Pinckley v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.

Decision Date05 February 1936
Docket Number5107
Citation165 So. 504
PartiesPINCKLEY et ux. v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Rehearing denied March 3, 1936.

Spencer Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar, of New Orleans, and Peterman, Dear & Peterman, of Alexandria, for appellant.

Stephens & Gahagan, of Natchitoches, and Harper F. Willis, of Rodessa for appellees.

TALIAFERRO Judge. HAMITER, Judge (dissenting).

OPINION

TALIAFERRO, Judge.

Plaintiffs, the mother and father of Ralph Pinckley, deceased, bring this suit against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to recover damages for his death; it being alleged and admitted that he was run over and killed by a northbound passenger train of defendant, a short distance south of the corporate limits of city of Natchitoches, La., about 5 o'clock the morning of January 28, 1934.

The negligence and carelessness charged against the operatives of the train are these: Running the train at a greatly excessive rate of speed, considering the neighborhood where the accident occurred, and its proximity to the coporate limits of the city of Natchitoches; by not keeping a proper lookout; and by not having the train under proper control.

In amplification of these general averments, petitioners set up that the train which killed Pinckley was going north; of the place of accident; that the track there was daily used by pedestrain going neighborhood was thickly settled; and that serving their son on the track, to stop the train.

In the alternative, plaintiffs contend that if it should be held that the negligence of deceased to any extent contributed to his death, in that case the defendant's agents and employees, in chaarge of the train, had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and failed to avail themselves of it.

Defendant denies that young Pinckley was killed from any negligence or carelessness on the part of the operatives of its train, and affirmatively alleges that said train was at the time properly equipped and operated, and was being run at a rate of speed permitted by law and its own rules. Alternatively, the negligence of deceased in any manner or to any extent met death because of fault or negligence on the part of defendant's agents or employees.

This appeal is prosecuted by defendant from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $ 5,100. Increase in the amount of the award is prayed for by appellee.

There is virtually no dispute over the material facts of the case. We experience no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the deceased, Ralph Pinckley, met death solely from his own gross negligence; and therefore defendant, being free from fault, was improperly sued by his parents.

Deceased, who was 24 years old, and Miss Helen Hudson, age 19, attended a dance at a night club 7 miles south of the city of Natchitoches, and left there, walking, at an early hour the morning of January 28, 1934, en route to the city, where they lived. They were picked up by a passing car and carried to Gongre crossing, 968 feet below the place where they were both run down and killed. They left the car at the crossing, expressing the intention of waiting for some one else to join them. This party doubtless never came, and they resumed their journey afoot toward home. They were seen no more by any one, until the girl was recognized by the fireman and engineer when the train, going at the rate of 60 miles per hour, was not over 200 feet from her. The girl was then in a sitting posture, her knees encircled and drawn together by her arms and hands, her head resting on the knees. Pinckley, at the time, was close to and beyond Miss Hudson, and was not seen at all by the trainmen until after the tragedy. He was probably lying down.

The testimony of the fireman and engineer discloses that the lights on the locomotive, in keeping with the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commission, well illuminated the track ahead for 800 feet, and that within this distance, persons erect on the track may easily be recognized as such, but that said train, moving at 60 miles per hour, could not be stopped under 1,800 feet, and was not, in this instance, stopped before going that far after the accident; that the customary signal was given, two long and two short blasts of the whistle, before reaching Gongre crossing, and that at this time the bright headlights of an automobile coming toward them obscured their vision up the track until the car passed them, at which time the train was not over 200 feet from the deceased; and that the girl's body was reduced to such a small size that at first they thought it was a bundle of paper on the track and only discerned it to be a woman when about 100 feet away. The brakes of the train were immediately applied, the gong sounded and whistle blown, as in case of alarm, but these did not in the least arouse the young lady or the deceased. They were evidently dead asleep from exhaustion and the night's dissipation. These alarm signals were heard by many persons living in the neighborhood. The fact that the train's operatives did not see Miss Hudson until the train was so close to her does not affect the situation. Had she been recognized 800 feet away, the result would, in all probability, have been the same. The train could not have been stopped in time to avert running her down. If the alarm signals did not arouse her and Pinckley when only 100 feet away, they would not have done so if given at a greater distance from them.

The accident occurred at 1,875 feet from the corporate limits of the city of Natchitoches. Immediately after passing the Gongre crossing, the engineer began to take steps to slow the train down so as to comply with a law requiring trains to go not over 25 miles per hour through the city. This could be easily done within the distance to the city's limits. There is no law or rule of the company limiting the train's speed as it approached the city. From New Orleans to Shreveport, defendant's passenger trains are scheduled to run 60 miles per hoour, except in cities, towns, or localities having laws forbidding such speed. Therefore, unless conditions, with reference to population, residences, traffic, etc., in and about the locus of this unfortunate tragedy, demanded that trains be driven through it in the nightime at a lesser rate of speed than that fixed by defendant's regular schedule, it is not tenable to say that a duty resting upon it, in this respect, was violated by the train's speed of 60 miles per hour. The fact that many pedestrains chose to walk on the tracks, instead of the paths and graveled highway paarallel thereto, certainly imposed no duty upon defendant to slow its trains down for the convenience and safety of such people. If this were not true, train schedules could not accurately be observed and the efficacy of their service to the public would be materially impaired. Schedules would have to be altered and revised as often as and when the members of a community drifted into a general use of the train tracks for purposes of foot travel. It would be to subordinate a railway company's private rights and property to the convenience and, to some extent, control, of such pedestrians.

Deceased was killed in what might be accurately termed a suburb of the city of Natchitoches. There are perhaps a dozen residences, at various distances from the track, within a radius of one-fourth of a mile of the spot where the accident occurred. Other buildings are within said distance. It is because of the presence of these residences and other buildings, and the generally improved condition of the surrounding area, that plaintiffs strenuously urge and argue that it was negligence for defendant's train to be operated at the rate of 60 miles per hour through this locality. It is not pointed out, however, with any degree of certainty, how this complained of speed contributed to the accident, nor is it apparent to us that the accident would not have occurred had the train's speed been much less.

Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the following Louisiana cases to susstain their position: Blackburn v. Louisiana R. & N. Co., 144 La. 520, 80 So. 708; Jones v. Mackay Tel. Cable Co., 137 La. 121, 68 So. 379; La. 690, 691, 111 So. 62; McClanahan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 111 La. 781, 35 So. 902; McGuire v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 46 La.Ann. 1543, 16 So. 457; Gibson v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 10 La.App. 678, 121 So. 382, 383.

The facts of all these cases are easily differentiated from those of the case at bar. We shall not encumber this opinion with an analysis of them.

It is true that the court held in the Blackburn Case that if the train was being run at night at such a rate of speed that it could not be stopped within the distance objects on the track could have been the proximate cause of the accident. However, while the rule here laid down may have had application to the peculiar facts of that case, it does not have general application. To apply it to railroads generally would materially impair the efficiency of the operation of their passenger trains and work inconvenience and hardship on the general public. Del Buono v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 12 La.App. 35, 124 So. 694; Mongogna v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 115 La. 597, 39 So. 699; Boyd v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. Co. (LaApp.) 147 So. 100; Campbell & Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.(La.App.) 152 So. 351; Jeter v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (La.App.) 149 So. 144.

The rule finds proper application to automobiles.

Deceased had lived in the city of Natchitoches for many years. The train that killed him was running on schedule. The night was dark. Some rain had fallen in the early part of the night; and the atmosphere was charged with light mist. He undoubtedly knew that a fast passenger train was due to pass over this track...

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