Pinkston v. City of Chicago
| Docket Number | 1-20-0957 |
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Citation | 2022 IL App (1st) 200957,203 N.E.3d 942,461 Ill.Dec. 340 |
| Parties | Alec PINKSTON, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomas A. Zimmerman Jr. and Matthew C. De Re, of Zimmerman Law Offices, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Celia Meza, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Myriam Zreczny Kasper and Justin A. Houppert, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff Alec Pinkston filed a class action complaint alleging that the City of Chicago (City) has an ongoing practice of improperly issuing central business district metered parking tickets. Mr. Pinkston alleged that the City routinely issues these tickets, for which there is a higher penalty than ordinary metered parking tickets, outside of the boundaries of the central business district established by the Chicago Municipal Code (Municipal Code). On behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, Mr. Pinkston sought a declaration that the tickets were void, an injunction to halt the practice, and the disgorgement of parking fees and the interest charged on those fees as a remedy for the City's unjust enrichment. The City successfully moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018) ) on the grounds that Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the City's Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) before initiating this action in the circuit court.
¶ 2 On appeal, Mr. Pinkston maintains that several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply and should have prevented dismissal of his claims. He argues that (1) the ticket he received was void, both because the City lacked statutory authority to issue it and because it was invalid on its face; (2) it would have been futile to challenge his ticket with DOAH; (3) resolution of his claims required no fact finding or agency expertise; (4) availing himself of the administrative process would have resulted in irreparable injury; and (5) DOAH could not have provided him the "ultimate relief" he sought.
¶ 3 Although we agree with the City that the first four of these exceptions do not apply, we are persuaded that the last one does. We accept, for purposes of this motion to dismiss, Mr. Pinkston's argument that DOAH, which is tasked by the Municipal Code with establishing liability or nonliability for individual parking violations, cannot provide him with the core relief he seeks—injunctive and monetary relief to prospectively and retroactively redress the deleterious effects of the City's purportedly widespread practice of issuing erroneous central business district tickets. We reverse the circuit court's dismissal of Mr. Pinkston's complaint and remand for further proceedings on his claims.
¶ 5 The City regulates metered parking spaces within its boundaries. A failure to comply with parking meter regulations outside the central business district results in a $50 fine. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(a) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended Apr. 21, 2021). Within the central business district, the same violation resulted—at the time Mr. Pinkston's ticket was issued—in a $65 fine. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(b) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended at Chi. City Clerk J. Proc. 38042 (Nov. 16, 2016)). That penalty has since been raised to $70, with no corresponding increase for violations outside of the district. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended Apr. 21, 2021).
and includes parking spaces on both sides of the above-mentioned streets. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-4-010 (amended July 21, 2021).
¶ 7 In his class action complaint, Mr. Pinkston alleged that on May 21, 2019, he parked his vehicle in a parking meter zone located at or near 1216 South Wabash Avenue in Chicago. Mr. Pinkston returned to his vehicle to find that he had received a ticket, purporting to be pursuant to section 9-64-190(b) of the Municipal Code, for having an expired parking meter within the central business district. The ticket stated that Mr. Pinkston's vehicle was parked at 1202 South Wabash Avenue. Both 1216 South Wabash Avenue and 1202 South Wabash Avenue are located south of Roosevelt Road and thus outside the southernmost boundary of the central business district. Mr. Pinkston alleged that he paid the $65 fine associated with his ticket "under duress."
¶ 8 Citing a May 14, 2019, news article analyzing data concerning parking tickets issued by the City, Mr. Pinkston alleged that over a five-year period the City had issued more than 30,000 central business district tickets for vehicles, like his, that were parked outside of the central business district. Mr. Pinkston alleged that the City was thus engaged in a "routine practice" of erroneously issuing such tickets.
¶ 9 On behalf of himself and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals, Mr. Pinkston asserted three counts against the City, seeking (1) a declaration that the improperly issued tickets were facially invalid, void, and unenforceable; (2) an injunction to prevent the City from continuing to issue central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the district; and (3) as a remedy for unjust enrichment, the repayment of fines, penalties, and interest the City had unjustly received and retained at the expense of class members.
¶ 10 The City moved to dismiss Mr. Pinkston's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Civil Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018) ), arguing that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. According to the City, the parking ticket issued to Mr. Pinkston was subject to administrative review by DOAH and, under the Administrative Review Law (id. § 3-101 et seq. ), he was required to seek a finding of no liability by first challenging the ticket with DOAH and then filing a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court if DOAH rejected his challenge. Because Mr. Pinkston filed his complaint outside of this administrative review process, the City maintained that his claims were barred by the administrative exhaustion of remedies doctrine. The City argued in the alternative that Mr. Pinkston's claims were barred by the voluntary payment doctrine, as he had also elected to pay his ticket before contesting it.
¶ 11 In response to the City's motion, Mr. Pinkston argued that "many exceptions" to the exhaustion doctrine applied. He maintained that he had no obligation to pursue administrative remedies, for example, before challenging a facially invalid and therefore void ticket that the City was not statutorily authorized to issue. Mr. Pinkston further argued that administrative proceedings could not have provided him with adequate relief because only a court can issue an injunction against the City's continued issuance of erroneous central business district metered parking tickets. Mr. Pinkston also insisted that administrative proceedings would have been futile because the City's failure to withdraw his erroneous ticket of its own accord indicated that any challenge made to the ticket "would certainly be denied by [a DOAH] hearing officer." Finally, Mr. Pinkston argued that no factfinding was required because the location of his vehicle relative to the boundaries of the central business district was not disputed and there was thus "no need for the expertise of the City's DOAH in this matter." Mr. Pinkston maintained, consistent with his allegations, that he had not voluntarily paid the $65 penalty associated with his ticket but had been compelled to do so to avoid late fees, immobilization of his vehicle, suspension of his driver's license, and other potential consequences.
¶ 12 The circuit court granted the City's motion in its entirety and dismissed Mr. Pinkston's claims with prejudice, concluding that Mr. Pinkston had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that none of the enumerated exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court rejected Mr. Pinkston's argument that the City lacked authority or jurisdiction to issue the ticket he received and that the ticket was thus void ab initio. The court explained that although the ticket may have been "issued for a violation that could not factually be proven," it was not void because the City was authorized to issue tickets for parking violations. The court noted that Mr. Pinkston had failed to plead any facts showing it would have been futile to contest his ticket with DOAH. And the court rejected "the notion that all parties who receive parking tickets in the city of Chicago can avoid administrative review because no agency expertise is involved." Accepting that proposition, in the court's view, "would eviscerate the concept of administrative hearings and administrative review for truly trivial matters and bombard the Court with litigation over parking and other related fines."
¶ 13 Finding that "a factual question remained as to whether [Mr. Pinkston's] payment of the parking ticket was truly voluntary," the court did not base its dismissal on application of the voluntary payment doctrine.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
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