Pimentel v. Houk

• Decision Date: 25 January 1951
• Citation: 101 Cal.App.2d 884,226 P.2d 739
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PIMENTEL v. HOUK. Civ. 7808.

Page 739

226 P.2d 739

101 Cal.App.2d 884

PIMENTEL v. HOUK.

Civ. 7808.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 25, 1951.

Hearing Denied March 26, 1951.

C. Ray Robinson, Merced, for appellant.

Landram & Silveira, Merced, for respondent.

ADAMS, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff sued defendant for the collection of two promissory notes. Defendant filed an amended answer and a 'counterclaim and/or cross-complaint,' the latter being in two counts. In the first count defendant sought damages against plaintiff, alleging that he was the lessee of certain lands and the owner of certain implements and farming equipment essential for the farming of his leased lands upon which he had growing crops of beets, peas, onions and lettuce; that plaintiff, at the time of the filing of his action against defendant, caused a writ of attachment to issue, and, well knowing that defendant's farming equipment was necessary for the farming of his land, 'because of that fact, and not for the purpose of collecting the alleged debt sued upon in said action, but for the sole, single and express purpose of financially destroying defendant and cross-complainant, did, wilfully, deliberately and maliciously cause said Writ of Attachment to be served and levied upon the said tractors, tillage implements and farming equipment hereinabove referred to'; and that 'as the sole, direct and proximate result of the said wilful, deliberate and malicious serving and levying of said Writ of Attachment, this defendant and cross-complainant was deprived of the use and possession of said tractors, tillage and farming equipment,' and 'as the direct and proximate result of the wilful, deliberate and malicious levy' of the said writ there were lost and destroyed large acreages of sugar beets, peas, onions and lettuce, of varying values set forth, approximating a total of $50,000.00.

In the second count it was alleged that plaintiff interfered with the conduct of defendant's farming business by wilfully, deliberately and maliciously filing his action against defendant; that plaintiff well knew that the tractors, etc., were essential to defendant's farming business and did wilfully, deliberately and maliciously cause the writ of attachment 'to be issued and levied upon said tractors, tillage implements and farming equipment, all with the intent to injure and harass this defendant and cross-complainant, and for the sole, single and express purpose of destroying the said farming business, and financially injuring defendant and cross-complainant.' It was also alleged that plaintiff knew that certain creditors of defendant held chattel mortgages upon some of defendant's equipment, and that he wilfully, maliciously and deliberately interfered with the conduct of defendant's business by personally urging creditors to repossess the mortgaged equipment all with the intent to injure and harass defendant, and for the sole and express purpose of destroying defendant's farming business, and injuring him financially. Resulting losses, such as were alleged in the first count, were then averred as results of the 'levying of said Writ of Attachment.'

Plaintiff demurred to the cross-complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action in either count, and on the grounds of uncertainty, ambiguity and unintelligibility for failure to set forth the nature, location or extent of defendant's lands, or what were the alleged tractors, tillage implements and farming equipment, or the nature, location or extent of the crops of beets, peas, onions and lettuce.

The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and dismissed the amended cross-complaint. From the latter judgment this appeal was taken.

Appellant makes no contention that plaintiff's action was one wherein a writ of attachment properly might not issue, nor does he contend that the cross-complaint states a cause of action for malicious prosecution. He concedes that the writ was regularly issued and served; but he urges that his cross-complaint is based upon an abuse of process. Quoting from 80 A.L.R. 580, 581, he urges that 'an action for the abuse of attachment process may be maintained although the attachment has not been vacated'; and that the 'gist of an action for abuse of process is the improper use of process after it has been issued.' The question, then, is whether the process in this case was used for an improper purpose.

In Prosser on Torts, at pages 894-895, it is said: 'The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. * * * The ulterior motive may be inferred from the wrongful use made of the process, but the use itself may not be inferred from the motive.'

In the case before us it may be conceded that the allegation that plaintiff caused the attachment to issue without any purpose of collecting the debt but solely for the purpose of destroying defendant financially, may constitute a sufficient allegation of an ulterior purpose; but we are of the opinion that defendant failed to allege use of the process for a purpose not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. It was entirely proper in the regular proceeding--to collect the notes sued upon--for plaintiff to resort to an attachment of defendant's assets. It is not alleged that said attachment covered property exempt from execution, that it covered an excessive amount of defendant's property, that the debt alleged to be owed by defendant was otherwise secured, or that defendant requested that the levy be made upon other property. On the face of the record plaintiff was fully within his rights in causing the writ of attachment to be issued and served; and the fact that he may have had an ulterior motive to destroy defendant financially did not render the use of the writ one improper in the...