Pine v. Okzewski

• Decision Date: 02 February 1934
• Docket Number: No. 155.,155.
• Parties: PINE et al. v. OKZEWSKI et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

170 A. 825

PINE et al.

v. OKZEWSKI et al.

No. 155.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 2, 1934.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Roswell D. Pine, Jr., and another against Adam Okzewski and another. Judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed by the Supreme Court (168 A. 48, 111 N. J. Law, 172), and defendants appeal.

Reversed, and cause remanded.

James A. Hamill, of Jersey City (William George, of Jersey City, of counsel), for appellants.

William L. Rae, of Jersey City, for respondents.

HEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming a judgment of the First District Court of Jersey City, in favor of plaintiffs, in an action in tort for false imprisonment.

On September 18, 1932, respondents, while driving through the city of Jersey City, in an automobile owned and operated by Smith, were intercepted by appellants in the performance of their duties as police officers, assigned to service in the traffic bureau of the city's police department. Respondents were residents of the state of Oklahoma. They were students en route to their respective universities in New England. The vehicle bore Oklahoma registration plates. It resembled an automobile that had been stolen in the city of Newark the day before, and it was stopped to afford the police officers an opportunity to determine whether it was the stolen car. An examination of the motor number disclosed that it was not. The officers demanded the production of the registration certificate and driver's license. Smith did not possess a driver's license. He informed the officers that such a license was not required by the laws of his state. Respondents testified that they were then informed by the officers that they "would be held for investigation." They were taken by the officers to a nearby station house, and placed in the "reserve room." They were advised that "they would have to remain there until the investigation was completed." While they were not locked in the room, one of the officers remained with them, and it cannot be gainsaid that they were detained pending the investigation. When it was ascertained that the laws of Oklahoma did not require the licensing of motor vehicle operators, they were released. There was no complaint charging a violation of law. Respondents testified that they were detained from 6 p. m. to 8 p. m., while appellants insist that the period of detention did not exceed forty minutes. But this divergence in the testimony does not relate to a material matter. It is not suggested that a detention, originally lawful, became unlawful because unreasonably prolonged. It is claimed that the detention was unlawful ab initio, and it was on this theory that the cause was tried and determined in the District Court, and the judgment sustained in the Supreme Court.

The sole ground for reversal urged by appellants is that there was justification for the detention of respondents, and that, therefore, the evidence did not warrant a judgment in their favor. This claim is well-founded. The gist of the action for false imprisonment is an unlawful detention. The essential thing is the constraint of the person, without legal justification. Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 N. J. Law, 621, 61 A. 121, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 118 Am. St. Rep. 716; Wiegand v. Meade, 108 N. J. Law, 471, 158 A. 825. Imprisonment or any restraint of the personal liberty of another is actionable, when done without lawful authority. "Imprisonment is any restraint of the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or his free action according to his own pleasure and will; a man is imprisoned when he is under the control of another in these respects or either of them, against his own will. It is false imprisonment when this is done without lawful authority, and such imprisonment is deemed an assault in law, though no assault in fact is made; the one includes both offences, the act being unlawful." Johnson v. Tompkins, 13 Fed. Cas. page 840, No. 7,416, 1 Baldw. 571, 600. The fundamental difference between an action for malicious prosecution, and one for false imprisonment, is that in the former the detention is malicious, but under the due forms of law, whereas in the latter the detention is without color of legal authority. Johnson v. Gird wood, 7 Misc. 651, 28 N. Y. S. 151, affirmed 143 N. Y. 660, 39 N. E. 21; Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 T. R. 544, 99 Reprint 1243, 1 E. R. C. 765; Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 539, 545, 94 S. W. 270.

The inquiry therefore is whether there was legal justification for the detention of respondents. The Supreme Court, in answering this in the negative, Invoked the common-law rule that, to prevent the escape of a felon, a peace officer had authority to arrest any one whom he reasonably suspected to have been engaged in the perpetration of a felony, and that, to prevent breaches of the peace, he had the right to arrest any person who was engaged in, or in his presence threatened to engage in, an affray or other breach of the pence, and that beyond this the law did not allow him to exercise the function of determining whether there was a sufficient cause for an arrest. Mayor, etc., of City of Newark v. Murphy, 40 N. J. Law, 145; Brown v. State, 62 N. J. Law, 666, 42 A. 811; Collins v. Cody, 95 N. J. Law, 65, 113 A. 709.

But the authority to arrest, in the circumstances here presented, is derived from chapter 208 of the Laws of 1921 (P. L. 1921, p. 643), as amended by chapter 171 of the Laws of 1931 (P. L. 1931, p. 347 [Comp. St. Supp. § 135—49 et seq.]). This act requires the registration of all automobiles driven in this state, whether owned by residents or nonresidents, and the licensing of operators of such vehicles. It directs that the driver's license shall have indorsed thereon the name of the licensee, in his own handwriting, and that this license and the registration certificate shall be in the possession of the driver or operator at all times when the driver or operator is in charge of the vehicle on the highways of the state. A further requirement is that the driver shall, when so requested by a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties under the act, exhibit his operator's license and the registration certificate, and write his name in the presence of the officer, so that the latter may determine the identity of the licensee and the correctness of the registration certificate. A nonresident owner, who has registered his vehicle in, and has complied with the laws of, the state of his residence, and a nonresident chauffeur or driver, who has complied with the laws of his state with respect to the licensing of drivers or chauffeurs, are exempted from the registration and licensing provisions for a period of ninety days in each calendar year, provided such nonresident chauffeur or driver shall, at all times while operating a motor vehicle in the state, have in his possession the registration certificate of the vehicle which he shall then be operating and his driver's license, and "shall exhibit said registration certificate and driver's license to any motor vehicle inspector, police officer, or magistrate, who, in the performance of the duties of his office, shall request the same." It is a misdemeanor to operate or use a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner.

Section 31 (1) of Act 1921 (Comp. St. Supp. § 135—82, subd. (1), vests in any constable or police officer authority to arrest, without warrant, any person violating, in the presence of such officer, any of the provisions of the act, and to bring the defendant before any magistrate of the county where such offense has been committed. It is therein provided that, in the event of a violation of a provision other than subdivision 3 of section 14 (relating to driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or habit-producing drug), the person so offending shall be detained until such officer shall make oath or affirmation, declaring that the person under arrest has violated one of the provisions of the act, specifying the provision, whereupon a warrant shall issue.

It is an established rule in the exposition of statutes that the intention of the Legislature is to be derived from a view of the whole and of every part of the statute, taken and compared together. The real intention, when ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of terms. When words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context and the occasion and the necessity of the law and from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. Lynch v. City of Long Branch, 111 N. J. Law, 148, 167 A. 664; In re Merrill, 88 N. J. Eq. 261, 273, 102 A. 400. A statute often speaks as plainly by inference and by means of the purpose which underlies it, as in any other manner. Winans v. Luppie, 47 N. J. Eq. 302, 20 A. 969; Hoguet v. Wallace, 28 N. J. Law, 523; 25 R. C. Li 978. That which is clearly implied is as much a part of the law as that which is expressed. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101. This statute should have a reasonable interpretation to effectuate the policy and object therein declared, or clearly implied. The provisions requiring registration of motor vehicles, and the licensing of chauffeurs and drivers, are designed to aid in the identification of each vehicle, and of those who are responsible for its movements and conduct. Unwen v. State, 73 N. J. Law, 529, 64 A, 163, affirmed 75 N. J. Law, 500, 68 A. 110.

The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and, in the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles—those moving in interstate...