Pinheiro v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Opinion by Reed, J.
• Decision Date: 02 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 3009,3009
• Citation: Pinheiro v. State, No. 3009 (Md. App. Mar 02, 2020)
• Parties: RICHARD PINHEIRO v. STATE OF MARYLAND

RICHARD PINHEIRO v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 3009

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

March 2, 2020

CRIMINAL LAW > NONJURY OR BENCH TRIAL AND CONVICTION > APPEAL AND TRIAL DE NOVO > REVIEW > QUESTION OF FACT > SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO CONVICT

The issue before this Court calls into question the sufficiency of evidence following Appellant's bench trial, which we will review on both the law and the evidence, and we will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous.

CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW > PRESUMPTIONS > FACTS OR PROCEEDINGS NOT SHOWN BY RECORD > SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE > CONSTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE > CONSTRUCTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT, STATE, OR PROSECUTION

CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW > VERDICTS > CONCLUSIVENESS OF VERDICT > WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN GENERAL > REASONABLE DOUBT

The test for sufficiency of evidence asks whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW > QUESTION OF FACT > PRESUMPTIONS > REASONABLE INFERENCE

We will give deference to all reasonable inferences that the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether the appellate court would have chosen a different reasonable inference.

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > IN GENERAL > PURPOSE > POLICY BEHIND OR SUPPORTING STATUTE

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > PARTICULAR ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE > ABSENT TERMS; SILENCE; OMISSIONS

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > STATUTE AS A WHOLE; RELATION OF PARTS TO WHOLE AND TO ONE ANOTHER > CONTEXT

To ascertain whether the legislature intended for physical evidence under Criminal Law Article § 9-307(b) to encompass body worn camera footage, we review the statute's plain language, considering the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs.

CRIMINAL LAW > NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF CRIME > CRIMINAL INTENT AND MALICE > IN GENERAL

The term 'specific intent' designates some specific mental element or intended purpose above and beyond the mental state required for the mere actus reus of the crime itself.

CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE > PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES > INTENT OR MENS REA

Because specific intent is a subjective concept and, without the cooperation of the accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its presence must be shown by established facts which permit a proper inference of its existence.

CRIMINAL LAW > EVIDENCE > PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES > PRESUMPTIONS > INTENT

This Court allows an inference that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > CLARITY AND AMBIGUITY; MULTIPLE MEANINGS > ABSENCE OF AMBIGUITY; APPLICATION OF CLEAR OR UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE OR LANGUAGE > GIVING EFFECT TO STATUTE OR LANGUAGE; CONSTRUCTION AS WRITTEN

If the statutory language is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, we apply the statute as written.

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > CLARITY AND AMBIGUITY; MULTIPLE MEANINGS > ABSENCE OF AMBIGUITY; APPLICATION OF CLEAR OR UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE OR LANGUAGE > PLAIN LANGUAGE; PLAIN, ORDINARY, COMMON, OR LITERAL MEANING

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > PARTICULAR ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE > DEPARTING FROM OR VARYING LANGUAGE OF STATUTE

We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION STATUTE AS A WHOLE; RELATION OF PARTS TO WHOLE AND TO ONE ANOTHER > CONFLICT

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES AS TO CONSTRUCTION > STATUTE AS A WHOLE; RELATION OF PARTS TO WHOLE AND TO ONE ANOTHER > GIVING EFFECT TO ENTIRE STATUTE AND ITS PARTS; HARMONY AND SUPERFLUOUSNESS

We must view the plain language within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute's object and scope.

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > CLARITY AND AMBIGUITY; MULTIPLE MEANINGS > RESOLUTION OF AMBIGUITY; CONSTRUCTION OF UNCLEAR OR AMBIGUOUS STATUTE OR LANGUAGE > PURPOSE AND INTENT; DETERMINATION THEREOF

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > EXTRINSIC AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION > IN GENERAL

STATUTES > CONSTRUCTION > LEGISLATIVE HISTORY > PLAIN, LITERAL, OR CLEAR MEANING; AMBIGUITY

If the statutory language remains ambiguous, only then will we resolve the ambiguity by considering the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

Maryland courts have long recognized the common law misdemeanor offense of misconduct in office, which is defined as corrupt behavior by a public officer in the exercise of the duties of his or her office or while acting under color of his or her office.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

A person can be found guilty of misconduct in office under one or more of the three types of behavior: (1) misfeasance, (2) malfeasance, and (3) nonfeasance. Sewell, 239 Md. App. at 601

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

Misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

Malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

A public officer commits malfeasance by corruptly exceeding the scope of his or her authority and commits misfeasance by acting within the scope of his or her authority but doing so corruptly.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > EVIDENCE > WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY

The measure of what constitutes official misconduct is an imbricating continuum of proof and conduct that toes the sometimes murky line between what is and what isn't within an officer's scope of authority, falls within the overlay on this continuum.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT > CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY > OFFENSES > IN GENERAL

The State is only required to prove that the public officer acted willfully, fraudulently, or corruptly to sustain a conviction for misconduct in office, regardless of whether the official misconduct charge is based on an act of misfeasance or malfeasance.

CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW > VERDICTS > CONCLUSIVENESS OF VERDICT > WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN GENERAL > WEIGHING EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW > REVIEW > VERDICTS > CONCLUSIVENESS OF VERDICT > CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

To determine whether the State satisfied its burden, we will not reweigh the evidence; rather, we ask if the direct or circumstantial evidence at trial could have persuaded a rational trial judge to conclude" that Appellant was guilty of the underlining offense.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 118023003

REPORTED

Kehoe, Reed, Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Reed, J.

On January 23, 2018, Richard Pinheiro (hereafter "Appellant") was indicted by a grand jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on two counts: (1) fabricating physical evidence in violation of § 9-307(b) of the Criminal Law Article of Md. Ann. Code and (2) the Maryland common law crime of misconduct in office. Following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to three years' imprisonment, with all but time served suspended. Appellant timely filed this appeal and presents the following question for our review, which we condensed for concision:¹

I. Was the evidence before the trial judge sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for fabricating evidence and misconduct in office?

For the following reasons, we hold that the evidence was sufficient and affirm the trial court's ruling.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 24, 2017, Appellant was part of a district drug unit conducting surveillance in Southwest Baltimore City, Maryland. In the course of the investigation, a covert officer observed several suspected narcotics transactions in an alley under surveillance. Based on the observation of the covert officer, Appellant and another unit officer stopped and briefly detained a suspected buyer. Acting on the information obtained from the brief detention, officers found narcotics in the center console of the buyer's vehicle. The officers were then directed to search for additional narcotics in the alley where the covert officer initially observed the alleged transactions.

Upon searching the alley, the officers' body worn cameras² (BWC) were in activation mode.³ Hidden in the alley, officers found a knotted bag containing twenty-twocapsules of white powder suspected to be heroin. Officers then exited the alley and deactivated their BWC. Recognizing how the first bag of drugs was packaged, Appellant, unaccompanied by the other officers, returned to continue the search based on his experience and belief that more drugs existed in the alley. Appellant found an additional plastic bag containing capsules of suspected heroin and then left the alley to show the other officers. It was at that time Appellant was reminded that his BWC was not in activation mode. Appellant then reentered the alley, placed the drugs in a red can, and arranged the can under debris near where he alleged he initially discovered the drugs. After the drugs were in place, Appellant exited the alleyway, activated his BWC, and is heard saying, "I'm going to check here." He then reentered seconds later to "reenact" his search and the discovery of the additional bag of heroin. Appellant picked up the can and pulled out the bag of heroin. He is heard to say, "yo,"...