Pinckney v. Crosby
| Decision Date | 06 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:02-CV-667-J-32HTS.,3:02-CV-667-J-32HTS. |
| Parties | Vernon PINCKNEY, Petitioner, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Vernon Pinckney, Cross City, FL, pro se.
Shasta Wilkerson Lkruse, Karen Elise Armstrong, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.
On July 15, 2002, Petitioner Vernon Pinckney, who is proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition (Doc. # 26) on February 25, 2003; a Second Amended Petition (Doc. # 35) on January 26, 2004; and, a Third Amended Petition (Doc. # 50) on January 4, 2005. Petitioner is now proceeding on the Third Amended Petition, in which he challenges his 1997 state court (Duval County, Florida) conviction for sale or delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. Petitioner raises six claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to properly investigate the case and interview or call witnesses at the trial; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request a mistrial during the prosecutor's closing argument; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial on four separate occasions; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to a conflict of interest since counsel represented Petitioner and his co-defendant; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to advise him of the disadvantages of waiving his speedy trial rights and his right to obtain counsel; and, (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise or preserve his Batson1 claim.
Respondents filed an Answer in Response to Third Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 56) (hereinafter Response). In support of their contentions, they submitted exhibits.2 Petitioner has filed a Reply to Respondents' Answer to Petitioner's Third Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 55) (hereinafter Reply). Petitioner has also submitted exhibits in support of his Third Amended Petition. See Petitioner's Appendix (Doc. # 51).3
After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of cocaine possession and sale or delivery of cocaine. On April 10, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced, as a habitual violent felony offender, to twenty (20) years for the sale or delivery of cocaine and five (5) years for possession of cocaine, to run concurrently. On appeal, Petitioner raised the following claim: the trial court reversibly erred in denying his motion for mistrial when the State harmfully commented on facts not in evidence during its closing argument. Ex. B. On April 1, 1998, the appellate court per curiam affirmed. Pinkney v. State, 717 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).4 The mandate issued on April 17, 1998. Ex. B.
Petitioner filed a motion for post conviction relief on October 1, 1998, and subsequent amendments on November 13, 1998, and April 13, 1999. Ex. C. He raised the following grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to properly object and move for a mistrial during the State's closing argument; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request a competency examination prior to trial when counsel knew that Petitioner was not competent to stand trial; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to properly communicate a specific plea bargain offered by the prosecutor and for failure to advise him of the evidence against him in order to enable him to make an informed decision regarding the offer; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his failure to request a jury instruction on the independent act of the co-felon; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to assert the voluntary intoxication defense at trial; (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to the habitual violent offender sentence (which the trial court imposed without following the proper procedures) and for failure to file a motion to correct sentence; (7) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to investigate and call nine witnesses and two experts to testify at the trial; (8) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for allowing Petitioner to proceed to trial with an all white jury; (9) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for misleading Petitioner to testify; (10) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not bringing out facts concerning the arrest; (11) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to file proper discovery motions; (12) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to file motions to suppress evidence seized and statements made upon his arrest; (13) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object, preserve for appeal and file a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the fact that the prosecutor excluded all eligible black jurors, thus forcing Petitioner to endure an all white jury; (14) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for conflict of interest (a) for representing both Petitioner and his co-defendant at the same time during the pretrial stage, and (b) for being under investigation for substance abuse; (15) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to preserve an issue for direct appeal (that the prosecutor had elicited statements from defense witness Tyrone Robinson that Petitioner had done his time); and, (16) the conviction was obtained by the use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest. Id.
On July 13, 2000, an evidentiary hearing was conducted with respect to four issues.5 Ex. D, Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing (hereinafter EH Tr.). The trial court, on August 16, 2000, denied the motion. Ex. C at 202-10. On March 6, 2002, the appellate court per curiam affirmed. Pinckney v. State, 810 So.2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The mandate issued on March 22, 2002. Ex. E.
On December 17, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was denied on January 22, 2002. Ex. F. On September 30, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied. Ex. G. On December 4, 2003, the appellate court per curiam affirmed, and the mandate issued on December 30, 2003. Id.
As previously noted, Petitioner initiated this action in this Court on July 15, 2002. This action was timely filed within the one-year limitation period for filing section 2254 petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Response at 3.
This Court has carefully reviewed the record and, for the reasons set forth more fully below, concludes Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. A habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court if he alleges facts which, if proven, would entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Smith v. Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1053-54 (11th Cir.1999) (citation omitted); Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1516 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)). Here, the pertinent facts of the case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Smith, 170 F.3d at 1054 (). No evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court. High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir.2000) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 909, 121 S.Ct. 1237, 149 L.Ed.2d 145 (2001).
On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (hereinafter AEDPA). Since this action was filed after the effective date of AEDPA, the Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA. Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 1573, 155 L.Ed.2d 319 (2003); Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 n. 10 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1104, 122 S.Ct. 2310, 152 L.Ed.2d 1065 (2002); Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 103, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000).
The Eleventh Circuit has described the standard of review under AEDPA:
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governs the authority of the federal courts to consider applications for writs of habeas corpus submitted by state prisoners. Section 2254 was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which was effective as of April 24, 1996. AEDPA applies to all petitions filed after its effective date....
AEPDA "places a new constraint on a federal habeas court's power to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court" by establishing a deferential standard for reviewing state court judgments in these cases. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Subsection (d) of § 2254 provides:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
AEDPA also makes clear that...
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