Pingree v. Detroit, L. & N.R. Co.

Decision Date09 June 1887
Citation66 Mich. 143,33 N.W. 298
PartiesPINGREE and others v. DETROIT, L. & N.R. CO.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Error to Wayne.

SHERWOOD J., dissenting.

Isaac Marston, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Charles B. Lothrop, for defendant.

CAMPBELL C.J.

This case presents a single question on facts found. Plaintiffs had a chattel mortgage against Francis M. and Myron C. Butts which was made on August 4, 1886. The next day the two Butts made a transfer of the property to one Steere. Plaintiffs replevied from Steere, and on August 12th shipped the goods by defendant's railroad from Edmore, directed to Detroit, taking the usual bill of lading. On the same day the goods were taken by the sheriff at Stanton, on an attachment against said F.M. and M.C. Butts, in favor of John W. Fuller and others. Defendant notified plaintiffs of this seizure. Plaintiffs now sue defendant for not delivering the goods at Detroit. The question is whether the seizure by the sheriff exonerated defendant from such delivery. The court below held that it did.

There seems to be a little apparent conflict between the cases on this question, but there can be no doubt where the rule of justice lies. If the carrier could rely against all the world upon the right of the consignor to intrust him with possession, then it would be reasonable to hold him estopped from questioning that title. But there is no authority for such immunity. The true owner may take his property from a carrier as well as from any one else. If a carrier gets property from a person not authorized to direct its shipment he has been declared by the supreme court of this state to have no lien for his services, and no right to retain the property. Fitch v. Newbery, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1. There is no sense or justice in enabling a consignor to compel a carrier, at his peril, to defend a title that he knows nothing about, and has no means of defending, unless the consignor gives it to him. In the present case the attachment was against plaintiffs' mortgagors, and was regular. It must have been levied on the claim that plaintiffs had no right to the goods. Defendant could not have resisted the seizure without incurring the risk of serious civil, and perhaps criminal, liability; and, if plaintiffs' claim is correct, this must have been done at defendant's own risk and expense.

This precise question was decided in favor of the carrier in Stiles v. Davis, 1 Black, 101, upon the ground that defendant was not required to resist the sheriff, and could not properly do so. This rule has been adhered to by the United States supreme court, and followed to a considerable extent. It is the only rule compatible with public order. A carrier must otherwise resist the officer, or find some one who will swear out a replevin, which a carrier usually has not knowledge enough to justify. If the carrier cannot call on the consignor to defend, and must take the risk and the loss, his position would be one of hopeless weakness. If he declines to accept custody of goods, he runs the risk of an action; and if a wrongful holder, by doubtful title, or even by theft, compels him to receive the consignment, he can get the value from the carrier who has had them seized by the true owner, unless the carrier has means of proof, that he never can be presumed to have, of the lack of interest in the shipper.

Whatever may be a carrier's duty to resist a forcible seizure without process, he cannot be compelled to assume that regular process is illegal, and to accept all the consequences of resisting officers of the law. If he is excusable for yielding to a public enemy, he cannot be at fault for yielding to actual authority what he may yield to usurped authority. I think the judgment should be affirmed.

MORSE and CHAMPLIN, JJ., concurred.

SHERWOOD J., (dissenting.)

This is an action against the defendant, as common carrier, to recover damages for its failure to carry safely, and deliver in Detroit, a quantity of boots and shoes. The cause was tried in the Wayne circuit, before Judge CHAMBERS, without a jury. The parties, by their attorneys, agreed upon the facts, and in accordance therewith they were found by the court, and upon which the learned judge found, as a question of law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, and judgment was entered against plaintiffs for costs. The case is now before us, on error, for review.

The following is the substance of the material facts found by the court, viz.: On the twelfth day of August last, plaintiffs delivered to defendant, at Edmore, certain goods, to be delivered to plaintiffs at Detroit. Defendant carried the same safely to Stanton, Montcalm county, and, on the arrival of the goods there, they were seized and taken from defendant by the sheriff of Montcalm county, as the goods of F.M. Butts et al., by virtue of a writ of attachment issued out of the circuit court for that county in a suit wherein J.W. Fuller et al. were plaintiffs, and Francis M Butts et al. were defendants, and to which suit plaintiffs were in no manner parties. The writ under which the sheriff acted was a good and valid one, and the seizure made by him was without the consent, connivance, or procurement of defendant. Defendant at once notified plaintiffs of the seizure of said goods, and the return-day of said writ, to which plaintiffs made no reply except to offer to assign to defendant whatever claim they might have against the sheriff. That the defendant was a common carrier of goods at the time they received the plaintiffs' property for transportation, and had no knowledge of the true owner of the goods, or of the title or possession of the same prior to the time of the delivery to them, and that the value of the goods was $899.85. That said Butts delivered to Pingree & Smith, above-named plaintiffs, to secure payment of $801.78, a bill of sale of a stock of goods,...

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