Pinkney v. Mobis Ala., LLC
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-CV-244-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | BARRON K. PINKNEY, Plaintiff, v. MOBIS ALABAMA, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Before the court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 28), the brief filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the supporting and opposing evidentiary materials (Docs. # 29, 30, 42). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the appropriate law, and the evidence, the court finds that Defendant's motion is due to be granted.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), and 38 U.S.C. § 4212 (Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se. On April 4, 2011, Plaintiff Barron K. Pinkney ("Pinkney" or "Plaintiff") filed the instant action under the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974 ("VEVRAA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") challenging the termination of his employment with MOBIS Alabama, LLC ("MOBIS"). (Doc. # 1.) Pinkney is a black male, who served in the United States Air Force in Germany and the United States during the Vietnam War era.1(Doc. # 30 at 5.) In October 2007, Aerotek, a staffing agency, assigned Pinkney to work for MOBIS Alabama Instrument Panel, LLC ("MAIP"), which is an affiliate of MOBIS located on its campus. (Doc. # 30 at 6.) In January 2008, Pinkney applied for a permanent position with MOBIS,2 and on his application, he indicated that he was willing to work on the first, second, or third shift. Id. On February 6, 2008, MOBIS offered permanent employment to Pinkney as a Maintenance Technician on the second shift (6:30 p.m. to 6:00 a.m). Id. Pinkney's supervisors included GaryHoward ("Howard"), who is white, Wade Whetstone ("Whetstone"), who is black, and Johnny Pringle ("Pringle"), who is black. Id.
In June 2008, Pinkney complained about racial discrimination in the workplace. (Doc. # 30 at 7.) Pinkney alleged that Team Leader Mike Tesino ("Tesino") and Process Technician Gary Procee ("Procee") unfairly criticized his work and tried to convince MOBIS to terminate Pinkney's employment. Id. Pinkney contended that black employees, particularly Whetstone, referred to each other as "n----r," that Tesino referred to Whetstone as "Buck Wheat," that white employees received preferential task assignments (technical instead of cleaning), and that MOBIS gave new tools and access to manuals to white employees, but did not give black employees the same tools or access. (Doc. # 29-2 at 30.) Pinkney did not allege that any white employee used the word "n----r," nor did he allege that any employee ever directed the denigrating word toward him. (Doc. # 29-2 at 27, 32, 34.) MOBIS conducted an investigation of the complaints but was unable to substantiate any of the claims. (Doc. # 29-1 at 82-108; Doc. # 30 at 7.) After MOBIS investigated his complaints, Pinkney did not hear the aforementioned individuals use the racially charged language again. (Doc. # 29-2 at 33.)
On or about July 31, 2009, Pinkney sought medical treatment for a shoulder injury. (Doc. # 30 at 8.) Pinkney's doctor instructed him to take a couple of days offwork, and Pinkney put in a request with Howard to take vacation time on August 3-4, 2009. Id. Howard approved Pinkney's request. Id. On August 5-6, 2009, Pinkney also was absent from work; however, he did not request permission to take those days off. He felt it was unnecessary due to the prior-approved request for vacation time based on the same injury. Id.; (Doc. # 29-1 at 73.) In the very early morning of August 19, 2009, Pringle, the Second Shift Production Manager, gave Pinkney a Team Member Attendance Notification ("Notification") related to his absences on August 5 and August 6. Id. MOBIS has a "No Fault Attendance Policy." (Doc. # 30 at 7; Doc. # 29-1 at 29-32.) To ensure that each employee receives notice of his attendance record, MOBIS requires its employees to sign a Team Member Attendance Notification. Id. Signing the Notification is solely an acknowledgment of receipt, and it provides space to provide a written dispute of the contents. Human Resources ("HR") will subsequently investigate the dispute and make any necessary corrections as warranted. Id. Refusal to sign the Notification results in immediate termination.3 (Doc. # 30 at 9; Doc. # 29-1 at 29-32.)
Pringle asked the Team Relations Specialist, Lamar Miller ("Miller"),4 to sit in on the meeting with Pinkney; both Pringle and Miller are black. (Doc. # 30 at 8.) Pringle read the Notification to Pinkney, and instructed Pinkney to sign the Notification to verify receipt. Id. Pinkney did not agree with its issuance and refused to sign the Notification. Id. Pringle emphasized that signing is not an admission of guilt, but rather a verification that Pinkney received the Notification, and that he could provide a statement contesting its contents, which HR would review in the morning. (Doc. # 29-1 at 73.) Pinkney again asserted that it had been issued in error and refused to sign. (Doc. # 30 at 8.) Pringle sent Pinkney back to work and called the Assistant Manager of Team Relations, Curt Bennett ("Bennett"), at his home. (Doc. # 30 at 9.)
Bennett instructed Pringle to call Pinkney back into his office and give him another opportunity to sign the Notification. Id. Pinkney again expressed that he did not believe he should be issued the Notification, and refused to sign. Id. As instructed by Bennett, Miller told Pinkney to turn over his access badge to Kevin McCaskill ("McCaskill"), and both Miller and McCaskill escorted Pinkney out of the building. (Doc. # 30 at 10.) In the afternoon of August 19, 2009, Bennett calledPinkney at his home and informed him that the Personnel Department had terminated his employment. Id.
On December 7, 2009, Pinkney filed a Charge of Discrimination ("EEOC Charge") with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Doc. # 29-7 at 2; Doc. # 30 at 10.) Pinkney alleged that MOBIS administered its attendance policy in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. Pinkney complained of other employees' use of "Buck Wheat" and "n----r," which were the subject of his June 2008 internal complaint, as well as Tesino's statement that "America is not ready for a Black President." Id. Pinkney also stated that overtime opportunities and the assigning of cleaning duties as opposed to technical duties were given in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. Finally, Pinkney alleged that Howard would "reluctantly allow Black employees to defend themselves against any accusations." (Doc. # 29-7 at 2; Doc. # 30 at 10-11.)
On January 5, 2011, the EEOC issued the following determination:
Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by the charge.
(Doc. # 1-1.) The EEOC notified Pinkney that he had ninety days from the receipt of the notice to file a lawsuit, if he chose to do so. Id. On April 4, 2011, Pinkney filedhis complaint, alleging that MOBIS violated the VEVRAA and Title VII. (Doc. # 1 at 1.) Pinkney alleges that the discrimination was as follows:
(Doc. # 1 at 2.) Pinkney requests recovery of back pay and reinstatement to his former position with MOBIS, as well as any other appropriate relief. (Doc. # 1 at 3.)
All litigants, pro se or not, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, the court does not have "license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Giles v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., 359 F. App'x 91, 93 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted) ("Although pro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally,this liberal construction does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.").
A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-( b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2011). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Ritchey v. S. Nuclear...
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