Pineda v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 24 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-1191.,07-1191.
• Citation: 520 F.3d 237
• Parties: Jose PINEDA, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

520 F.3d 237

Jose PINEDA, Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY.

No. 07-1191.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: February 5, 2008.

Filed: March 24, 2008.

Scot R. Withers, Esq., (Argued), Lamb McErlane PC, and Andrew P. Motel, Esq., Law Offices of Andrew P. Motel, LLC, West Chester, PA, for Appellant.

C. Scott Toomey, Esq., Tiffany M. Alexander, Esq., Kristen E. Dennison, Esq., (Argued), Campbell Campbell Edwards & Conroy, P.C., Wayne, PA, for Appellee.

Before: McKEE, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and IRENAS,^* Senior District Judge.

OPINION

IRENAS, Senior District Judge.

Appellant Jose Pineda is an automobile technician who was injured when the rear liftgate glass of a 2002 Ford Explorer shattered. He filed a products liability action against Appellee Ford Motor Company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and retained an expert to support his claims. After extensive discovery and a Daubert hearing,¹ the District Court² ruled that Pineda's proffered expert witness was not qualified to testify and that his methodology was not reliable. The District Court then granted Ford's motion to exclude the testimony of Pineda's expert and its motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse both decisions and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Pineda was employed as an automobile technician by Murphy Lincoln-Mercury in West Chester, Pennsylvania. On July 18, 2002, he worked to replace several components of the rear liftgate on a 2002 Ford Explorer. Pineda initially examined the Explorer on July 2, when the owner brought the vehicle to the dealership for repair because the rear liftgate would not close properly. Pineda determined that one of the hinges that connected the liftgate glass to the body of the Explorer was damaged. He also knew that, in April of 2001, Ford issued a Special Service Instruction for repair of the liftgate brackets on 2002 Explorers built between February 5 and March 30, 2001.³ The brackets connected the lift cylinders, which supported the rear liftgate in the open position, to each side of the liftgate glass. Pineda told the owner of the vehicle to refrain from using the rear liftgate until it could be repaired. He then ordered replacement lift cylinders, liftgate brackets, and liftgate hinges, all of which were available for installation on July 18.

That morning, Pineda replaced the lift cylinders and liftgate brackets without incident. Later in the afternoon, he began to replace the liftgate hinges. During his deposition, Pineda described what happened next:

It was right after lunch, somewhere around 1:00, when I finished to install the hinge on the left side and moved to the right side. I got the book because [there] was no information related to the torque specs on the hinge, so I got the book, torqued the hinge [on the glass side] to the specs of the book, then put the nut on the body side. When I finished torquing the nut on the body side, I hear a click and felt like the glass was exploding. I closed my eyes and I felt something hit my leg.

. . . .

I stepped back with my eyes closed, two steps. I was in so much pain on my leg that I have to open my eyes, and I saw my calf wide open.

Pineda filed a complaint against Ford on July 16, 2004, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged that the liftgate glass and hinges on the 2002 Ford Explorer were defective in design and that Ford failed to adequately warn of the dangerous condition.⁴

In order to satisfy his burden of proof on the products liability claims, Pineda retained Craig D. Clauser, P.E., as an expert. Clauser produced a report on September 30, 2005. It concluded that the liftgate glass shattered because its "design was defective in that it was only marginally able to resist fracture in its intended service and the pertinent manual and bulletins lacked adequate instructions and warnings." Clauser's report noted that "[n]o improper action by Mr. Pineda caused this incident to occur."⁵

Ford deposed Clauser on March 31, 2006. He stated at the deposition that his design defect opinion was based on his comparison of warranty claims for 2002 and 2003 model year Ford Explorers. Specifically, his analysis of performance reviews based on the warranty claims led him to conclude that 2002 models had a design defect related to the liftgate glass and hinges. His opinion was also based on third-party opinions he found on the internet at BlueOvalNews.com.⁶

As to his failure to warn opinion, Clauser testified that the 2002 Explorer's service manual did not provide specific, step-by-step instructions for replacing the liftgate brackets and hinges and reconnecting them to the liftgate glass. He further testified that the service manual failed to warn that the need for following such instructions was a safety issue. Clauser admitted that, in reaching his conclusions, he did not perform any objective testing of his own, e.g., stress analysis or other experiments on the liftgate glass of the vehicle at issue or on 2002 Explorers generally.

After the deposition, Ford filed motions to exclude Clauser's testimony and for summary judgment. Alternatively, it moved for a pretrial Daubert hearing. The bases for these motions were that Clauser was unqualified to provide expert testimony and that, even if he were qualified, Clauser's testimony was unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert.⁷ The District Court granted the motion for a Daubert hearing, which was held on September 28, 2006. Prior to the hearing, on July 11, 2006, Clauser provided a supplemental report, in which his opinions from the first report remained unchanged. Nonetheless, at the start of the hearing, Pineda voluntarily withdrew his design defect claim and proceeded only on his failure to warn claim.

Clauser was the only witness to testify at the Daubert hearing. Pineda's counsel first asked Clauser to discuss his credentials as a professional engineer with experience in materials analysis and systems failure analysis. Clauser admitted that he was not a warnings expert, except to the extent that "a warning and instructions" are "solution[s] to an engineering problem." He also testified about Ford's 2004 Safety Recall Instruction (the "SRI"), which described the procedure for replacing the liftgate brackets and hinges on the 2002 Ford Explorer. Clauser stated that the SRI, unlike the 2002 service manual used by Pineda, provided adequate warnings and proper, detailed instructions for the replacement of the liftgate brackets and hinges.⁸

By Opinion and Order dated November 15, 2006, the District Court granted Ford's motion to exclude Clauser's testimony in its entirety because: (1) Clauser admitted that he was not qualified as a warnings expert; (2) when discussing alternative warnings, Clauser could not compare the 2002 service manual to the SRI pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 407; and (3) Clauser's testimony was not based on an accepted methodology, i.e., his testimony was unreliable. The District Court held Ford's motion for summary judgment in abeyance pending Pineda's response to the issue of whether he could withstand summary judgment without expert testimony.

Pineda did not file the requested response by the District Court's imposed deadline of November 29, 2006. He sought an extension of time until December 13, which the District Court granted, but Pineda failed to meet that deadline as well. On December 19, the District Court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment and incorporated its November 15 decision by reference. Pineda filed a timely notice of appeal on January 18, 2007. His appeal does not challenge the District Court's conclusion that "in the absence of expert testimony, a jury could not render a just and proper decision" on his failure to warn claim. Thus, the only issue before us is whether the District Court erred in its decision to exclude Clauser's proffered expert testimony.⁹

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction based upon the diversity of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction over the District Court's final order granting Ford's motion for summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "Under the `merger rule,' prior interlocutory orders [such as the order excluding the testimony of Clauser] merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final order." In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir.1996).

We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a District Court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999); see also In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir.1999). "An abuse of discretion arises when the District Court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact." TMI, 193 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not interfere with the district court's decision "unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the District Court's decision involved a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, our review is plenary. See id.

III.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a trial judge acts as a "gatekeeper" to ensure that "any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable." Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). The Rules of Evidence embody a strong preference for admitting any evidence that may assist the trier of fact. Id.; see...