Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., Inc., 47910

Decision Date02 April 1973
Docket NumberNo. 47910,No. 2,47910,2
PartiesPINKERTON AND LAWS COMPANY v. ATLANTIS REALTY COMPANY, INC
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Clayton H. Farnham, Atlanta, for appellant.

Gershon, Ruden, Pindar & Olim, George A. Pindar, Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

CLARK, Judge.

'Finder's fee' contracts, euphemistically termed 'business opportunity agreements', are a fact of life in today's business world. The extent to which they are used is shown by the annotation on the subject in 24 A.L.R.2d 1160 which contains cases from 26 jurisdictions. The annotation defines such contracts 'as an arrangement by which an intermediary finds, introduces, and brings together parties to a business opportunity, leaving the ultimate negotiation and consummation of the business transaction to the principals.'

One of the earliest citations therein discussed is our 1923 case of Garrett v. Wall, 29 Ga.App. 642, 116 S.E. 331, where this court upheld the validity of an oral agreement in which the owner of timber had promised compensation to an intermediary who had performed his agreed services in finding and introducing a prospective purchaser of sawmill timber. The principles which guided this court in its opinion of 50 years ago were those applicable to contracts generally. As is stated at page 1165 in the A.L.R. article: 'The validity of a business opportunities contract is fundamentally determined by rules applicable to contracts generally, including choice of law rules, the requirement of consideration, the necessity of definite terms, and the sufficiency of evidence from which such a contract may be implied in fact or in law.'

In the case sub judice there was a letter agreement from a construction company, Pinkerton & Laws Co., defendant-appellant, to the Atlantis Realty Co., plaintiff-appellee. Testimony from defendant's witness indicates their assumption to have been that the realty company's sales representatives had some useful connections with a national restaurant chain preparing to extend their operations into the southeast. The letter began with the key words 'In consideration for services rendered by you and expected from you,' and then detailed briefly the amounts that would be paid and when such payments were due. The portions thereof pertinent to our study read: '(a) For the first contract we complete with Denny's Restaurant, we will pay an amount equal to 2% of the contract price . . .; (b) As we feel any subsequent work will be almost solely dependent upon our performance as General Contractors and in order for us to remain competitive we feel a payment of 1% of the contract price on all work after the initial contract is feasible. . . .' The construction concern was successful in obtaining and completing almost a million dollars of contracts from Denny's Restaurants on which the realty company sought commissions. In addition to contending that the realty company's representative was not the procuring cause of their success in obtaining the Denny's Restaurants' construction jobs, the defendant argued its understanding to be that the letter agreement was limited to obtaining opportunities for 'negotiated' construction contracts as opposed to 'bidding.' The letter agreement contained nothing concerning this phase. Six contracts were involved, the first three being on Fort Lauderdale jobs which resulted from Denny's Restaurant having invited defendant to bid, the other three being negotiated contracts, one in Miami and two in Atlanta.

The case was tried without a jury before Judge Joel J. Fryer. In the rendition of his judgment for the realty company plaintiff he stated his 'Findings of Fact' and 'Conclusions of Law.' This appeal is from that judgment. The sole enumeration of error says 'The trial court erred in basing its judgment against appellant upon findings of fact not supported by facts in the record, thereby rendering its judgment contrary to law.' Held:

1. This appeal demonstrates the usefulness of the procedure established by Code Ann. § 81A-152(a) (Ga.L.1970, pp. 170, 171) requiring the trial judge handling a case without a jury to make a special finding of facts and separately to state his conclusions of law. Prof. Moore writes: 'The purpose of findings of fact is threefold: as an aid in the trial judge's process of adjudication; for the purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and as an aid to the appellate court on review.' 5A Moore's Federal Practice 2706, § 52.06. To this should be added the benefit to bench and bar in abbreviating appellate briefs by pin-pointing the factual questions.

This statute further provides that 'Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . .'...

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28 cases
  • Hagin v. Powers
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • October 8, 1976
    ...700(1), 194 S.E.2d 604. And, if there is any evidence to support it, this court will not disturb it. Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga.App. 662, 665, 197 S.E.2d 749. The findings of fact and conclusion of law as to liability of the defendants are amply supported by the evi......
  • Lamas v. Baldwin
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • September 27, 1976
    ...court's judgment is based upon a stated fact for which there is no evidence, it should be reversed.' Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga.App. 662, 665, 197 S.E.2d 749, 751. The trial court's finding that plaintiff contracted with defendant individually is clearly It is settl......
  • CFUS PROPERTIES, INC. v. Thornton
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • September 20, 2000
    ...the appellate court should not interfere with the trial court's judgment after a nonjury trial. Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga.App. 662, 665(1), 197 S.E.2d 749 (1973). The judgment was not clearly erroneous; therefore, it should not be set aside. Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v......
  • Buchanan v. Georgia Boy Pest Control Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • February 17, 1982
    ..."intent" of the contracting parties with regard to the beneficiary of the one-year guarantee. See Pinkerton & Laws Co. v. Atlantis Realty Co., 128 Ga.App. 662, 666(3), 197 S.E.2d 749 (1973). 2. Because the judgment of the trial court must be reversed for the reasons stated in Division 1 of ......
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