Pinson v. Samuels

• Decision Date: 05 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 10–5059.,10–5059.
• Citation: 761 F.3d 1
• Parties: Jeremy PINSON, et al., Appellants v. Charles E. SAMUELS, Jr., et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

761 F.3d 1

Jeremy PINSON, et al., Appellants

v.Charles E. SAMUELS, Jr., et al., Appellees.

No. 10–5059.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 14, 2013.

Decided Aug. 5, 2014.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus (No. 1:10–cv–00092).

Dawn E. Murphy–Johnson, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae for appellants. With her on the briefs was Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court.

Wynne P. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge:

Jeremy Pinson is a federal prisoner serving a twenty-year sentence for threatening the President, knowingly and willfullymaking a false statement to a United States Marshal, and mailing threatening communications. Pinson has made frequent use of the federal courts during his time in prison, having filed more than 100 civil actions and appeals across the nation. In this case, filed in the District of Columbia, Pinson challenges the conditions of his confinement at the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, Alabama. The district court determined that venue in the District of Columbia was improper and ordered the action transferred to the Northern District of Alabama. Pinson then filed a mandamus petition in this court seeking to vacate the district court's transfer order, and also to compel the district court clerk to accept certain rejected filings. Four fellow prisoners join his petition, and all of them seek to proceed in forma pauperis in this court. Pinson and one other petitioner also moved to stay collection of the filing fees, arguing that the federal in forma pauperis statute entitles them to defer the payment of fees in this case until they complete their payment of fees owed in other cases.

Because Pinson has run afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes provision and has failed to demonstrate that he qualifies for the imminent danger exception, we deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. We also hold that the remaining petitioners lack standing to challenge either the transfer order or the clerk's rejection of the filings. Finally, we deny the motion to stay the collection of filing fees pending the payment of fees in other cases.

I.

In December 2009, Pinson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, naming several Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials as defendants. At the time, he was incarcerated in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega. SMUs house gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates who present unique security concerns. See BOP Program Statement 5217.01 (Nov. 19, 2008). Pinson's complaint alleged that SMUs are “unconstitutionally violent and dangerous” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. App. 9. He claimed that his designation to an SMU placed him “in imminent danger” because BOP officials failed to identify him as a former associate of a gang and to separate him from members of rival gangs. App. 8–9. He further alleged that the defendants knew that he was a homosexual who thus would “face[ ] a substantial risk of harm” if designated to an SMU.App. 8. Pinson moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

In January 2010, the district court issued an order transferring Pinson's case to the Northern District of Alabama. The court determined that venue did not properly lie in the District of Columbia “[b]ecause none of the alleged events forming the basis of the complaint occurred in the District.” Transfer Order, ECF No. 3, App. 21. The court stated that Pinson's IFP application would be decided by the transferee court. Id.

In March 2010, after unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration of the transfer order, Pinson filed a notice of appeal. This court construed the notice as a petition for a writ of mandamus, and ordered Pinson to pay the $450 docketing fee or to file a motion to proceed IFP. Pinson moved to proceed IFP, as well as to stay any collection of filing fees until he completed payment of filing fees owed in other cases he had brought.

Pinson, joined by several fellow SMU inmates, then submitted a “Motion for Joinder of Appellees and for Appointment of Counsel.” According to that motion, the other inmates had attempted to join Pinson's lawsuit by filing a “Motion for Joinder” in the district court. The prisoners claimed to have submitted the Motion for Joinder twice, once prior to the transfer of the case and once as an accompaniment to Pinson's motion for reconsideration of the transfer order. The prisoners argued that the district court clerk exceeded his authority by allegedly returning the motion unfiled on both occasions. They also submitted an amended notice of appeal clarifying their intention to challenge both the transfer order and the clerk's rejection of the Motion for Joinder. This court construed the amended notice of appeal to be a supplement to the mandamus petition.

Over the next several years, the parties engaged in an extended back-and-forth concerning Pinson's eligibility for IFP status and his motion to stay the collection of filing fees. A motions panel of this court dismissed all the prisoners attempting to join the case (for failure to prosecute) except Andrew Hobbs and Jeremy Brown, both of whom were granted IFP status. The panel also appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments in favor of the petitioners. Another motions panel later reinstated two of the previously dismissed prisoners, Antoine Bruce and John Leigh, as petitioners, and ordered them to file completed motions for leave to proceed IFP. Bruce also joined Pinson's motion to stay the collection of filing fees.

II.

We first consider Pinson's request to proceed IFP before this Court, which we deny. The federal IFP statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, generally authorizes courts to waive ordinary filing fees for an indigent litigant seeking to bring a lawsuit. See28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In 1996, prompted by widespread concerns that inmates had been flooding the courts with meritless claims, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See Chandler v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 1356 (D.C.Cir.1998). The PLRA substantially amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 with regard to prisoner-litigants. Unlike other litigants, prisoners accorded IFP status can no longer avoid payment of filing fees altogether. They instead are permitted to pay in monthly installments rather than in one, up-front payment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

Additionally, prisoners who have incurred three or more “strikes” face a potential bar against proceeding IFP:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [authorizing IFP proceedings] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C § 1915(g). Because it is undisputed that Pinson has accumulated at least three strikes, the statute prohibits him from proceeding IFP unless he falls within the imminent danger exception.

In assessing imminent danger, we examine the conditions faced by Pinson at the time he initiated his action. Both sides urge us to broaden the inquiry to encompass later developments. Amicus points to the August 2010 murder of another SMU inmate (who was an attempted co-petitioner), as well as an alleged January 2011 incident in which Pinson was nearly stabbed. The government, for its part, contends that Pinson's relocation to an AdministrativeMaximum facility in Florence, Colorado, renders moot his claim of imminent danger concerning his confinement in the Talladega SMU. We reject the invitation to take into account those subsequent events.

Our decision in Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C.Cir.2009), precludes consideration of post-complaint developments when assessing the applicability of the imminent danger exception. We explained there that “we assess the alleged danger at the time [the prisoner] filed his complaint and thus look only to the documents attesting to the facts at that time, namely his complaint and the accompanying motion for IFP status.” Id. at 420. That approach squares with the statute's temporal reference point: the initial act of “bring[ing]” a lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052–53 (9th Cir.2007). Section 1915(g) directs attention to whether the prisoner “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury” when he “bring[s]” his action, not to whether he later in fact suffers (or does not suffer) a serious physical injury.

The provision's status as a mere “screening device” reinforces that understanding. Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1050, 1055. Otherwise, the inquiry into imminent dangerousness could require examining myriad post-filing developments and adjustments of confinement conditions that may transpire during the course of a lawsuit (and that often attend an inmate's imprisonment). Restricting the inquiry to the allegations in a prisoner's complaint better coheres with § 1915(g)'s “limited office.” Id. at 1055.

Turning, then, to the allegations in Pinson's complaint (and his accompanying motion for IFP status), his claim of imminent danger closely resembles one we rejected in Mitchell. Mitchell's complaint alleged that “even though BOP knew he had testified for the government, it illegally transferred him to USP Florence, a prison known for murders and assaults on ......