Pines v. Farrell
| Citation | 577 Pa. 564,848 A.2d 94 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
| Decision Date | 28 April 2004 |
| Parties | Zygmont A. PINES, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania and Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Petitioners, v. Terrance FARRELL, Recorder of Deeds for the County of Chester, Respondent, City of Philadelphia, Intervenor. |
848 A.2d 94
577 Pa. 564
v.
Terrance FARRELL, Recorder of Deeds for the County of Chester, Respondent,
City of Philadelphia, Intervenor
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted on Briefs November 7, 2003.
Decided April 28, 2004.
Edward Clement Sweeney, Downington, for Terrance Farrell.
Craig R. Gottlieb, for City of Philadelphia.
Before CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and BAER, JJ.
OPINION
Justice CASTILLE.
On October 31, 2003, this Court assumed plenary jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 726. The issue before us is whether financial regulations promulgated by the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, which interpreted the definition of "property transfer" set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a.1)(1)(v) to include mortgage assignments, mortgage releases, and mortgage satisfactions, are valid and enforceable. For the reasons that follow, we hold that these actions are property transfers and that they bind the recorders of deeds, clerks of courts, and equivalent officials throughout Pennsylvania who are charged with the duty of collecting fees in connection with such transfers.
On October 24, 2002, this Court entered a per curiam order onto the Judicial Administration Docket which directed that "the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania is authorized to promulgate financial regulations to implement 42 Pa.C.S. § 3733 as amended by Act 122 of 2002." See In Re Promulgation of Financial Regulations Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 3502(A), No. 245 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1. The order was effective immediately and the text of the order noted that it was entered pursuant to this Court's rulemaking authority, as well as Section 3502(A) of the Judicial Code.1 The amendment to Section
Section 3733 is found in Subchapter C ("Judicial Computer System") of Chapter 37 ("Facilities and Supplies") of the Judicial Code, and is entitled "Deposits into account." The Act 122 amendment to Section 3733 rewrote subsection 3733(a.1), which governs "additional fees." That subsection now reads as follows:
(a.1) Additional fees.—
(1) In addition to the court costs and filing fees authorized to be collected by statute:
(i) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged and collected by the prothonotaries of the Pennsylvania Supreme, Superior and Commonwealth Courts for each initial filing for which a fee, charge or cost is now authorized.
(ii) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged and collected by the prothonotaries, clerks of orphans' courts and registers of wills of all courts of common pleas, or by any officials designated to perform the functions thereof, for the initiation of any civil action or legal proceeding.
(iii) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged by the clerks of courts of all courts of common pleas, or by any officials designated to perform the functions thereof, for the initiation of any criminal proceeding for which a fee, charge or cost is now authorized and a conviction is obtained or guilty plea is entered.
(iv) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged and collected by the minor judiciary, including district justices, Philadelphia Municipal Court, Philadelphia Traffic Court and Pittsburgh Magistrates Court, for the initiation of a legal proceeding for which a fee or cost is now authorized, except that in criminal, summary and traffic matters the fee shall be charged only when a conviction is obtained or guilty plea is entered.
(v) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged and collected by the recorders of deeds and clerks of court, or by any officials designated to perform similar functions, for each filing of a deed, mortgage or property transfer for which a fee, charge or cost is now authorized.
Id.2 At issue in this dispute is subsection (v), which requires collection of an additional $10 fee "for each filing of a deed, mortgage or property transfer for which a fee, charge or cost is now authorized."
In accordance with the authority delegated in this Court's Order, the Court Administrator promulgated financial regulations which, inter alia, defined the filings encompassed by subsection (v). The regulations provide that the documents defined as a mortgage, deed or property transfer include (subject to later amendment): (i) Deeds in any form; (ii) Mortgages; (iii) Mortgage assignments; (iv) Mortgage releases; (v) Mortgage satisfaction pieces; (vi) Installment sales agreements; (vii)
On February 10, 2003, respondent Terrance Farrell, the Recorder of Deeds of Chester County, Pennsylvania, filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County against petitioners, the Court Administrator and the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts ("AOPC"). Respondent alleged, inter alia, that the Court Administrator exceeded the grant of authority provided in this Court's October 24, 2002 Order when he interpreted the term "property transfer." Respondent sought a judgment declaring that it is within the discretion of individual recorders of deeds to determine what the General Assembly meant by the term "property transfer" and that the Administrator's definition of "property transfer" is invalid. In response, petitioners filed preliminary objections asserting a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and improper venue, and demurring to the complaint.
