Pinchon v. Washburn
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-03031 |
| Citation | 532 F.Supp.3d 543 |
| Parties | Edward PINCHON, Petitioner, v. Russell WASHBURN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Michael C. Holley, Federal Public Defender's Office, Nashville, TN, for Petitioner.
John H. Bledsoe, III, Nicholas S. Bolduc, Tennessee Attorney General's Office, Nashville, TN, for Respondent.
In 1998, a Tennessee jury found Edward Pinchon guilty of murder. Pinchon was only 17 years old when the murder took place. Without accounting for how the mitigating qualities of Pinchon's youth might affect his prison term, Pinchon was sentenced to "imprisonment for life." Under Tennessee law, "imprisonment for life" is, at a minimum, 51 years in prison. Thus, Pinchon's earliest release will come at age 68. Worst case, he will be 77 before he is released.
Over a decade after Pinchon's conviction, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). There, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits automatically sentencing juvenile offenders—even murderers—to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455. "Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences," the Court explained. Id. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. "It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional." Id. "It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him." Id. And mandatory life without parole "disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it." Id.
Based on Miller , Pinchon asked the Tennessee courts to grant him relief. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that Miller prohibited mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders and while Pinchon was a juvenile offender, his sentence was not life without parole. So the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals denied Pinchon's Miller claim.
Pinchon then turned to federal court, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. This Court referred all pretrial matters to Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern. Although there are strong arguments that Miller's holding extends to Pinchon's lengthy sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) greatly restricts a federal court's ability to second guess state court decisions. Magistrate Judge Newbern recognized this, and in a thorough and well-reasoned report, she recommends that Pinchon's petition be denied under § 2254(d).
Both Pinchon and Warden Russell Washburn have filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, the Court will overrule these objections and adopt the Magistrate Judge's report.
Pinchon faced challenges growing up. He came from a poor family and school records indicate that his home was "extremely inadequate." (See Doc. 25, PageID.88.) Pinchon attended a special-needs school and his formal education ended in the 10th grade. Pinchon v. State , No. M2003-00816-CCA-R3PC, 2004 WL 193055, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2004). And according to one psychological examiner, Pinchon's IQ was (and is) in the upper 60s, which corresponds to mild mental retardation
. Id. at *2.
When Pinchon was 17 years old, he somehow got involved in a sexual relationship with a man in his 40s, Leslie Handy. State v. Pinchon , No. M1999-00994-CCA-R3CD, 2000 WL 284071, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2000). Handy occasionally bought clothes for Pinchon, and Pinchon would stay at Handy's place about five nights a week. Id. Although it is not clear how much of this evidence was presented at trial, Pinchon says that Handy took advantage of his "many vulnerabilities, i.e., youth, poverty, and intellectual disability" and "essentially paid Pinchon for sex by buying him clothes and giving him food and a place to sleep." (Doc. 25, PageID.88.)
On April 21, 1997, Handy was killed. That day, Pinchon and three other boys arrived at Handy's place. Pinchon , 2000 WL 284071, at *1. According to a neighbor who was over at Handy's at the time, after Pinchon and Handy wrestled playfully, Pinchon went and retrieved a shotgun. Id. Handy told Pinchon to stop acting foolish, and Pinchon said he would "bust [Handy's] head to the fat." Id. But ultimately, Pinchon put the shotgun away and he and the three other boys left. Id. A few minutes later, Handy's phone rang and the neighbor who was still over at Handy's answered. Id. Pinchon was on the line. Id. He told the neighbor that he wanted to speak to Handy and that he was "going to kill that bitch." Id. About 15 minutes later, Pinchon and his three companions returned to Handy's; the neighbor was still there, and, according to her, Pinchon said, "How much you bet I won't kill that g-d_____ bitch?" Id. Pinchon pulled out a .22 pistol, which prompted the neighbor to leave. Id. About 10 seconds later, she heard a gunshot; shortly after that, she heard more gunshots. Id. Pinchon and two of the companions would later say that the fourth person with them, Josh Graham, argued with Handy and that they saw Graham run to the car with the .22 pistol. Id. at *2.
Over a year after Handy's death, the State of Tennessee arrested Pinchon. Pinchon , 2000 WL 284071, at *3. At trial, the neighbor testified as described above, and Pinchon and two of the companions implicated Graham. Id. at *2. It appears that Graham did not testify because he had since been murdered. Id. at *2. In September 1998, a Tennessee jury convicted Pinchon of first-degree murder. (Doc. 27-2, PageID.279.)
Pinchon was sentenced to "imprisonment for life." Under Tennessee law, a person convicted of first-degree murder can receive one of three sentences: death, life in prison without the possibility of parole, and imprisonment for life. Tenn. Code 39-13-202(b) (1997). Because Pinchon was a juvenile at the time of Handy's death, he was not eligible for the death penalty. Tenn. Code § 37-1-134(a)(1) (1997). And the State of Tennessee did not seek life in prison without the possibility of parole. Pinchon , 2000 WL 284071, at *4. So, by default, Pinchon was sentenced to "imprisonment for life," which is sometimes more simply referred to as "life." As such, the mitigating qualities of Pinchon's youth were not factored into his sentence. And while it may not have been completely settled at the time, it is now clear that a Tennessee life sentence is 60 years in prison, with the possibility of credits reducing the time to 51 years. See Brown v. Jordan , 563 S.W.3d 196, 200–01 (Tenn. 2018) ; see also Vaughn v. State , 202 S.W.3d 106, 118–19 (Tenn. 2006) (). Thus, at the earliest, Pinchon will be released when he is 68 years old; at the latest, he will be released when he is 77.
In the years that followed, Pinchon made several attempts to challenge his conviction. He appealed without success. See Pinchon v. State , No. M2003-00816-CCA-R3PC, 2004 WL 193055, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2004) (summarizing direct appeal). And he sought post-conviction relief in state court without success. See Pinchon v. Myers , 615 F.3d 631, 637–38 (6th Cir. 2010) (summarizing procedural history). He also filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, also without success. See id.
Over a decade after Pinchon was sentenced, a pair of Supreme Court cases opened the door for Pinchon to challenge his sentence. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama . There, the Court "h[e]ld that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ "
567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). Part of the rationale for this holding was that sentencing a juvenile to die in prison is a determination that the juvenile cannot change; "but," the Supreme Court explained, "incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth." Id. at 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455 ; see also id. at 471, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (). And in 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana . There, the Court held that Miller's holding applied retroactively, i.e., it applied to criminal sentences that were already final at the time Miller was decided. 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725, 736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
Shortly after Montgomery was decided, Pinchon sought to reopen his state post-conviction proceedings. In denying Pinchon's motion, the state trial court stated, "because [Pinchon] was sentenced to life and retains the possibility of release, [his] sentence is not a violation of the constitutional right provided in Miller ." (Doc. 27-1, PageID.195.)
Pinchon then turned to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Precisely what that court said is critical here, so it is worthwhile to quote liberally from the Tennessee court's opinion. (Doc. 27-1, PageID.249–250.) Acknowledging Montgomery , the court stated, "It is clear that Miller's prohibition on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders is a new substantive rule requiring retroactive application to cases on state collateral review." (Id. at PageID.250.) But, said the court, Pinchon "was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole; he was sentenced to life." (Id. ) And, the Tennessee appellate court explained, a sentence of life "carries the possibility of release, albeit after fifty-one...
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