Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

• Decision Date: 08 January 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12-1872 (RC)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Jeremy PINSON, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

514 F.Supp.3d 232

Jeremy PINSON, Plaintiff,

v.U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-1872 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed January 8, 2021

Elizabeth J. Bower, Catherine Fata, Stephanie Miner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Christopher Charles Hair, U.S. Attorney'S Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS , MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION , AND RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jeremy ("Grace") Pinson¹ initiated this lawsuit against the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), BOP officials, and other government defendants ("Defendants") over eight years ago. The case involves disputes along two fronts: a series of FOIA requests Pinson filed from prison and Pinson's claims that BOP officials retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights. Today, the Court addresses Pinson's remaining constitutional claims. It first holds that there is no implied cause of action enabling a prisoner to sue federal prison officials in their individual capacities for First Amendment retaliation. The Court then dismisses as moot Pinson's official-capacity claim alleging that BOP officials retaliatorily transferred her to a supermax prison. Finally, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Pinson's official-capacity claim alleging that BOP officials retaliatorily refused to investigate her administrative complaints.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

In an earlier decision, the Court dismissed some of Pinson's constitutional claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and required her to submit a more definite statement for the remaining claims. See Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Pinson I) , No. 12-cv-1872, 2016 WL 29245, at *23–27 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2016). After receiving Pinson's statement, Pl.’s More Definite Statement Bivens Claims ("Pl.’s Statement"), ECF No. 279, the Court considered those claims in another opinion, see Pinson v. U.S. Dep't of Justice (Pinson II) , 246 F. Supp. 3d 211 (D.D.C. 2017).

In the latter opinion, the Court recognized that Pinson had sued two BOP officials—Charles Samuels and John Dignam—in both their individual and official capacities. Id. at 214 ; see also Corrected Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") at 2, ECF No. 32. It also noted that Pinson sought money damages as well as an injunction prohibiting Samuels and Dignam from taking "further acts of retaliation." Pinson II , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (quoting SAC at 16). Because Defendants had not addressed Pinson's official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, the Court limited its analysis to the individual-capacity claims requesting money damages. Id. at 217 n.6.

The Court framed Pinson's suit as consisting of three First Amendment retaliation claims alleging: (1) "that Dignam and Samuels refused to investigate Pinson's administrative complaints in retaliation for her First Amendment activities;" (2) "that Samuels transferred Pinson to ADX Florence in retaliation for her First Amendment activities;" and (3) "miscellaneous retaliation for her First Amendment activities directed by Samuels." Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). Reasoning from then-controlling D.C. Circuit precedent, the Court held that Pinson could bring her retaliation claims as a Bivens action—in other words, under a cause of action implied in the First Amendment. Id. at 218–21. It went on to deny Defendants summary judgment on the first two claims and grant Defendants summary judgment on the third claim. Id. at 227–31. The parties have since completed discovery.

Based in part on recent Supreme Court precedent, Defendants have submitted a motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and renewed motion for summary judgment on Pinson's two remaining First Amendment retaliation claims. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Mot. Recons., and Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ("Defs.’ Mot."), ECF No. 477-1. That motion is ready for resolution. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Opp'n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, Mot. Recons., & Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.’s Opp'n"), ECF No. 485; Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Mot. Recons., & Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ("Defs.’ Reply"), ECF No. 487.

B. Factual Background

The Court now briefly summarizes the facts behind Pinson's two surviving constitutional claims under the assumption that the reader is familiar with its previous opinions on the subject. See Pinson I , 2016 WL 29245, at *8–9 ; Pinson II , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 215–16.

Pinson has been incarcerated for over a decade. See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Dispute ¶¶ 1–3. ("Pl.’s Resp. SOMF"), ECF No. 485-1. In that time, she has filed over one thousand administrative grievances, id. ¶ 122, she has regularly contacted and written for various news outlets, see, e.g. , Pl.’s Statement ¶ 8, and she has filed or helped other inmates file numerous lawsuits, e.g. , SAC at 14. She says that these First Amendment–protected activities earned her the ire of Samuels, formerly the BOP's Director, and Dignam, who used to be Chief of the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs ("OIA"). Neither official still works with the BOP. See Pl.’s Resp. SOMF ¶¶ 6, 10; Pl.’s Opp'n at 27.

