Pinkerton v. Le Beau
| Decision Date | 25 January 1893 |
| Citation | 54 N.W. 97,3 S.D. 440 |
| Parties | PINKERTON v. LE BEAU et al. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The mechanic's lien law of this state should be liberally construed in favor of the mechanic and material man. The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof should be strictly construed, has no application to the Code of this state, the rule having been abrogated by statute.
2. As a general rule a person in possession of land under a contract to purchase the same cannot, to the prejudice of the legal owner, subject either the land, or buildings erected by him thereon, to a mechanic's lien; but by the mechanic's lien law of this state the general rule has been changed as to the buildings erected on the land, but not as to the land itself.
3. A stipulation in a contract for the sale of land, that it was understood between the parties that the vendee should erect a building upon the land, does not, of itself, constitute the vendee the agent of the vendor, within the meaning of the mechanic's lien law, nor authorize the vendee to subject the land of the vendor to a lien for material furnished for a building contracted for by such vendee.
4. A party in possession of land under a contract to purchase the same has authority to contract for the erection of buildings or improvements thereon, and to subject such buildings or improvements to the lien of the party furnishing material therefor or performing labor thereon, which buildings or improvements may be sold separately from the land, and removed therefrom by the purchaser, although the vendee may subsequently abandon said premises, and forfeit all his rights under the contract to purchase.
Appeal from circuit court, Pennington county; John W. Nowlin, Judge.
Action by Wallace W. Pinkerton against Kelly Le Beau and James Haft to foreclose a lien for materials furnished under the mechanic's lien law. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against both defendants, and defendant Haft appeals. Reversed.
Charles W. Brown and Wm. Gardner, for appellants. A. E. Wallace, for respondent.
This was an action to foreclose a lien for material furnished under the mechanic's lien law of this state. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants and the defendant Haft appeals. The complaint is in the usual form. The defendant Haft answered, denying all the allegations of the complaint except the transfer of the claim to the plaintiff, and set up affirmatively that he was the owner of the premises upon which the lien was sought to be foreclosed. The case was tried by a referee, who found the facts and stated his conclusions of law thereon. The facts found, material to the determination of this appeal, are as follows: That on March 8, 1887, the defendant James Haft was the owner of the land on which the lien was claimed; that on or about said date (March 8, 1887) the defendant James Haft entered into a contract with the defendant Kelly Le Beau whereby it was agreed that said Haft should sell to said Le Beau said property for the sum of $1,300, payable $650 on March 15, 1888, and $650 on March 15, 1889, with interest at 12 per cent. thereon, payable semiannually; that it was further understood between said Haft and Le Beau that the latter should put a building, to wit, an opera house, upon said land. The referee further finds that in pursuance of said understanding or parol agreement the defendant Kelly Le Beau went into possession of the property above described and began the erection of an opera house thereon, and caused a large amount of work to be done thereon; that the foundation of said building was laid, and the frame put up and rough siding and roof were put on; that then said Le Beau abandoned the work and did nothing more; that said defendant Kelly Le Beau never made any payment to said Haft, but dropped the work and left the state; that said lumber so furnished was used by said Le Beau in the construction of said opera house; that there was never any contract between plaintiff and the defendant James Haft for any lumber or materials for said building, and said Haft never agreed to pay for the same. From the findings of fact the referee concluded, as matter of law, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a lien, and that the defendant Haft was entitled to a judgment for costs. On filing the referee's report with his findings of fact and conclusions of law, the defendant Haft moved the court for judgment, which motion the court denied. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to review the report of the referee, modify and change the conclusions of law of said referee, and to enter judgment for plaintiff. This motion was granted, and the court thereupon substituted its conclusions of law for those of the referee, which are as follows: Judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against both defendants, decreeing a sale of the premises to satisfy plaintiff's lien, in the usual form.
Numerous errors are assigned and set out at length in the abstract, but the learned counsel for the defendant Haft have condensed them in their brief into three propositions, only two of which will be considered, as the second was abandoned on the argument.
The objection that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is not made to the complaint proper, but to the account filed, a copy of which is annexed to the complaint as an exhibit, and made a part thereof. The counsel for appellant contend that it appears from the account filed that the firm of W. W. Pinkerton & Co. were the parties entitled to the lien, and not the plaintiff individually, by whom the lien was filed, and that it is not stated therein that the claim was assigned by said firm to the plaintiff. This objection assumes that the lien was filed by the plaintiff. It is, however, alleged in the complaint that the account was filed by W. W. Pinkerton & Co., that the contract for the material was made by that firm, and that the material was furnished by that firm. Substantially the same facts are stated in the account filed, as appears from the copy annexed to the complaint as an exhibit. The concluding statement, therefore, in the account filed, that "the affiant claims a lien on said premises," should, we think, be construed with reference to the other statements in the account, and understood as claiming a lien for the firm of which affiant was a member. The plaintiff has stated no facts in the account filed which would entitle him to a lien individually, nor has he stated such facts in his complaint; and hence the statement that he claimed the lien should either be disregarded, or held to be a lien for the firm.
Other objections are made to the exhibit, but, as they go mainly to the form of certain statements therein, as not being sufficiently specific, they are, in our opinion, without merit. The mechanic's lien law does not prescribe any particular form in which the account to be filed shall be made out, but simply provides that "a just and true account of the demand due, *** after allowing all credits and containing a correct description of the property to be charged with said lien, and verified by affidavit," shall be filed. Section 5476, Comp. Laws. When, therefore, an account filed states substantially the facts required to be stated by the statute, and is duly verified, we think it should be held sufficient. The mechanic's lien law was designed for the protection of a meritorious class of persons, whose material or labor has contributed to create and bring into existence the buildings or improvements upon which the lien is claimed, or has enhanced the value of...
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