had modified the plans to remove the water diversion work and, on November 16, 2015, submitted another permit application to conduct water diversions as public highway improvements (second application) within the disputed portion of Starr Road. Pursuant to § 7.5 of the town's inland wetlands regulations, an application to conduct a regulated activity requires the written consent of the property owner. On the second application, River Junction asserted ownership of the property where the regulated activity was proposed to occur. Town Ordinance No. 10-041 requires the submission of an application to the town's Board of Selectmen (board) for any proposal to conduct work on a public highway within the town. By town ordinance, approval by the board or its designee is required to authorize road improvement work. By letter dated November 16, 2015, Paul A. Lenky, the then first selectman of the town, purported to give River Junction the required consent to submit the second application.

In January and February, 2016, pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19 (a), the Pimentals and the Livingstones, respectively, filed notices of intervention in which they asserted that the activity described in the application would involve conduct by River Junction that would have, or was reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing, and/or destroying the public trust in the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. A public hearing on divers dates from February through June, 2016, followed. On July 20, 2016, the commission voted to approve the second application, conditioned on the board's issuance of an approval pursuant to Town Ordinance No. 10-041—approval that required a determination by the commission that Starr Road is a public highway.

Following the conditional approval by the commission, the plaintiffs commenced this action by way of a two count complaint on August 15, 2016. Count one, which was directed to the commission and River Junction, was brought as an administrative appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8, whereby the plaintiffs sought to have the decision by the commission granting River Junction's second application reversed. In count two, which was directed to the town and River Junction, the plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the disputed portion of Starr Road pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31.³ The plaintiffs filed a motion to bifurcate adjudication of the two counts—such that the court would try count two first—on the ground that if the court found in favor of the plaintiffs on count two, count one would be rendered moot. The court, Calmar, J., granted that motion by agreement of the parties. Thereafter, on February 14, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended, operative complaint (as to count two only), which was submitted in a format directed by the court that indicated which allegations remained in dispute for trial purposes.

In its defense, River Junction maintained that it was entitled to make improvements to the disputed portion of Starr Road and to travel on it as a public highway.

In its answer, River Junction asserted two special defenses, both sounding in estoppel, alleging that the town was estopped from denying that Starr Road was a public highway.⁴ The first special defense was grounded on allegations that in 1978, incident to the approval of a subdivision, the town had accepted a deed for a 17 foot wide strip of land along the southerly boundary of Starr Road, commencing at its intersection with New Road and extending approximately 1246 feet, resulting in a widening of that portion of Starr Road to 50 feet. According to River Junction, that acceptance constituted an acknowledgement by the town in 1978, that Starr Road was a public road. The second special defense rested on allegations that, in connection with three different lots, the town issued building permits, including to the Pimentals and the Livingstones’ predecessor in title, on land located beyond the cul-de-sac. The significance of these issuances was that town zoning regulations required lots to have frontage on a public road in order to be buildable. River Junction alleged that, as a result of the town's foregoing conduct, three of the four properties beyond the cul-de-sac—exclusive of its own—received confirmation that those lots were buildable, having frontage on a public road.

On February 15, 16 and 22, 2018, the plaintiffs’ quiet title claim, set forth in count two, was tried to the court. The trial included a site visit by the court with counsel. Following posttrial briefing, on January 11, 2019, the trial court entered an order finding in favor of the plaintiffs and the town, with a memorandum of decision to follow. In a comprehensive memorandum of decision dated February 6, 2019, the court explained that River Junction had failed to prove that the disputed portion was a public highway. Specifically, the court stated that River Junction had failed to establish (1) a manifested intent by the owner to dedicate the disputed portion for public use, and (2) acceptance by the proper authorities or by the general public. As found by the court, "Starr Road is a town road or public highway only for approximately 0.15 miles from New Road to the northeast edge of the cul-de-sac."⁵ This appeal followed.⁶ Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

River Junction claims on appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that it failed to demonstrate a manifest intention by the owner of the fee to dedicate the disputed portion of Starr Road to public use. To put River Junction's claim in its proper context, we note at the outset that, as was made clear by counsel for River Junction at oral argument before this court, its position is that...