On August 7, 2003, the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, per the Honorable Jacqueline C. Cody, sustained the preliminary objection alleging lack of jurisdiction and, as a result, transferred the matter to the Commonwealth Court. On September 2, 2003, the Commonwealth Court, per the Honorable Warren Morgan sitting as a court of original jurisdiction, directed briefing and oral argument of petitioners' remaining preliminary objections concerning venue and whether the complaint stated a valid cause of action.
Prior to the scheduled oral argument, however, petitioners belatedly filed an Emergency Petition in this Court, requesting that this Court assume plenary jurisdiction over the matter. On October 31, 2003, this Court entered a per curiam order assuming jurisdiction over this matter involving the Court Administrator and the AOPC, both of whom are subject to this Court's authority. The per curiam order also directed respondent to make a fully documented accounting of each filing that fell under the Court Administrator's definition of "property transfer" which had not been collected and to begin collecting the disputed fees to be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account. The matter was then briefed on an expedited basis and submitted for this Court's decision.3
On December 10, 2003, the City of Philadelphia filed a Motion to Intervene and a Memorandum of Law in support of that Motion. On December 15, 2003, the City filed its Intervenor Brief. This Court granted the Motion to Intervene on December 23, 2003, based on the fact that the City is the Recorder of Deeds for Philadelphia County and its collection of fees will be equally affected by our decision,4 and that the City's brief was not merely repetitive
Preliminarily, we must first determine whether the Court Administrator had the authority to promulgate a regulation interpreting the term "property transfer." Respondent contends that the Administrator had no such authority, that our order authorized him only to promulgate "financial regulations" and that the Administrator's interpretation of the term "property transfer" is not within the scope of that authorization. Respondent states that it is unclear what this Court meant in stating that the Administrator was authorized to promulgate "financial regulations." This argument need not detain us long.
This Court's order authorized the Court Administrator to promulgate financial regulations necessary to implement 42 Pa.C.S. § 3733, as amended by Act 122. The order explicitly cited to Section 3502(a) of the Judicial Code. That Section authorizes the relevant authority to promulgate financial regulations in connection with the collection of funds appropriated to the unified judicial system. The statute also recognizes that "the governing authority" may "defin[e] for such accounting purposes terms not otherwise defined in this title." In light of the explicit terms of our order and the authority cited, the notion that the Court Administrator lacked power to define terms is meritless. Although respondent may not agree with the Administrator's enumeration of which filings are "property transfers," the Administrator did not act beyond the authority delegated to him in providing practical guidance as to which filings are encompassed by the statutory term.
We now turn to respondent's claim that the Court Administrator erred in defining "property transfer" to include mortgage assignments, mortgage satisfaction pieces and mortgage releases.6 As this question ultimately involves a question of statutory interpretation, this Court's review is plenary.
Petitioners argue that the phrase "property transfer" is not a term of art and the Court Administrator's interpretation of the filings subject to an additional fee under Section 3733(a.1)(1)(v) is a reasonable one. Petitioners further argue that the categories of filings set forth in the Administrator's regulation are consistent with the legislative intent that property transfers already subject to a filing fee likewise should be subject to this additional filing fee.
In response, respondent avers that the regulations are an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Commonwealth v. Dodge
...desires our court to consider are required to be set forth in the appellate brief and not just incorporated by reference); Pines v. Farrell, 577 Pa. 564, 570 n. 3, 577 Pa. 564, 848 A.2d 94, 97 n. 3 (2004) (holding that reliance on the “briefs and pleadings already filed in this case” was “n......
-
In re Funches, Bankruptcy No. 07-13883ELF.
...that a mortgage acts a lien between the mortgagor and mortgagee and third parties ("the lien theory"). See generally Pines v. Farrell, 577 Pa. 564, 848 A.2d 94 (2004) (examining state and federal cases applying Pennsylvania law and the seeming vitality of both theories in Pennsylvania).39 a......
-
Montgomery Cnty. v. Merscorp, Inc., Civil Action No. 11–CV–6968.
...(quoting Presbyterian Corporation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle 109 (Pa.1831)). In 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Pines v. Farrell, 577 Pa. 564, 848 A.2d 94 (2004). Specifically the [16 F.Supp.3d 553] issue presented in that case was whether certain financial regulations which had been ......
-
Merscorp, Inc. v. Del. Cnty., 67 MAP 2017
...Pennsylvania adheres to the "title theory" of mortgages, which "deems a mortgage to be a conveyance." Id. at 21, citing Pines v. Farrell , 577 Pa. 564, 848 A.2d 94, 99 (2004) (mortgage assignments are "conveyances" for purposes of Pennsylvania's recording acts). The Recorders submit the Com......