Pindar v. Pindar, 5726
| Decision Date | 29 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 5726,5726 |
| Parties | Evelyn PINDAR v. Vernon PINDAR. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
John B. Ford, Salem, orally, for plaintiff.
Shaw & Eldredge (Carleton Eldredge, Exeter, orally), for defendant.
The Trial Court after hearing evidence denied the defendant's motion for modification of a divorce decree with respect to support payments based on the fact that the minor child had married. The defendant's exception to this denial was transferred by Loughlin, J.
The parties were divorced by decree dated April 21, 1965. That part of the decree which related to custody and support was entered in accordance with a stipulation of the parties. It provides as follows:
The minor daughter of the parties was married in June 1967, just before reaching the age of twenty and did not complete her junior college education which she had been pursuing since the fall of 1966. She and her husband are both employed but she is also attending business school. There was still $474 due on her junior college tuition at the time of hearing. The plaintiff is employed with a takehome pay of $97 or $100 per week. She testified that she had been compelled to sell her home to make ends meet while the daughter was in college. There has been no change in the circumstances of the defendant since the original decree.
The issue is whether the marriage and employment of the daughter in and of themselves entitled the defendant to a termination of the support order as a matter of law. We hold that it does not
While for tax purposes the parties agreed that payments would be treated as support for the child until she became twenty-one years old, the undertaking of the defendant ran to the plaintiff and was to continue for three years after the daughter reached the age of twenty-one years or completed her schooling 'whichever is later.' Whichever of these two events occurred later simply...
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