Pinkerton Sec. and Inves. Serv. V. Chamblee

• Decision Date: 22 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1051138.,1051138.
• Citation: 961 So.2d 97
• Parties: PINKERTON SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICES, INC. v. Alan CHAMBLEE, as administrator of the estate of Troy Chamblee, and Tony Jackson.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

961 So.2d 97

PINKERTON SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION SERVICES, INC. v. Alan CHAMBLEE, as administrator of the estate of Troy Chamblee, and Tony Jackson.

No. 1051138.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

December 22, 2006.

Gregg L. Smith, Birmingham, for appellant.

Myron K. Allenstein and Rose Marie Allenstein of Allenstein & Allenstein, LLC, Gadsden, for appellees.

SEE, Justice.

Pinkerton Security and Investigation Services, Inc. ("Pinkerton"), seeks review of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Troy Chamblee¹ and Tony Jackson. The trial court granted Chamblee and Jackson's summary-judgment motion on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear Pinkerton's independent action brought under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. We hold that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Chamblee and Jackson, because it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Rule 60(b) motion. We further state that Pinkerton has exhausted its remedies under Rule 60(b); therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2000, Chamblee and Jackson, at one time employees of Pinkerton, separately sued Pinkerton in the Jefferson Circuit Court, arguing, among other things, that during the hiring process, Pinkerton had fraudulently misrepresented to them the medical-insurance coverage available to Pinkerton employees. The cases were consolidated and tried before a jury. In July 2003, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Chamblee and Jackson and the trial court entered judgments on the jury's verdict. On July 28, 2003, Pinkerton moved for a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P.

On September 11, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on Pinkerton's Rule 50 motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court told the parties that they had two weeks to try to settle the matter, after which the judge would call one party and ask for a draft of a proposed order. On September 24, 2003, the trial judge contacted Pinkerton, informed it that he had decided to enter a judgment as a matter of law for Pinkerton, and asked Pinkerton to prepare a proposed order. The next day, on September 25, 2003, Pinkerton provided the proposed order to the trial court. The trial court did not contact Chamblee or Jackson to inform them of the decision, nor did the judge enter the decision into his bench notes or on the case-action-summary sheets.

In November 2003, the trial court entered an order granting Pinkerton's motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Chamblee and Jackson wrote the trial court, arguing that it was without jurisdiction to grant Pinkerton's motion because the motion had been denied as a matter of law under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., 90 days after Pinkerton had filed the motion.² When the trial court did not respond, Chamblee and Jackson petitioned for a writ of mandamus, asking this Court to direct the trial court to rescind its November order.

In January 2004, Pinkerton moved to amend the record under Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to show that on September 24, 2003, the court had contacted Pinkerton to tell it that the court was granting Pinkerton's motion and to ask it to draft a proposed order. Pinkerton also asked the trial court to amend the record to show that Pinkerton provided the trial court with the requested order the next day. Chamblee and Jackson filed written objections. The trial court held a hearing on the matter and entered an order amending the record as requested.³

We consolidated Chamblee's and Jackson's petitions, and in Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So.2d 244 (Ala.2004), we granted Chamblee's and Jackson's consolidated petitions for a writ of mandamus, declaring the November 2003 order void because Pinkerton's Rule 50 motion had been denied as a matter of law on October 26, 2003, 90 days after the motion was filed. Thus, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the November 2003 order. 899 So.2d at 249. We further ordered the trial court to vacate its order altering the record and to remove any changes that might have been made to the record pursuant to that order. 899 So.2d at 249.

In December 2004, after this Court's decision in Chamblee, Pinkerton filed its first Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief from the July 2003 judgments, arguing that the judgments were based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and at the hearing Pinkerton also argued that relief might be proper either under Rule 60(b)(1) or under Rule 60(b)(6).⁴ The trial court denied Pinkerton's Rule 60(b) motion on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain it. The trial court based its decision on our statement in Chamblee that the trial court's jurisdiction over the cases had expired 90 days after Pinkerton had filed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law. 899 So.2d at 247.

In January 2005, Pinkerton filed a second Rule 60(b) motion, again seeking relief from the July 2003 judgments, but this time citing only Rule 60(b)(6) and addressing the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 60(b) motion. The trial court denied this second Rule 60(b) motion, again citing lack of jurisdiction. Pinkerton appealed the denial of its second motion. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal, stating that Pinkerton's second motion was a successive Rule 60(b) motion based on the same grounds as the first and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider it. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigations Servs., Inc. v. Chamblee, Civil Appeals found that because the trial court lacked jurisdiction the trial court's denial of the motion was a void judgment, which cannot support an appeal. Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded, it also lacked jurisdiction to consider the trial court's ruling on the motion. 934 So.2d 386, 391 (Ala.Civ.App.2005).

In February 2005, Pinkerton filed a third Rule 60(b) motion, this time as an independent action before a different trial judge ("the second action"). Pinkerton again sought relief from the July 2003 judgments. Chamblee and Jackson moved to dismiss and later amended the motion to call it a "motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment," arguing lack of jurisdiction, res judicata, failure to state a claim, collateral estoppel, and waiver. The trial court in the second action entered a summary judgment against Pinkerton and in favor of Chamblee and Jackson, stating that the second action, like Pinkerton's second Rule 60(b) motion before the first trial court was an impermissible successive Rule 60(b) motion and, therefore, that the trial court in the second action, like the trial court in the first action, did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion. Because it seeks equitable relief and the amount involved is more than $50,000, Pinkerton now appeals the summary judgment directly to this Court.

Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment and all questions of law de novo. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So.2d 342 (Ala.2006).

Analysis

Pinkerton's appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Chamblee and Jackson on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it raises two issues for this Court. First, whether the trial court in fact lacked jurisdiction over Pinkerton's second action brought under Rule 60(b). Second, if the trial court indeed lacked jurisdiction, whether the summary judgment was proper on that ground. We answer the first question in the affirmative and hold that the trial court in the second action lacked jurisdiction over Pinkerton's Rule 60(b) motion. We answer the second question in the negative and hold that a trial court cannot properly enter a summary judgment, even one entered on the basis of lack of jurisdiction, when it lacks jurisdiction over the action.

Jurisdiction

The trial court stated that it lacked jurisdiction over the second action because it was an impermissible successive motion under Rule 60(b). We agree.

Rule 60(b) was adopted to allow a trial court to give equitable relief from a final judgment "even after the normal procedures of motion for new trial and appeal are no longer available." Rule 60, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption. There are six reasons a trial court grants relief under Rule 60(b):

"(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence ...; (3) fraud ..., misrepresentations, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged or a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.

In Giles v. Giles, 404 So.2d 649, 651 (Ala.1981), we held that the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to give "some flexibility, particularly in an effort to do what is right and just." "[T]rial courts usually have wide discretion in determining whether to grant Rule 60(b) motions, but that discretion is not unbridled." 404 So.2d at 651. The trial courts "must balance the desire to remedy injustice against the need for finality of judgments." Rule 60, Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption.

Keeping this balance between equity and finality in mind, Alabama courts have clearly and consistently held that post-judgment motions are not to be used as a substitute for appeal. Transcall American, Inc. v. Comtel-Birmingham, Inc., 571 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Ala.1990); Ex parte Dowling, 477 So.2d 400, 404 (Ala. 1985); Pinkerton I, supra; Ex parte Tampling Tile Co., 551 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Ala. Civ.App.1989). Successive Rule 60(b) motions brought on the same grounds are impermissible because they are "generally considered motions to reconsider the original ruling and are...