Pingle v. Richmond Heights Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:12-cv-2892 |
| Parties | TIMOTHY L. PINGLE, PLAINTIFF, v. RICHMOND HEIGHTS LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on two motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's amended complaint. The first is the motion of defendant Robert J. Moore ("Moore") (Doc. No. 91), accompanied by a brief in support (Doc. No. 91-1 ["Moore Mot."]). Plaintiff has opposed Moore's motion (Doc. No. 100 ["Opp'n Moore"]), and Moore has replied (Doc. No. 104 ["Moore Reply"]).
The second is the motion of defendant Richmond Heights Local School District Board of Education ("Board"). (Doc. No. 92 ["Board Mot."].) Plaintiff has opposed the Board's motion (Doc. No. 99 ["Opp'n Board"]), and the Board has replied (Doc. No. 103 ["Board Reply"].) Defendants' motions are ripe for decision and, for the reasons that follow, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
This case has an extensive factual and procedural history, as reflected in earlier opinions by this Court. Certain specific facts will be presented in greater detail later in this opinion as necessary for the Court's summary judgment analysis. Briefly, plaintiff Timothy Pingle ("plaintiff" or "Pingle") was employed by the Board as its secondary school principal beginning in August 2011 under a two-year administrator contract. In November 2011, the superintendent of the school district—Linda Hardwick ("Hardwick"), an African American female—was suspended by the Board.
The Board was required to appoint an interim superintendent, and Pingle, who is Caucasian, believed he was qualified for the job. Prior to the Board's selection of an interim superintendent, Pingle sent two emails to two Board members on November 6 and 7, 2011, related to the suspended superintendent and the Board's imminent selection of an interim superintendent. The Board selected defendant Moore to be the interim superintendent. Moore is African American, and was the elementary school principal at the time.
Upon the recommendation of Moore, the Board suspended plaintiff in December 2011 with pay for the stated reason that Pingle's November 6 and 7 emails were racist and violated Board policy. On the morning of his suspension, plaintiff sent all the Board members another email entitled "My Side of the Story" which purportedly explains the context of his emails of November 6 and 7. In February 2012, the Board suspended Pingle without pay, and initiated termination proceedings for five (5) reasons, two (2) of which were the November 6 and 7 emails.
Ohio Rev. Code § 3319.16 contains detailed procedures for terminating teacher contracts, which were followed by the Board. The statute provides for four levels of review, the first being a hearing conducted by a neutral referee. (See Doc. No. 46 (Opinion and Order ["OO"]) at 1578.1).
The hearing was conducted over five (5) days, during which both sides offered testimony and exhibits, and the referee thereafter issued a report. (Doc. No. 91-2 () at 3340.) In his report, the referee found that there was good cause to terminate Pingle based on the emails of November 6 and 7, 2011:
I find that the racial comments made by Dr. Pingle in the two emails are sufficient to give the Board good and just cause to terminate his contract. In so finding, I note that as an administrator and secondary school principal, Dr. Pingle, in addition to his various duties and responsibilities, was or should have been a role model to others in the District, particularly teachers and students. Regardless of whether anyone outside of the Board knew of his emails, his action in sending them demonstrated conduct that was unacceptable and which the Board could not risk him repeating.
The next step in the statutory process is review of the referee's report and recommendation by the school board. By resolution dated September 10, 2012, the Board accepted the referee's report and recommendation and voted unanimously to terminate plaintiff's contract "on the grounds of good and just cause." (Doc. No. 92-1 at 3617-19 (["9/10/12 Resol."]) at 3617-19.)
The next available review is an appeal to the court of common pleas in the county in which the school is located. Plaintiff filed that appeal in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, along with claims of discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law.Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based upon plaintiff's federal claims. (Doc. No. 1 (Notice of Removal) at 2.).
After various motions and rulings by this Court regarding the removed complaint, plaintiff sought leave to dismiss with prejudice his state court appeal pursuant to § 3319.16—count 1. (Doc. No. 47.) The Court granted plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 50), and thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint with leave of Court. (Doc. No. 54 (First Amended Complaint ["Am. Compl."]).).
The amended complaint asserts five counts: Count 1 (against the Board)—race and color discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights act of 1964, because plaintiff was not considered for selection as interim superintendent based on his race—Caucasian, and because plaintiff was paid less than the African American elementary school principal (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-58); Count 2 (against the Board and Moore)—race and color discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A) and 4112.99, because Pingle was not considered for selection as interim superintendent based on his race—Caucasian, and because plaintiff was paid less than the African American elementary school principal (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-65); Count 3 (against the Board)—retaliation in violation of Title VII for terminating plaintiff as secondary school principal, for engaging in the protected activity of: (a) complaining both orally and in e-mails on or about November 7, 2011, that he was not being considered for interim superintendent because he is Caucasian, and that he was paid less than the African-American elementary school principal, and (b) filing an EEOC charge on March 9, 2012 ( ); Count 4 (against the Board and Moore)—retaliation in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(I) and 4112.99 "for opposing unlawful discrimination and/or participating in proceedings related to complaints of unlawful discrimination" (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 73-75); andCount 5 (against Moore)—aiding and abetting discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(J) and 4112.99 by (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-79.).
Moore moves for summary judgment on Counts 2, 4 and 5 of the amended complaint. The Board moves for summary judgment on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.
The moving party must provide evidence to the court which demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact. Once the moving party meets this initial burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d265 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmoving party may oppose a summary judgment motion "by any of the kinds of evidentiary material listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves[.]" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The Court must view all facts and evidence, and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom, in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962).
General averments or conclusory allegations of an affidavit do not create specific fact disputes for summary judgment purposes. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888-89, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). "Summary judgment requires that a plaintiff present more than a scintilla of evidence to demonstrate each element of a prima facie case." Garza v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 536 F. App'x 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007)). "'The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].'" Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
In summary, the district court's review on summary judgment is a threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial due to genuine factual issues that must be resolved by a finder of fact because those issues may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at...
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