In one claim, Pinson alleges that Samuels transferred her to ADX Florence (the BOP's most secure facility) in retaliation for her complaints, press contacts, and lawsuits against the BOP. She testified that, before Samuels was BOP Director, he instructed an employee to warn her to stop her First Amendment activities. Pl.’s Opp'n, Ex. 6 ("Pl.’s Dep."), at 79:20–81:3, ECF No. 485-8. A BOP staff member told her about Samuels's order and explained that Pinson's efforts to draw attention to prison conditions had generated "a lot of agitation" and "were making [her] situation worse." Id. Pinson said several other BOP staff members indicated that Samuels was the only one who could remove her from ADX Florence and that he would only do so if Pinson stopped her First Amendment activities. See id. at 111:2–112:10. The BOP transferred Pinson from ADX Florence in October 2014, and she has not been housed there since. Pl.’s Resp. SOMF ¶¶ 113, 115. Pinson testified that, after her transfer, she spoke with Samuels when he visited a facility she was housed in. Pl.’s Dep. at 103:10–108:7. Samuels did not offer her anything to stop contacting the media or filing lawsuits, Pinson explained, but he was clearly displeased with the negative publicity that her activities generated. Id. at 110:6–22.

Pinson's other claim asserts that Samuels and Dignam "refused to investigate" numerous complaints she filed alleging misconduct by BOP employees unless she ceased her First Amendment activities. See SAC at 14; see also Pl.’s Statement ¶¶ 1–4, 7. She says that an OIA special agent told her that Dignam would not investigate her complaints because she "was a gadfly constantly inundating Dignam's office with complaints, adverse press attention, [and] lawsuits." Pl.’s Dep. at 87:10–12 (quoting Pl.’s Statement ¶ 5). According to Pinson, the agent and a BOP unit manager made clear that Dignam would investigate her complaints if she stopped those activities. See, e.g. , id. 87:12–13, 88:15–19, 90:25–91:22. Pinson testified that two other OIA special agents conveyed the message to her again a few years later. She said one agent told her: "[D]ude, you're hated all the way to the top. No one is going to help you and end up in the New York Times over something that you filed." Id. at 97:1–5 (quoting Pl.’s Statement ¶ 6). When Pinson asked the agents who they meant by "the top," they indicated "they meant Dignam and Samuels." Id. at 97:5-7 (quoting Pl.’s Statement ¶ 6); see also id. at 100:11–16.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendants’ motion is styled as motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and renewed motion for summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. First, they want the Court to reconsider its decision holding that Pinson had an implied cause of action to sue Samuels and Dignam in their individual capacities. Id. at 2; see also Pinson II , 246 F. Supp. 3d at 218–21. When a court order "adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties" and "does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties," it may revise the order "at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The court has discretion to reconsider an interlocutory order "as justice requires." Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. , 241 F.R.D. 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). It may be appropriate to reconsider such an order when the court "has ‘patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controlling or significant change in the law or facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the Court.’ " Singh v. George Washington Univ. , 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Cobell v. Norton , 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) ).

Defendants argue that the Court should dispose of Pinson's individual-capacity claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Defs.’ Mot. at 2, 4–5. A motion under that rule requests "judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Although a party can raise the failure-to-state-a-claim defense under Rule 12(c), id. 12(h)(2)(B), the standard governing such a motion differs from the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, see generally Murphy v. Dep't of Air Force , 326 F.R.D. 47 (D.D.C. 2018). "As with a motion under Rule 12(b), ‘[t]he court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accepts as true all factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations.’ " Young v. Perdue , ...