Pine v. Synkonis
| Decision Date | 11 January 1984 |
| Docket Number | 490 C.D. 1982. |
| Citation | 79 Pa.Cmwlth. 479,470 A.2d 1074 |
| Parties | Anna M. PINE, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward S. Pine, Deceased, v. Joseph P. SYNKONIS, Jr. et al. Appeal of Joseph P. SYNKONIS, Jr., Harold Humbert, Joseph Brocco, Richard Brocco, William Hughes and Clark E. Whitesell. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Argued Dec. 16, 1982.
Herbert L. Olivieri, Harrisburg, Joseph Goldberg, Philadelphia, for appellants.
Edwin L. Scherlis, Austin Hogan, Ronald L. Wolf, Loyis Hinman, III Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before BLATT CRAIG and DOYLE, JJ.
This litigation arose out of a motor vehicle accident on June 16 1974, in which a vehicle traveling north through the 26th Street underpass of the Schuylkill Expressway in Philadelphia crossed through a missing section of medial barrier and struck a United taxicab being driven south by Edward S. Pine. Pine died two days after the accident and was survived by a wife and child.
Anna M. Pine administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, brought an action in trespass against Joseph P. Synkonis, Jr., Harold Humbert, Clark E. Whitesell, Joseph Brocco, William Hughes, and Richard Brocco in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. The defendants, appellants before this Court, were all employees of the Commonwealth Department of Transportation (Department). [1] The City of Philadelphia was also named as a defendant. A bifurcated trial was held before the Honorable Charles A. Lord and the jury returned a verdict against the six individual defendants and in favor of the City of Philadelphia. Damages were assessed at $642,375. [2] Delay damages of $26,413.52 were added. Following argument before a court en banc, defendants' motions for a new trial and/or judgment n.o.v. were denied. Judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
Evidence adduced at the trial indicated that at the time of the fatal accident there was a gap in the medial guardrail barrier in the 26th Street underpass which extended at least eighty feet. Other evidence indicated that all the defendants were aware of the high risk of accident generally present in the underpass and all admitted that the missing medial guardrail in this location would create a hazardous condition for motorists. There was also evidence that damaged or missing guardrail had been left unrepaired for an extended period of time. [3]
Initially we must determine whether the Appellants are protected by the qualified immunity announced by the Supreme Court in DuBree v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978). In DuBree, the Court [4] analyzed prior law governing official immunity and established considerations for determining whether an official should be immune. These can be summarized as follows:
1. Can the official be held to a predictable standard of care, which can be defined and applied with relative ease.
2. Do the official's decisions or actions have a significant impact on the public or impact on a large portion of the public. The greater the impact of such decision making, the greater the need to isolate the official from the threat of liability.
3. Did the official himself engage in actionable conduct. Officials will not be held liable for the acts of those under them simply because they are in the chain of command.
4. But for a defendant's status as an official, would an action in negligence lie. Plaintiff must establish a duty, breach of that duty, causation and injury.
5. Would any public policy be promoted in shielding the official from liability.
6. Has the plaintiff failed to pursue other available remedies.
Appellants urge that they are protected under DuBree and rely on the Superior Court's application of the DuBree considerations in Lehnig v. Felton, 278 Pa.Superior Ct. 12, 419 A.2d 1330 (1980) (Lehnig II ). In Lehnig v. Felton, 235 Pa.Superior Ct. 100, 340 A.2d 564 (1975) (Lehnig I ) remanded 481 Pa. 557, 393 A.2d 302 (1978), the Superior Court affirmed an entry of summary judgment in favor of Department of Transportation officials in an action arising from the death of a truck driver whose truck went out of control after hitting a pothole. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of DuBree. On remand, entry of summary judgment in the officials' favor was again affirmed. The Superior Court found that there were no allegations of direct conduct on the part of the officials nor of responsibility for the repair of the conditions which caused the accident. Echoing DuBree, the Court opined that the officials could not be held liable simply because they were in the "chain of command." 278 Pa.Superior Ct. at 15, 419 A.2d at 1332. The Court also noted:
[A]t a time when those responsible for the maintenance of state highways have been in a position where important economic decisions had to be made as to what areas needing repairs should and had to have priority, it is of utmost importance that they be able to engage in unfettered decision making.
We can agree that, as a matter of general policy, Department officials should be able to engage in unfettered decision making in those matters which require exercise of their discretion, [5] but we find Lehnig II distinguishable. Unlike Lehnig II, the case before this Court includes considerable allegations and attempts to prove both responsibility for repair of the missing guardrail and negligence in the carrying out of those official duties to repair. Appellee, plaintiff below, charged each defendant with a direct breach of a duty to inspect and order the repair of a known hazardous road condition, and did not rely on the "chain of command" to affix liability. We must, therefore, look beyond the example of Lehnig II and ourselves apply the DuBree considerations to the Appellants in this case. [6]
Our analysis must necessarily proceed from an examination of the position and duties of each of the Appellants.
Joseph P. Synkonis, Jr., was a Highway District Engineer I. It was his duty to generally oversee 4500 miles of highway in the Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia five-county area. He acknowledged that he was aware that the 26th Street underpass represented a dangerous condition but testified that he was not personally aware that guardrail was missing. The record offers no evidence indicating that he was personally aware of the specific hazard which resulted in this accident. The trial court notes that he was provided with a car and car phone by the Department but his job description indicated that repair work was reviewed by him "through the occasional inspection of results obtained and through the analysis of proposed programs by professional and administrative superiors." Surely, the considerations announced in DuBree and the policy articulated in Lehnig II dictate that an official at this high level of decision making be immune from threats of liability in the performance of such broad-ranging responsibilities. We find no way to articulate a standard of care for such officials which would adequately predict in what circumstances liability should attach. In addition, we do not find a duty in officials at this level to personally inspect or to otherwise identify specific repair needs. Notwithstanding the provision of a car and car phone, it was clearly not Synkonis' job to continuously ride the 4500 miles of road under his supervision to discover maintenance problems. Nor do we find responsibility at this level to personally see that specific repairs are completed, even should the official actually become aware of the need. Maintenance decisions at this level are made in the context of regionwide (district) manpower, equipment and financial considerations. Synkonis cannot be held liable simply because of his position at the top of the "chain of command."
Similarly, we find Harold H. Humbert to enjoy qualified immunity under DuBree. His job description indicated the same review duties as those of Synkonis. Humbert acknowledged that part of his duties involved maintenance of the roads in the five-county area, but testified that he was not personally aware of the 26th Street underpass problem. There was no evidence to the contrary. Here again the official responsibilities were broad-ranging and we believe public policy dictates that officials at this level be free from the cloud of potential liability. The broad discretion exercised at the regional level makes it impossible to establish a predictable standard of care. We also find no duty to inspect or see that specific repairs are completed. Humbert also cannot be found liable simply because of his position in the "chain of command."
Clark Whitesell was the District Maintenance Engineer for the five-county area. His duties included supervision of routine maintenance through superintendents and periodic inspection, and the record indicates that he had received reports of accidents in the 26th Street underpass which damaged the median guardrail. Again, however, because of the broad range of his supervisory duties, we are unable to articulate a standard of care and we believe public policy is best served if the maintenance official at this level is free to exercise his judgment and establish repair priorities unfettered by a threat of suit. In addition, we find no duty at the regional (district) level to personally see that repairs are made.
Joseph Brocco was the Department Superintendent for Philadelphia County and was responsible for knowing the conditions of the 360-400 miles of roadway under his supervision. In the record he admitted responsibility to ride the roads to discover maintenance problems and admitted knowing of a number of accidents in the 26th Street...
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